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Executive Summary 
• The Lisbon targets are not achieved. Many countries had the Lisbon employment targets in 
sight, until the financial crisis blocked their path. The unemployment target has always been 
too ambitious, none of the EU27 countries will achieve 4% in 2010. 
• Short-term fluctuations however do not solve the long-term challenges of a tightening labour 
market, the consequence of an ageing population. Solutions must be found for quantitative as 
well as qualitative mismatches between labour demand and labour supply.  
• In 2050 a ‘potential employment gap’ of around 15% of total labour demand (35 million 
people) develops under a ceteris paribus baseline scenario. A hypothetical ‘no migration’ 
scenario underlines the important role of labour migration in bridging this potential gap.  
• Increasing participation is a necessary but probably insufficient solution, especially in 
countries where employment rates are already above average. Increasing (real) productivity 
rates as well will be inevitable, in order to reduce labour demand. 
• If the quantitative gaps are bridged, a qualitative mismatch of skills might still create frictions. 
If low-skilled do not increase their employability they might not match future skill needs, as 
labour demand will become more skill-intensive. 
• Many international organisations already support long-term participation policies. Not only 
through ‘more jobs’ but also through ‘better jobs’. The changing sectoral structure of the 
Western economies. asks for a transformation of our welfare systems from job security to 
income security. To enhance participation, striking the right balance between employment 
flexibility and income security is essential (the ‘flexicurity’ concept). Promoting ‘decent work’, 
fighting illegal labour and more (specific) education are other important policy elements. 
• Active labour market policies can help to increase participation, but should be evaluated for 
effectiveness and effectivity more often.  
• Evaluations of active labour market policies (ALMP) aimed at increasing female and elderly 
participation are generally more conclusive than evaluations of policies aimed at increasing 
labour force participation of the unemployed. Because of the heterogeneous character of the 
latter, tailor-made approaches tend to be more effective for this group than general training 
programs or general wage subsidies. Regular evaluations of policy programs in terms of 
effectiveness and efficiency would improve their usefulness.   
• Evaluations of policies aimed at increasing female and elderly participation are generally more 
conclusive than evaluations of policies aimed at increasing the labour force participation of 
the unemployed. Because of the heterogeneous character of the latter, general measures are 
often less effective than tailor-made approaches.  
• Modern labour markets institutions incorporate a life-cycle approach, and allow modern 
labour relations to fulfil the demand for different combinations of  family, life and labour 
market work. Empirical literature stresses also the importance of child care availability,  
financial institutions that ‘make participation pay’.  
• Modern labour relations (like part-time work, fixed term contracts, temporary agency work 
and self-employment) are becoming more common. They are a central requisite for high 
labour force participation in a modern economy in which both men and women want to 
combine family life and labour market work. Scandinavian & Anglo-Saxon countries have 
ii 
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many voluntary tempworkers. Apparently some part of the higher participation of these 
countries is connected to their labour markets providing ‘good quality’ temporary jobs.   
• In the last decade part-time work was the most important driver of participation, especially 
for women. Temporary agency work may play an increasing role as intermediate employment 
form and drive labour force participation by mobilising long-term unemployed and inactive 
members of the workforce (‘stepping-stone-function’). 
• An important but in many countries unexploited potential as driver of participation is the 
flexibilisation of the standard employment relationship. Implantation of flexible elements into 
the open-ended full-time contract could be new element to what is normally regarded as 
‘flexicurity’.  
  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii 
SEO ECONOMISCH ONDERZOEK 
The EU Lisbon targets 
The European Union’s 2010 Lisbon employment targets, originally agreed upon in 2000 by the 
then fifteen Member States, are all affected by the current recession in an important way. Just as 
some targets were about to be realized, the economic downturn washed away this possibility. Put 
simply, none of the Lisbon targets will be met in 2010. The average European employment rate 
will remain below 70%, while average employment for women will remain below 60% and for 
elderly below 50%. Unemployment will not only be higher than the target of 4%, it will actually 
be 2-3 times higher.  
 
Looking on a country level, many countries had the Lisbon participation targets in sight, until the 
crisis blocked their path. The unemployment target was only realistic for a few countries (NL, 
Denmark, Austria, Slovenia, Czech Republic) until the summer of 2008. Countries that were 
unlikely to meet Lisbon targets in 2010 before the impact of the crisis are certainly not going to the 
meet targets. But forecasts are such that all countries that were getting close will not be able to 
meet those targets in the short run.  
 
Employment in the EU27 increased only 3 percentage points in the last decade 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ergan,2009); OECD LFS (2009). US/Can/Japan data are from 2008. 
The dark blue arrows show the development during the last ten years of the 20th century (1990-2000). The light 




Europe has shown a steady rise in employment participation since 2000, but has remained below 
the Lisbon target of 70%. In 2008, the average EU-27 employment rate was 66%. Then the 
economic crisis kicked in and trends reversed. Halfway 2009 only five EU countries met the 
overall 70% employment target: the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, and Germany. 
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Most Eastern European countries are below average. In Romania and Hungary participation 
levels have actually decreased since 2000. The figure below shows how the road to Lisbon of the 
EU-27 (regarding the overall employment target) was blocked by the impact of the crisis.  
 
Road to Lisbon employment target blocked by crisis 
 
Source:  Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ergan, 2009); OECD LFS (2009). 
Although the participation rise since 2004 did not really bring the original 70%-target in clear 
sight already, the movement is clearly in the wrong direction since 2008q2. Even if we would 
allow a correction because the new member states faced a lower employment than the EU15 for 
which the target was originally formulated, the crisis impact rendered it out of reach. 
 
 
The female employment target seemed realistic for some time. The figure below however shows 
how the road to Lisbon was blocked by the impact of the crisis. Even though women work in 
sectors where the damage was less than in male-dominated sectors, since the summer of 2008 the 
female employment trend goes in the wrong direction. 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland all have female participation rates more than 10 
percentage points above the target, but they do not compensate for other EU countries that still 
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Women participation’s road to Lisbon blocked by the 2008-2009 economic crisis 
 
Source:  Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ergan, 2009). 
Also the employment target for the elderly (people aged 55-64) seemed realistic before the 
recession. However, in 2009 the average EU employment rate was only 46%, four percentage 
points short. Portugal, the Netherlands, Germany, and the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian 
countries are well above average, but in Eastern, Central and Southern Europe older people are 
less often employed. The positive side of the story is that the long-run trend is still upward, in 
almost every country. 
 
The unemployment target of the Lisbon agenda was even more ambitious than other targets. In 
reality, the road to Lisbon has never been travelled, as the figure below demonstrates.  
Unemployment target has never been in sight 
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Since 2000 it took till the prosperous years of 2006-2007 -after the accession of Eastern 
European countries- before unemployment shortly dipped below 7%. But taking into account the 
crisis in 2009 it is on a unique 9.5% and expected to rise even above 10%.  
Demand and supply in the future labour market 
Although the current labour market is characterised by high unemployment in many countries, in 
the long run a tight labour market will prevail. The post-Second World War babyboom will cause 
a structural ageing of our society, which lowers potential supply of labour, relative to potential 
demand.  
Age distribution of the EU-27 population will shift to the right (between 2008  and 2050) 
 
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat (EUROPOP 2008). 
The above figure shows how in the coming decades the bulk of the population -which is now in 
the middle- will shift to the right during the coming decades. The share of people in the working 
age (15-64) will become smaller, the share of elderly (65 years and over) will rise and the share of 
‘older elderly’ (aged 80+) will more than double.1 As most elderly do not work anymore, ageing 
will bring down the potential labour supply. A lower supply confronted with a constant demand 
leads –all else equal- to what we have called a potential employment gap. It is not literally a ‘gap’, 
because over the course of time the economic system will inherently try to restore equilibrium. 
Some economic parameters (that we assumed constant, for the sake of argument) will have to 
adjust in order to close this potential gap. The concept of potential employment gap hereby 
serves as a quantitative measure of tension, it shows how much the economic parameters have to 
adjust.   
 
In our previous publication Mind the Gap we used the assumption of a constant demand, which is 
a rather strong assumption. In the current report we use a more general assumption. However, 
                                                        
1 The figure shows that in 2050 around 11% of our population will have an age of 80 years or higher. The share 
of people between 15-64 will have fallen from 67.3% to 57.1%. The a calculation is based on Eurostat’s 
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first present the results of the old calculation, using the latest Eurostat population projections. By 
assuming a constant total labour demand of 220 million, the potential labour supply of 194 
million would fall 11.6% short of demand in 2050.  In a no migration scenario the potential 
employment gap will rise to 27.4% of demand. 
Old calculation method applied on latest projections 




Gap in # 
persons (mln)
Gap as % of 
total demand 
Employment rate 
needed to close gap 
Baseline (old) 194 220 25.6 11.6% 74.7% 
No migration  (old) 160 220 60.3 27.4% 90.9% 
 
In the old projections the average EU population size in 2010 was similar to the population size 
in 2005, which allowed the assumption of constant total demand. The new projections show 
more volatility, and in many countries the total demand for labour will be affected by changes in 
the total population (apart from the ageing effect). Therefore we now only assume a constant 
labour demand per capita. This implies that labour demand is allowed to vary proportionally to the 
population size, as long as (real) labour productivity is assumed constant. In fact, labour demand 
per capita will remain constant as long as product demand (GDP/capita) growth in the same 
pace as real labour productivity. Population is expected to change according to the Eurostat 
baseline projection. In this scenario, labour supply is calculated to fall 15% short of labour supply 
in the year 2050 (see table below).2 In absolute numbers that is a potential employment gap of 35 
million people. A purely hypothetical ‘no migration’ scenario underlines the important role of 
labour migration in bridging this potential gap. If no migration would take place from employees 
currently outside the EU the potential gap would be a lot wider, that is 19%.  
 
 
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat (EUROPOP 2008, lfsq_ergan). 
                                                        
2 The potential employment gap is larger than it would be if the old calculation method was used, because total 
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Potential employment gap in the EU27 in 2050, in absolute and relative terms  




Gap in # 
persons (mln) 
Gap as % of 
total demand 
Employment rate 
needed to close gap 
Baseline 194 229 34.5  15.1%  77.7% 
No migration  160 197 37.3  18.9%  81.4% 
 
In order to overcome this ‘potential employment gap’ the main options are: 
• Increase employment participation (beyond the current Lisbon target). 
• Increase labour productivity (in real terms, not just nominal productivity). 
• Decrease local demand of goods & services (i.e. increase imports). 
• Allow labour migration, as long as it facilitates the match of labour demand and supply (it 
then is beneficial for both the employees and the host country). 
 
In the baseline projection the potential employment gap could be bridged with an average EU 
employment rate of 78% in 2050. That is 15 percentage points above the 2009 average, and 8 
percentage points above the Lisbon target. Considering the participation increase in the last 
decade (nearly 3 percentage points) this challenge might be realistic. The optimal solution 
however differs per country, the table below shows that a new employment participation target 
of 80% rate will not be a sufficient solution for every country.  












is that enough 
to ‘close the 
gap’? 
remaining gap  
(%-points) 
Austria 72.3 83.7 80 no 3.7 
Belgium 62.0 69.9 80 yes  
Germany 70.3 82.8 80 no 2.8 
Denmark 78.4 87.3 80 no 7.3 
Spain 65.0 81.7 80 no 1.7 
Finland 72.3 83.7 80 no 3.7 
France 65.2 74.1 80 yes  
Greece 62.2 75.4 80 yes  
Ireland 68.1 79.3 80 yes  
Italy 59.2 70.8 80 yes  
Netherlands 77.2 89.1 80 no 9.1 
Portugal 68.6 81.1 80 no 1.1 
Sweden 74.8 83.3 80 no 3.3 
UK 71.6 78.6 80 yes  
Czech Rep. 66.6 83.9 80 no 3.9 
Estonia 69.8 81.7 80 no 1.7 
Hungary 56.5 67.3 80 yes  
Lithuania 64.6 76.6 80 yes  
Latvia 69.5 83.0 80 no 3.0 
Poland 58.9 73.7 80 yes  
Slovenia 68.3 87.4 80 no 7.4 
Slovakia 61.7 78.2 80 yes  
Bulgaria 63.9 78.5 80 yes  
Romania 59.7 72.8 80 yes  
EU27 66.0 77.7 80 yes  
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat (EUROPOP 2008, lfsq_ergan). 
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In countries where employment rates are already well above average, we see the ‘curse of the 
leaders’: increasing participation from 70% to 80% is much easier than increasing participation 
from 80% to 90%. So, increasing (real) productivity rates as well will be inevitable, in order to 
reduce labour demand. Increasing imports over exports has negative monetary consequences, so 
it is not a sustainable long term strategy.   
If the quantitative gaps are bridged, a qualitative mismatch of skills might still create frictions. 
The lessons that the recent crisis tells us is that important sectoral shifts can be expected. 
Employment in some sectors in the EU will disappear (manufacturing), while ageing will increase 
demand in other sectors (health, leisure). Many employees have to be reallocated to different 
sectors of the economy. If low-skilled do not increase their employability they might not match 
future skill needs, as labour demand will become more skill-intensive, on average. 
This qualitative mismatch can be reduced by a more effective matching of the requested type of 
demand and type of supply. To achieve this there is no ready-made solution, huge differences 
exist between countries and between sectors. In some cases only some extra training is required, 
in some cases more focus on lifelong learning or a more activating welfare system is required. A 
shift in focus from ‘job security’ to ‘employment security’ seems inevitable in the future labour 
market.   
International policies for driving participation 
In Chapter 3 Professor Ton Wilthagen & Sonja Bekker discuss the policies that different 
international organizations pursue. Although all international organisations acknowledge that 
there is no-one-size-fits-all model for all countries, they do present general directions for the 
development of the labour market and the promotion of participation. They emphasize either a 
social rights and human conditions approach (CoE, ILO), a mixture of economic and social goals 
(EU, OECD) or a predominantly economic and financial perspective (IMF). This difference in 
approach also explains why some of the organisations place more emphasis on enhancing labour 
market participation (‘more jobs’) whereas others see the quality of participation in work as a core 
aspect (‘better jobs’). 
The key messages of the policies are presented in the table below. It shows the major concerns of 
each International Organisation on a limited range of policy issues, namely quantitative 
employment targets (for the increase of labour participation), the quality of participation in work, 
and the preconditions for promoting labour market participation, including training of 
employees, social dialogue, tax systems and social security and labour law. 
 
The target groups mentioned throughout this publication (women, elderly and unemployed) are 
often also mentioned in the policies of the respective international organisations. Concerning 
women the policies that drive participation often refer to a better combination of work & care 
(ILO, EU, OECD), demanding more gender equality (ILO, CoE, EU) and providing accessible 
and affordable child care facilities. Regarding the unemployed, active labour market policies are 
often recommended in order to bring people back to work (EU, OECD, CoE). For the elderly 
gradual transitions from work to retirement are suggested (OECD). Other vulnerable groups are 
migrants and handicapped persons (CoE, EU) and low skilled people. Also young people are 
seen as a vulnerable group, especially those who have difficulties in making the transition from 
school to work (EU).  
x 
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Key messages from international organisations on labour market participation and its dimensions 
 ILO IMF CoE EU OECD 
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‘Flexicurity’ is an important concept in the EU strategy. The European Commission has reached 
consensus that flexicurity policies can be designed and implemented across four policy 
components, but will not be effective without social dialogue 3: 
                                                        
3 EC (2007), Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity, COM(2007) 359 final. 
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• Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements through modern labour laws, collective 
agreements and work organisation; 
• Comprehensive lifelong learning strategies to ensure the continual adaptability and 
employability of workers; 
• Effective active labour market policies that help people cope with rapid change, reduce 
unemployment spells and ease transitions to new jobs; 
• Modern social security systems that provide adequate income support, encourage 
employment and facilitate labour market mobility. 
 
Although these international organisations advocate a structural and long-term perspective, all of 
them are currently very active in responding to the current financial and employment crisis. It 
remains to be seen to what extent this will eventually impact their key policies for labour market 
participation and employment in a more fundamental way. The European Commission e.g. has 
already stated that it considers its flexicurity policy no less relevant in the current times of crisis 
and also beyond the crisis. 
Policy solutions in the empirical literature 
Chapter 4 presents an elaborate meta-study of drivers of participation, focusing on what the 
scientific literature tells us about labour market policy effects that have been empirically tested. 
Although experiences from the past are no guarantee for the future, they can give valuable 
insights into how to model future policy. Three target groups are distinguished: women, the 
elderly and the (long term) unemployed. For each target group different policy instrument have 
been studied. 
 
Evaluations of active labour market policies (ALMP) aimed at increasing female and elderly 
participation are generally more conclusive than evaluations of policies aimed at increasing labour 
force participation of the unemployed. Because of the heterogeneous character of the latter, 
tailor-made approaches tend to be more effective for this group than general training programs 
or general wage subsidies. Regular evaluations of policy programs in terms of effectiveness and 
efficiency would improve their usefulness.   
 
Female participation is strongly influenced by the opportunity to balance work and family 
responsibilities. For this reason, a number of policy instruments who improve this balance have 
been studied in different countries. Two common and effective instruments are part-time and 
temporary agency work. Creating more flexible contractual arrangements is another way to unite 
work and family needs (see also Günther Schmid’s contribution in Chapter 6).  
An institutional setting that promotes participation is such that it ‘makes participation pay’. More 
equal tax treatment of second earners' income relative to single earners' income can be an 
effective way to create a better balance. It has been proved (for seventeen OECD countries) that 
this will increase female participation. Incentives concerning child care and (paid) parental leave 
have mixed effects in different countries. A reduction of childcare costs would stimulate labour 
force participation in the US and Canada. For other countries (the Netherlands, Italy, UK, 
Germany and France) childcare availability (in the right place and for the right hours) is more 
important than price.  
xii 
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The effect of parental leave on labour participation depends on the institutional design. Re-
entrance after (paid) parental leave is higher in social democratic welfare states, liberal and 
conservative welfare states have less favourable arrangements for parental leave (e.g. a guaranteed 
return to the same job). However, the re-entrance probability is also dependent of the length of 
the spell: too long spells lower returns.  
 
Stimulating the participation of older workers is becoming more and more important as in many 
countries the population is ageing and old age benefits are financed through a pay-as-you-go 
system. People can be encouraged to work longer by putting the financial incentives right. Once 
again, ‘make participation pay’. Raising the statutory retirement age, introducing an actuarially 
neutral social security system, linking pension contribution to pension benefits (defined 
contribution) are financial instruments which have been evaluated and proved to increase the 
participation of older workers. Early retirement schemes are important financial incentives for 
leaving the labour market at an early age. Reforms have had positive effects on the participation 
rate of older workers, although abolishment would be most effective, of course. Lump-sum 
bonuses have been studied in a Dutch survey and showed that people who are planning to retire 
early (at the age of 55) are less tempted by the bonus than people who are planning to retire later 
(at the age of 56-65). The effectiveness of this financial incentive seemed to be weakened by the 
presence of private funds, savings specifically intended for early retirement.  
Although most financial incentives are effective, they are not sufficient to promote employment 
opportunities of older workers by itself. In addition to pensions and early retirement systems, 
(too generous) unemployment, disability and other welfare benefits are used as alternative 
pathways to an early exit from the labour market. Restricting access to these alternatives and 
simultaneously reforming the pension system is needed to prevent early retirement.     
In general, many welfare systems still contain financial incentives that encourage people to leave 
the work force. These systems should be reformed in order to make participation pay.  
     
Active labour market policies aimed at reintegrating the (long term) unemployed have mixed 
outcomes: among different programs and also between countries. Most evaluations of 
monitoring and sanctioning programs show positive effects on the exit rate and duration of 
unemployment. They would even be more effective when the two are combined. Financial 
bonuses also reduce the duration of unemployment, but they might have negative side-effects like 
changing behaviour in order to become eligible for the bonus. Job search assistance, training 
programs and wage subsidies have mixed effects. Training programs are used everywhere in 
Europe, but positive effects are only found in half of the evaluations. Besides, classroom and on-
the-job training programs have better outcomes in the medium than in the short run. Apparently 
tailor-made approaches prove more effective than general education measures. Wage subsidies 
are often found to be positive, but most studies are incomplete. They fail to evaluate potential 
substitution and long-term effects. Subsidized work in the public sector does not seem to have 
any positive effects in the long run.  
Temporary agency work is often a ‘stepping-stone’ for the unemployed towards more regular 
work, at least in countries with a more mature market for temporary agency work (Germany, 
Italy, UK, the Netherlands, Belgium & Australia). The benefits for society are twofold:  
temporary agency workers generally have shorter unemployment spells, and their gained job 
experience creates better opportunities to find permanent work.      
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xiii 
SEO ECONOMISCH ONDERZOEK 
The overall conclusion on active labour market policies is that their effectiveness highly depends 
on the targeting level. General training programs or general wage subsidies might help to increase 
participation, but they will not do so if they are not specific enough. 
Modern labour relations 
Modern labour relations have become more prominent in the last two decades, although the 
traditional labour contract (fulltime open-ended) is still dominant. However, differences between 
countries -and sometimes between sex and age groups- are immense, as are the differences in the 
use of distinct forms of modern labour relations. In Chapter 5 we focus on part-time work, fixed-
term contracts, temporary agency work and self-employment. 
 
The odd one out is self-employment. According to official Eurostat statistics 10% of 
employment in the EU27 is in the form of self-employment. In Greece, Romania & Italy the 
share is somewhat higher but differences between countries are not immense. Most strikingly: the 
importance of self-employment did not increase during the last decades, the share of self-
employed has always been between 9.8% and 10.1% 
 
Part-time work, on the other hand, has become very popular in some countries. It has important 
socio-cultural explanations, as part-time work typically suits women who are making a deliberate 
choice for balancing work and family life. For women in the Netherlands part-time work is now 
the dominant type of labour, in other Northwest-European countries part-time work is also 
common among women, but in the rest of Europe it is still a marginal phenomenon.  
 
Part-time work is a female phenomenon 
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In many countries temporary work (in the definition of a direct fixed term contract between 
employer and employee) has been an important component of employment growth in the last 
one or two decades (Spain, Poland). But less general than part-time work, more clustered among 
specific groups (young people) and sectors (manufacturing, in some countries health care and 
construction).  
 
But fixed-term contracts are not the only relevant form of work included in the ‘temporary work’ 
definition. In North-western Europe temporary work is often characterized by a specific 
triangular labour relation, involving a temporary work agency, user company and employee. 
Compared to fixed-term contracts, temporary agency workers spend less time in unemployment, 
and in the countries with a mature agency work market it often acts as a ‘stepping stone’ to 
permanent work for the unemployed.  
 
A correlation exists between employment participation and the voluntariness of tempwork: the 
countries with higher participation have less people working involuntary in a fixed term contract. 
Or, to formulate it more positively: the higher participation comes hand in hand with more 
voluntary tempworkers.  Of course this statistical relation is not the same as a causal relation, but 
at least does not contradict the hypothesis that is analysed in more detail in Chapter 6: apparently 
some part of the higher participation of some (Scandinavian & Anglo-Saxon) countries might be 
connected to their labour markets providing ‘good quality’ temporary jobs.   
 
Voluntary tempwork is correlated with higher participation 
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Non-standard employment and labour force 
participation 
In Chapter 6 Professor Günther Schmid explores the determinants that might explain the 
development of non-standard employment in EU from 1998 to 2008, and discusses the policy 
consequences. He reaches the following conclusions (in brief): 
 
 (1) The main result regarding the nexus of non-standard employment and labour force 
participation is quickly told: it is part-time work – especially in its open-ended form of dependent 
work – which drives labour force participation. This holds especially (and obviously) true for 
women but also (and less obviously) for men. The overall driving capacity of temporary work, i.e. 
the employment relationship in fixed-term contracts, so far was weak. However, it might become 
a forceful and welcome driver if more good quality of jobs or stepping-stone-functions are 
provided, but it may also remain driven itself mainly by cost-cutting considerations of employers. 
Self-employment is ambiguously related to labour force participation since– in the long-term – 
countervailing tendencies let expect rather stagnation than an extension of this employment 
form. 
 
(2) The second important result is a deeper understanding of the dynamics of non-standard 
employment. The standard employment relationship defined in its traditional and narrow way 
(fulltime, open ended) declines and ‘non-standard’ forms increase. In Europe the employment 
rate in part-time, fixed-term and self-employment (overlaps controlled) rose from 17.5 percent 
(1998) to 22.3 percent (2008). The huge differences between the EU member states show a clear 
pattern: the ‘social-democratic’ employment regimes (Netherlands included) are at the top, but 
non-standard employment rates are also high in family centred ‘conservative’ and in ‘liberal’ 
regimes (for example Germany and UK). Apart from Poland, all East-European new member 
states are ‘underdeveloped’ in terms of non-standard employment.  
Whereas temporary work is mainly driven by cost competition and new forms of work 
organisation, the main underlying causal factors for part-time work are women’s strive for 
economic independence and the transformation of formerly unpaid family work into market 
work. Thus, globalisation, information technologies and ‘feminisation’ of the labour markets are 
the megatrends standing behind the increase of non-standard employment. Furthermore, the 
positive relationships of non-standard employment with labour force participation and GDP 
growth indicates that an increasing variety of employment relationship may well be one of the 
preconditions for a sustainable economic dynamics and prosperity.  
 
(3) The third important result relates to the differentiated role of the three components of non-
standard employment.  
Part-time work has clearly the strongest weight in this ‘partnership’. As it is (still) taken up mainly 
by women, this form of non-standard employment reflects above all restrictions in labour supply 
due to family obligations. And as many tasks, especially caring tasks, cannot or should not be 
transformed into market transactions, flexibility of working time will further be required if gender 
equality and work-life balance are highly estimated. Thus, non-marginal part-time employment in 
the form of open-ended part-time contracts (say in the range of 20 to 35 hours a week) has 
become normal in many cases. 
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For temporary work, we observed a relatively slow upward movement, if not a stagnating trend. 
Although the Eurostat database did not allow a distinction of different forms of temporary work, 
other sources make clear that temporary agency work may play an increasing role as intermediate 
employment form and drive labour force participation by mobilising long-term unemployed and 
inactive members of the workforce (stepping-stone function). 
Regarding self-employment, first attention should be drawn to the overall stagnating or even 
declining trend of this non-standard form of employment. This result sharply contrasts optimistic 
expectations of many policy makers and some researchers who sometimes see in self-
employment a panacea for job creation or increasing labour force participation. However, it 
became also clear that this component of non-standard employment deserves much deeper 
research, all the more because the phenomenon of fake self-employment erodes the strict 
borderlines between dependent work and genuine self-employment. 
 
(4) The fourth result is the unequal distribution of non-standard employment among socio-
economic groups. This observation, although not new, is all the more relevant since the usual 
higher risks related to non-standard employment in terms of income, unemployment, social 
security in old age and partly even in terms of health are sources of new inequalities if welfare 
states are not able to adjust their institutions to this new dynamics. The other side of the coin is 
the extremely poor level of labour market participation among the low-skilled which hints to the 
need of substantive efforts especially in education policy to overcome this deficit. As far as 
education is (or even should be) related to ‘on-the-job’ training, temporary work (including 
temporary agency work) might provide important experience. 
 
(5) These observations were reason to ponder a bit more about the underlying causes that erode 
the traditional standard employment relationship. Looking at the distribution of non-standard 
employment by industrial branches, the assumption of a continuous transformation of unpaid 
household work into market transaction driving especially part-time work and increasing female 
labour force participation was confirmed. This process encompasses the whole economy but 
concentrates on a few and in part strongly growing sectors (business and health services).  
 
(6) Labour market institutions also play a role. Taxes and social security contributions provide 
economic incentives both for the labour demand and supply side to search for employment 
forms with the highest returns or the lowest costs. High income taxes or social security 
contributions certainly do not encourage own account work except the respective people 
circumvent those rules by choosing informal (‘black work”) or even illegal forms of employment. 
On the slip side of ‘going informal’, however, we find lack of social security in case of illness or 
old age as well as hidden forms of exploitation or even Mafia-kind employment relationships.4  
 
(7) Unequal taxation of male and female income favours marginal forms of part-time with high 
risks related to sustainable labour market careers and social security in old age. It also favours the 
traditional role division between men and women. The same holds true for non-targeted forms 
of wage subsidies in form of in-work-benefits, that allow combining wage and transfer income ad 
ultimo but keeping people, especially women, in low wage jobs without promotion opportunities. 
Comparative research shows that lower earnings differentials between men and women in 
                                                        
4 The Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen (2001, chapter 11) saw in the Mafia even a functional 
equivalent to formalized structures and entitlements to social security. 
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developed welfare states with high labour force participation are probably to be attributed to 
their more egalitarian wage structures rather than to their family policies. Cross-national research 
also indicates that in contrast to extended maternal leaves, expansion of public sector 
employment and the provision of services such as subsidized day care are suitable instruments to 
increase labour force participation without doing harm to economic outcomes for women 
(Jaumotte 2003, Mandel/ Semyonov 2005). 
 
(8) High employment protection drives fixed-term employment, especially for men. Fixed-term 
contracts allow employers to circumvent dismissal protection or to combine external flexibility 
(hire and fire) with internal security for the core labour force (employment protection) with 
respective loyalty and – may be – higher productivity. Both options lead to a segmentation of the 
labour market in so called ‘insiders’ with open-ended contracts and ‘outsiders’ with fixed-term 
contracts. Employment protection regulation, therefore, would have to be developed in a way 
that both flexibility and security complement each other in a functional way without enhancing 
the inbuilt tendencies of labour market segmentation.  
 
(9) Cultural factors also play a role in choosing non-standard employment relationship. A few 
sophisticated studies provide evidence that women of ‘conservative’ welfare regimes are still not 
very supportive to the transformation of care work into market transactions. They choose part-
time work mainly for the reason to combine unpaid family work with some additional market 
income. With respect to temporary work, the most important preferential reason is to combine 
education with gainful work or to accumulate vocational experiences of various kinds in order to 
maintain or to improve employability. Due to their risk-pooling capacity, temporary work 
agencies might play an important role for optimal job matching and recruitment, especially for 
school leavers and young adults. In countries with high levels of fixed term contracts also for 
mature adults (like Spain or recently Poland), however, having no other choice is the main 
reason, which means lack of jobs with open ended contracts. Such countries have to come to a 
more balanced regulation of ‘flexicurity’, not least for the sake of higher productivity enhanced 
through the ‘psychological contract’ fostered by open-ended contracts. 
 
Good studies are missing related to self-employment. However, we found a ‘best practice case’ of 
research in Sweden which produced in part thrilling results that probably can be transposed to 
other comparable countries. Most people in dependent work who decide to become self-
employed choose a combination of dependent part-time employment and part-time self-
employment, to test under the ‘safety umbrella’ of dependent work whether own account work 
might become an alternative income source at the end. Many become fully self-employed at the 
end, the majority however returns to dependent work or keeps the combinatory status. 
Unfortunately, a conscious employment policy that systematically supports or encourages such 
trial and error processes is not yet in sight. Nevertheless, as evaluation studies in the meantime 
show, employment or labour force participation can effectively be promoted by this way.5 
 
(10) Last, but not least, our results hint to a great and in many countries unexploited potential as 
functional equivalent to non-standard employment: the flexibilisation of the standard 
employment relationship. The implantation of flexible elements into the open-ended full-time 
contract can take various forms: agreements on regulated time-offs (sabbaticals) for various 
                                                        
5 For Germany, e.g., see Baumgartner/ Caliendo (2007). 
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reasons such as child care, care for the frail elderly or disabled, educational leaves, or recreation. 
Such agreements provide at the same time the relative security of a formal employment 
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Introduction of IDEAL 
In most developed countries the use of non-standard, more flexible forms of labour has 
increased during the last one or two decades. But at the same time very large differences exist 
between countries in the scale and forms of modern labour relations. The enlargement of the EU 
with the Eastern & Central-European countries increased heterogeneity even more. Differences 
in regulations & restrictions, the workforce and the economic situation are considered to be the 
main causes for these differences. The Netherlands are a special case when looking at flexible 
labour. Not only are modern forms of labour commonly used in the Netherlands (part-time work 
can not be called ‘non-standard’ anymore), also the role of temporary agency work is much larger 
than in most other countries. For Randstad Holding, a major player in the Dutch, European and 
even world market for temporary work, it is important to learn more about the use of flexible 
forms of labour, the driving forces behind it and differences between countries in labour market 
institutions and the relationship with flexible labour. 
 
Although much statistical information exists –by amongst others OECD, Eurostat, CIETT, ILO, 
national Statistical Offices– detailed internationally comparable statistics (both time series and 
cross section data) on flex-work are scarce. A further problem with these statistics is that 
definitions differ strongly between countries and that they are adjusted frequently. A third 
problem is that the distinguished countries, the frequency and the topics covered vary between 
sources. For Randstad Holding these were reasons to start a project in September 2000 with the 
aim of collecting labour market data in general and data on flexible forms of labour in particular.  
 
The project resulted in the International Database of Employment and Adaptable Labour 
(IDEAL). This database is created by SEO Economic Research in co-operation with and 
commissioned by Randstad Holding. The aim of IDEAL is to bring together a large number of 
comparable  international statistics on employment, modern labour relations and agency work. In 
May 2004 this resulted in the first publication of the Randstad Jobs Report, in which an 
international outlook was presented based mainly on data recent to the year 2002. In 2007 an 
update followed, with a special focus on labour migration. In this third report we present another 
update of the database, with new countries and more recent figures. A special focuses this year is 
on the theme ‘drivers of participation’.  
 
Data comparability issues 
On some topics we will also be able to compare figures of the countries with averages for the 
European Union as a whole (preferably EU-27 and EU-15). The main focus of IDEAL is on 
international comparability between statistics. For that reason the countries in our database are 
separated into three categories, representing three different levels of comparability. Our first 
source are Labour Force Survey (LFS) data from Eurostat: they are to a large degree based on 
comparable definitions, and also published frequently and on relatively short term. Of course, 
Eurostat focuses mainly on the European countries, so for other countries we also look for 
similar data at OECD. Although in the use of definitions this source is more or less comparable 
with Eurostat, their publication horizon is much longer. Most statistics are annual and published 
in the second half of the following year, so they might be less up-to-date sometimes. If neither 
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Eurostat or OECD can provide information, tertiary sources are considered, but at an enormous 
cost of comparability loss. Tertiary sources (like ILO) are collected from very different sources, 
mostly infrequent and therefore not very recent. Differences in national definitions make these 
statistics only suited for within-country purposes, not for between-country comparisons. We 
therefore use these tertiary sources only if we think they contain valuable information that is 
comparable with the other sources. Statistics are presented in nearly all tables and figures for the 
following countries:  
• Austria (AT) 
• Belgium (BE) 
• Germany (DE) 
• Denmark (DK) 
• Spain (ES) 
• Finland (FI) 
• France (FR) 
• Greece (GR) 
• Ireland (IR)  
• Italy (IT) 
• Luxembourg (LU) 
• Netherlands (NL) 
• Portugal (PT) 
• Sweden (SE) 
• United Kingdom (UK) 
• Cyprus (CY) 
• Czech Republic (CZ) 
• Estonia (EE) 
• Hungary (HU) 
• Lithuania (LT) 
• Latvia (LV) 
• Malta (MT) 
• Poland (PL) 
• Slovenia (SI) 
• Slovakia (SV) 
• Bulgaria (BG) 
• Romania (RO) 
• Norway (NO) 
• Switzerland (CH) 
 
Where available statistics are also presented for the following countries: 
• Australia  
• Canada (Can) 
• Japan (JP) 
• Mexico 
• New Zealand 
• Turkey (TR) 
• United States (US) 
 




















• South Africa 
• Sri Lanka 
• Thailand 
• United Arab Emirates 
• Uruguay 
 1 
SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
1 The EU Lisbon targets: participation and 
unemployment 
The European Heads of State and Government decided in Lisbon in 2000 to endorse a new 
strategic social goal to be attained by 2010: for the EU to “become the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.” Regaining ‘full employment’ is at the core of 
the new strategy. The European Council set out -as the key indicator of this success- that by 
2010, the employment rate should rise to 70% for the European Union as a whole and to 60% 
for women. Among the elderly (aged 55-64) participation should be at least 50%. At the same 
time the EU average unemployment rate should be reduced to 4% or less. In the first Randstad 
Jobs Report (Berkhout & van Leeuwen, 2004) we showed that the participation targets might be 
met by the EU-15 on average in 2010, but that the unemployment target was too ambitious. In 
the second Report (Berkhout, Dustmann & Emmer, 2007) we concluded that the participation 
targets might be met by the enlarged EU-25 on average, but not by every country individually. In 
the current report we take a third look, taking into account three more years of data and two new 
member states as well. Finally, we have to conclude that none of the Lisbon targets will be 
achieved by 2010, by neither EU15, EU25 or EU27. Although most official statistics only run 
through 2009, given the economic impact of the recent financial crisis we do not believe that the 
European labour market situation will improve dramatically in the year 2010.  
1.1 Population and potential labour force 
In most of this publication we will present percentages, because these are easily comparable 
between countries. Absolute numbers of employed persons are not useful when we want to 
compare the degree of participation between countries, but they do give an impression of the size 
of the labour market in the country. In IDEAL, we have recorded the absolute values of the total 
population and the working age population with age 15-64 (the so called ‘potential labour force’). 
These quantities are presented in Table 1 for EU and OECD-countries and in Table 2 for non-
OECD countries.  
With the EU expansions in 2004 and 2007 the total EU population increased with over 100 
million people, living in Eastern Europe. The working age population increased by 70 million 
people, to a current total of 330 million. In most Western countries about two-thirds of the 
population is currently of the working age. In Chapter 2 we will show that in the next decades 
this share will decline. Apart from the Arab countries, the gender composition of the potential 
labour force is balanced.  
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Table 1 Total population in EU & OECD countries, 2008 (x1000) 
 Total population  % 15-64 = ‘Potential labour force’ % female 
Austria 8,223  68% = 5,580 50% 
Belgium 10,690  66% = 7,063 50% 
Germany 81,391  66% = 53,847 50% 
Denmark 5,481  66% = 3,595 50% 
Spain 45,266  69% = 31,210 49% 
Finland 5,286  66% = 3,513 50% 
France 60,560  66% = 39,681 51% 
Greece 10,776  67% = 7,228 50% 
Ireland 4,422  68% = 3,028 50% 
Italy 59,294  66% = 39,154 50% 
Luxembourg 472  68% = 323 51% 
Netherlands 16,187  68% = 10,970 50% 
Portugal 10,619  67% = 7,143 51% 
Sweden 9,193  66% = 6,041 49% 
United Kingdom 60,254  66% = 40,055 50% 
Cyprus 756  69% = 523 51% 
Czech Republic 10,409  71% = 7,406 50% 
Estonia 1,337  68% = 908 52% 
Hungary 9,892  69% = 6,794 51% 
Lithuania 3,366  69% = 2,316 52% 
Latvia 2,271  69% = 1,568 52% 
Malta 411  70% = 288 49% 
Poland 37,121  71% = 26,228 51% 
Slovenia 2,026  70% = 1,419 49% 
Slovakia 5,394  72% = 3,883 50% 
Bulgaria 7,640  68% = 5,187 50% 
Romania 21,529  70% = 15,044 50% 
EU27 490,263  67% = 329,994 50% 
EU25 461,094  67% = 309,763 50% 
EU15 388,111  67% = 258,430 50% 
Australia 21,432  68% = 14,474 50% 
Canada 33,311  69% = 23,151 50% 
Japan 127,692  64% = 82,300 50% 
Mexico 106,683  65% = 69,376 51% 
New Zealand 4,269  67% = 2,842 51% 
Norway 3,490  90% = 3,148 49% 
Switzerland           7,647  68% = 5,211 50% 
Turkey 69,562  66% = 45,731 50% 
United States       304,060  67% = 204,064 51% 
Source:  Eurostat (lfsi_act_a, 2009) OECD (ALFS, 2009). 
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Table 2 Total population non-OECD countries, 2008 (x1000) 
 Total population  % 15-64 = ‘Potential labour force’ % female 
Andorra* 83  72% = 60 48% 
Angola* 12,531  54% = 6,719 49% 
Argentina* 40,482  63% = 25,692 50% 
Bahrain* 718  70% = 502 42% 
Brazil* 196,343  67% = 131,097 50% 
Chile* 16,454  68% = 11,121 50% 
China* 1,330,045  72% = 956,533 49% 
Croatia* 4,492  67% = 3,020 50% 
India* 1,147,996  63% = 727,026 49% 
Kuwait* 2,597  71% = 1,832 36% 
Malaysia* 25,274  63% = 15,992 50% 
Monaco* 33  61% = 20 50% 
Montenegro** 678  64% = 431 50% 
Mozambique* 21,285  53% = 11,208 51% 
Oman* 3,312  55% = 1,806 42% 
Qatar* 825  77% = 633 29% 
Serbia** 7,559  65% = 4,907 50% 
Singapore* 4,608  77% = 3,527 51% 
South Africa* 48,784  65% = 31,947 50% 
Sri Lanka* 21,129  68% = 14,360 51% 
Thailand* 65,493  70% = 46,068 51% 
United Arab Emirates* 4,621  79% = 3,634 27% 
Uruguay* 3,478  64% = 2,227 50% 
* estimates 2008; ** value 2007. 
Source:  CIA Factbook (2009); ILO (2008). 
 
1.2 Participation 
The ‘potential labour force’ from the above table is the starting point for calculation of the 
employment rate, one of the most important indicators used in labour market policy. The 
employment rate or employment-population ratio’s are calculated by dividing the number of all 
people in employment (employees, self-employed, family workers) by the total number of people 
in the working age. Alternatively, one could describe the employment rate as ‘the number of employed 
as a % of the potential labour force’. Table 3 presents an overview of employment rates over the years, 
and Figure 1 reflects the employment situation in 2009 graphically.6  
 
                                                        
6 To provide robust and recent time-series, the yearly numbers in this and the following chapters are represented 
by the second quarter average of that year.  
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Table 3  Employment-population ratio’s for persons aged 15-64 
 1990 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria - 68.5 69.1 67.7 68.4 70.0 71.5 72.3 71.7 
Belgium 54.4  60.9 59.3 60.5 61.0 60.4 61.6 62.0 61.5 
Germany 66.4 65.3 64.9 64.3 65.8 67.4 69.1 70.3 70.8 
Denmark 75.4 76.4 75.1 76.0 75.5 76.9 77.3 78.4 76.2 
Spain 49.1 56.1 59.7 60.9 63.2 64.7 65.8 65.0 59.9 
Finland - 68.1 68.7 68.3 69.2 69.9 71.3 72.3 69.8 
France 60.8 61.7 64.0 63.7 64.1 63.8 64.6 65.2 64.7 
Greece 54.8 56.6 58.9 59.6 60.3 61.0 61.5 62.2 61.6 
Ireland 51.9 64.5 65.1 65.5 67.1 68.1 68.9 68.1 62.2 
Italy 53.9 53.4 56.1 57.7 57.8 58.9 58.9 59.2 57.9 
Luxembourg 59.2 62.7 62.2 62.5 63.6 63.6 63.6 65.0 65.7 
Netherlands 61.1 72.9 73.8 73.1 73.2 74.2 76.0 77.2 77.0 
Portugal 65.5 68.2 68.2 68.0 67.6 68.1 67.6 68.6 66.7 
Sweden - 71.1 73.6 72.4 72.6 73.1 74.3 74.8 72.7 
United Kingdom 71.1 71.0 71.4 71.5 71.5 71.4 71.2 71.6 69.6 
Cyprus - 65.4 69.2 69.4 68.7 69.5 71.2 71.1 70.2 
Czech Republic - 64.9 64.9 64.1 64.7 65.3 66.0 66.6 65.4 
Estonia - 60.3 62.3 62.9 64.9 68.8 69.7 69.8 63.8 
Hungary - 55.9 57.0 56.6 56.8 57.3 57.6 56.5 55.6 
Lithuania - 59.6 62.8 61.4 62.6 63.7 65.4 64.6 60.3 
Latvia - 57.4 61.7 62.2 63.0 65.5 67.6 69.5 61.4 
Malta - 54.5 54.6 53.4 53.6 53.6 55.2 55.2 54.9 
Poland - 55.1 51.4 51.4 52.2 53.9 56.8 58.9 59.3 
Slovenia - 62.7 62.5 65.6 66.0 67.1 68.3 68.3 67.6 
Slovakia - 56.3 57.9 56.7 57.4 59.3 60.4 61.7 60.4 
Bulgaria - 51.5 53.1 55.1 56.2 59.1 61.6 63.9 63.3 
Romania - 64.2 58.7 58.7 58.7 59.6 59.6 59.7 59.2 
EU27 - 62.1 62.7 62.8 63.5 64.4 65.4 66.0 64.8 
Switzerland - 78.3 77.9 77.4 77.2 77.9 78.6 79.5 - 
Norway - 77.9 75.6 75.3 74.6 75.3 76.7 78.3 77.0 
Turkey 54.5 48.8 45.8 46.1 45.9 47.1 47.2 47.4 44.7 
Canada 70.3 70.9 72.2 72.5 72.5 72.9 73.6 73.7 - 
Japan 68.6 68.9 68.4 68.7 69.3 70.0 70.7 70.7 - 
United States 72.2 74.1 71.2 71.2 71.5 72.0 71.8 70.9 - 
Source:  Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ergan, 2009); OECD LFS (2009). 
The average EU-27 employment rate is now nearly 65 percent, with most Eastern European 
countries below average. Only six countries have met the overall employment target of 70%. All 
in all in Europe shows a steady rise since 2000, but remains below the Lisbon target of 70 percent 
until 2008, and show a decline afterwards. Positive changes are not likely to occur in the short 
run, given the economic effects of the recent financial crisis. As a matter of fact, the effect of the 
crisis is especially prominent in some countries. Spain, Ireland and the Baltic states show 
employment rate drops of 4-6 percentage points, the Scandinavian countries and UK about half 
of that.   
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Figure 1 Employment rates in 2009 
 
Source:  Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ergan, 2009). 
Figure 2 shows the long-term development of the employment rate graphically; the dark arrow 
shows the development during the ten years of the last decade of the 20th century, the light arrow 
shows the development in the first eight years of the current century. 
 
Figure 2  Development of employment rates, 1990-2000-2009 
 
















































































50 60 70 80
1990-2000 2000-2009
6   CHAPTER 1 
SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
UK, Denmark plus the non-EU countries US, Canada & Switzerland had met the Lisbon target 
already in 1990. The Netherlands and Ireland made a huge catching-up during the nineties, but 
while the Dutch growth continued into the next decade, the Irish were badly hit by the recent 
crisis. The latter also applies for some new member states like Slovenia, Latvia and Estonia who 
experienced a huge drop in participation since 2008. Germany might meet the target thanks to 
more recent development. Spain showed high employment growth since 1990 onwards, but had 
to large a gap to close. In Belgium the economic situation is also negative, because the 
employment rate did not improve and stayed around 60 percent during the last decade. Italy is 
still far behind but finally growing (pre-crisis), which can not be said of Hungary where 
development is stagnating. Poland is a different case: they joined the EU only in 2004, and since 
then employment shows a positive development. All in all, the Lisbon target on average 
participation in 2010 will not be met. 
1.3 Participation and gender 
Another important target for 2010 is to reach an employment level of 60% among females (on 
average). In 2002 female employment was at 55.5 percent for the EU15. In 2009 this percentage 
has risen to 59% for all EU27 countries. In other words: getting very close, and expecting to get 
there in the near future. Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Finland all have female 
participation rates of at least 10%-points above the target, and compensate for other EU 
countries that still lag behind (Italy, Greece and Hungary).  
Within Europe there are structural differences in female labour markets. In most countries 
female employment is 10-15 percentage points less than male employment, but in Italy and 
Greece (and Japan) this so-called ‘gender gap’ is much larger. This can be seen in Figure 3 where 
employment rates are plotted for both men and women, and countries are sorted by the male 
employment rate. Female employment is still highest in Denmark at 74% (and rising), which is 
higher than male employment in Italy, France, Belgium and all of the new member states except 
Czech Republic and Estonia.  
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Figure 3  The gender gap in employment rates, 2009 
 
Source:  Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ergan,2009). US/Can/Japan data are from 2008. 
 
Figure 4  Development of the female employment rate, 1990-2000 and 2000-2009 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ergan, 2009). US/Can/Japan data are from 2008. 
Meeting the Lisbon target at some point mainly depends on those countries where the gender 
gap leaves enough opportunity for new people to enter the labour market. Of course efforts for 
increasing participation will be most effective if business cycle conditions are favourable. This 
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There might be cultural differences to be overthrown, maybe more than economic differences. 
This might be illustrated by Figure 4 which shows female employment developments since 1990. 
Clearly, the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland showed a shift in the cultural pattern of women 
staying at home to women going to work: employment rates rose by 25 percent. The same is true, 
to a lesser extent, for countries like Belgium and Portugal. Bulgaria, Latvia and Estonia have also 
made a serious shift in the last nine years. So in most EU-countries female employment became 
part of labour market culture, or was part of it already.  
But in the other Eastern European countries developments are not so positive in the last years, 
either they are small or they are negative. In Italy female employment is even lower than in 
Eastern Europe; it is a growing phenomenon but recent growth is not spectacular, given the fact 
that not even half of the Italian women are in some form of employment. Unfortunately, 
although many countries clearly passed the line, the gap with the larger East- and South-
European countries is so big that the Lisbon target of 60 percent female employment will 
probably just be missed. 
1.4 Participation and age 
The third target to be reached in 2010 is an employment rate of 50% for the elderly. In this 
section we take a closer look at the different employment situations of younger and older people. 
Even though there are no specific targets specified on youth (aged 15-24), in some countries low 
youth employment (because of high unemployment) is more of a problem than low employment 
among the elderly (because of early retirement).  
Figure 5  Employment rates of the elderly (age 55-64), 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ergan, 2009). 
Figure 5 shows that the average employment rate for people aged 55-64 in 2009 is 46 percent. 
Romania and Spain are close to this average; Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Portugal, the Netherlands, 
Germany and the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries are well above. In Eastern & Central 
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that there is still a lot to gain, especially on the longer term when the economic cycle is moving 
upward again. 
Figure 6  Development of the employment rate of the elderly (age 55-64), 1990-2000-2009 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ergan, 2009); OECD LFS (2009). 
Fortunately, from Figure 6 it becomes clear that elderly participation is developing in the right 
direction in most countries (except Portugal and Romania), at least since 2000. In the EU27 
participation of elderly did not rise during the last decade of the past century, but from 2000-
2009 it increased by 10 percentage points. That is quite an achievement, but unfortunately it was 
still not enough: the Lisbon target of 50% participation of the elderly (aged 55 and over) will not 
be met. 
 
A different story has to be told when looking at youth employment and unemployment. Figure 7 
shows that the development of youth employment has no clear pattern: in half of the countries 
youth employment has declined in the last eight year, the other half shows exactly the opposite. 
The Netherlands and Denmark have the highest employment among the youth and are still 
moving forward, while Hungary and Greece are going backwards. 
But for this group employment participation does not tell the whole story. A lot of people are 
still in education, and if ceteris paribus participation in education rises then employment might fall 
for a positive reason. On the other hand, youth employment in the Netherlands has risen 
particularly sharp because the number of people who are both in education and in employment 
has risen. Students started to work in relatively small jobs to finance their education because 
reimbursements were cut. To get a complete picture we should also look at the youth 
unemployment rates, which are shown in Figure 8. (The Lisbon target on overall unemployment 
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Figure 7  Development of the youth employment rate (age 15-24), 1990-2000 and 2000-2009 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ergan, 2009). 
 
Figure 8 Development of the youth unemployment rate (age 15-24), 1990-2000 and 2000-
2008 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (une_rt_a, 2008); OECD LFS (2008). 
 
We can see that in some countries youth unemployment changed quite a lot during the last 15 
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employment rate development & unemployment rate development is not clear; structural 
changes in the combination of education & work are also significant. For instance, in the 
Netherlands in the past century a huge increase in employment did bring down unemployment 
only marginally. The increase in employment here came from people who were ‘not in the labour 
force’ before. On the other hand, in Ireland during the period 1990-2000 we do see a huge 
increase in employment accompanied by a huge drop in unemployment. Apparently there is a 
relation between higher employment rates and lower unemployment rates among youth, but 
other factors (combining education & work) are also important for this group.  
1.5 Unemployment 
The unemployment target of the Lisbon agenda was even more ambitious than the employment 
rate targets. In the year 2000 when the target was set out, only four countries had an 
unemployment rate below or just at the target rate of 4%, while the EU15 average was at 7.7% 
(see Table 4). In 2004 unemployment was even higher, and only since 2005 the figures show 
signs of recovery, bringing down unemployment. But it lasted till 2006 for the unemployment 
rate average to get below the original levels of the year 2000. And then came the financial crisis in 
the second half of 2008, which rapidly reclaimed the progress that had been made before. 
Between June and December, EU unemployment increased by 1.5 %-points. In the first half of 
2009 another 0.4 %-points were added, in the second half another 0.6 %-points. Unemployment 
is higher than it has ever been since the targets were set. Spain shows a dramatic increase, which 
may not come as a surprise given the high incidence of fixed-term contracts in that country (we 
elaborated on this in section 5.2). Also unemployment in Latvia has risen dramatically last year. 
In this section we look at the official statistics and the long-term development of unemployment. 
In section 1.6 we’ll take a closer look on how the recent crisis affects the Lisbon strategy, based 
on short-term forecasts.   
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Table 4 Harmonized unemployment rates 
 1983 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009q2 2009q4 
Austria   3.9 3.6 4.8 5.2 4.8 4.4 3.8 4.8 5.5 
Belgium 10.7 6.6 9.7 6.9 8.4 8.5 8.3 7.5 7.0 7.7 8.1 
Germany   8.0 7.5 9.8 10.7 9.8 8.4 7.3 7.7 7.5 
Denmark 8.4 7.2 6.7 4.3 5.5 4.8 3.9 3.8 3.3 6.1 7.1 
Spain  13.0 18.4 11.1 10.6 9.2 8.5 8.3 11.3 18.1 19.4 
Finland  3.2 15.4 9.8 8.8 8.4 7.7 6.9 6.4 8.5 8.8 
France 7.7 8.4 11.0 9.0 9.3 9.2 9.2 8.3 7.8 9.5 10.0 
Greece 7.1 6.4 9.2 11.2 10.5 9.9 8.9 8.3 7.7 9.2        
Ireland 13.9 13.4 12.3 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.7 6.3 12.2 13.0 
Italy 7.4 8.9 11.2 10.1 8.1 7.7 6.8 6.1 6.8 7.4        
Luxembourg 3.4 1.7 2.9 2.3 5.1 4.5 4.7 4.1 4.9 6.4 6.1 
Netherlands 9.2 5.8 6.6 2.8 4.6 4.7 3.9 3.2 2.8 3.3 4.0 
Portugal 8.2 4.8 7.1 3.9 6.7 7.6 7.7 8.0 7.7 9.2 10.3 
Sweden 3.7 1.7 8.8 5.6 6.3 7.4 7.0 6.2 6.2 8.8 8.9 
UK 10.8 6.9 8.5 5.5 4.7 4.8 5.3 5.3 5.6 7.8        
Cyprus    4.9 4.7 5.3 4.6 3.9 3.8 5.3 6.1 
Czech Rep.    8.7 8.3 7.9 7.2 5.3 4.4 6.5 7.8 
Estonia    12.8 9.7 7.9 5.9 4.7 5.5 13.3        
Hungary    6.4 6.1 7.2 7.5 7.4 7.8 9.6 10.8 
Lithuania    16.4 11.4 8.3 5.6 4.3 5.8 13.7        
Latvia    13.7 10.4 8.9 6.8 6.0 7.5 17.1 22.1 
Malta    6.7 7.4 7.3 7.3 6.4 5.9 7.3 7.1 
Poland   13.3 16.2 19.0 17.8 13.9 9.6 7.1 8.0 8.8 
Slovenia    6.7 6.3 6.5 6.0 4.9 4.4 6.0 6.8 
Slovakia    18.8 18.2 16.3 13.4 11.1 9.5 11.2 13.5 
Bulgaria    16.4 12.1 10.1 9.0 6.9 5.6 6.4 7.7 
Romania    7.3 8.1 7.2 7.3 6.4 5.8 6.4        
Norway  5.2 4.9 3.4 4.4 4.6 3.5 2.6 2.6 3.0        
Canada 12.0 8.2 9.6 6.8 7.2 6.8 6.3 6.0 6.1 8.6        
Japan 2.6 2.1 3.1 4.7 4.7 4.4 4.1 3.9 4.0 5.4        
Turkey 7.7 8.0 7.6 - - - 8.4 8.5 9.4 13.2  
United States 9.6 5.5 5.6 4.0 5.5 5.1 4.6 4.6 5.8 9.5 10.0 
EU27    8.7 9.0 8.9 8.2 7.1 7.0 8.9 9.5 
EU25    8.6 9.0 8.9 8.2 7.2 7.1 9.0 9.6 
EU15 10.0 8.2 10.0 7.7 8.1 8.1 7.7 7.0 7.1 9.1 9.5 
Source: Eurostat LFS (une_rt_a, 2009; une_rt_q, 2010); OECD LFS (2009). 
In the long-term perspective of Table 4, Spain is one of the most particular countries, together 
with Ireland and Poland (see also Figure 9 below). Where most unemployment rates have always 
been within the range of 4-12% since 1983, in these countries the unemployment peak has been 
much higher. In the mid-nineties, unemployment was roughly 20% in Spain and 16% in Ireland. 
Polish unemployment reached 20% in 2003. But there are marked differences between these 
countries as well. In Spain unemployment was by far the highest of all countries in our study 
during most of the nineties, despite a spectacular fall from 20% unemployment in 1994 to 11% in 
2000. In the economic high tide between 2000-2007 Spain even catched up with other large 
countries like France & Germany. But the vulnerability of the Spanish labour market is shown in 
the rapidly rising unemployment since the early start of the crisis, reaching pre-2000 levels again. 
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Irelands unemployment rate was still high in 1993 (nearly 16%) but from that moment on the 
‘Irish employment miracle’ brought down unemployment a spectacular 12 percentage points in 
the following 7 years. In less than a decade Ireland made the transition from ‘highly problematic’ 
to a nearly full employment country. But Irelands labour market has also been struck by the 
financial crisis, so that unemployment nearly doubled and is above average now. 
Poland showed above average unemployment rates continuously, where a decreasing trend in the 
nineties turned into radically rising unemployment from 1998-2002. After EU accession 
unemployment rates dropped steeply, to even levels below EU15 average. Unlike Spain and 
Ireland, in Poland unemployment did not rise again dramatically last year. 
 
Figure 9  High unemployment in the nineties 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (une_rt_a, 2010; une_rt_m, 2009). 
In Figure 10 we focus on some other larger Western-European countries. During the early 
nineties unemployment rose all over Europe, but the duration of this effect differs widely across 
countries. The EU average stabilizes during 1994-1997 followed by a slight fall from 1997-2001. 
From 2001 onwards unemployment rose again all over Europe, but starting since 2005 this trend 
seems to be turned around. In the UK however, unemployment figures start to drop already 
from 1993 and continued to do so during the rest of the decade and even after 2001. 
Unemployment in the UK was well below at 6% in 2007, but it also hit by the economic 
downturn. The EU Autumn Forecast 2009-2011 expects unemployment in the UK to rise to 
8.7% in 2010. 7 
In Italy and France the period of stabilization and recovery after the economic trough in the 
nineties started relatively late. As a result they showed above average unemployment. In Italy the 
negative pattern reversed when unemployment continued to drop after 2001 while the EU (and 
the French) average rose again. Italy’s unemployment was below average for the first time in 
2005. And it still is: forecasts speak of levels between 8-9% until 2010. Unemployment in France 
moves quite parallel to the EU average, but always at a higher level.  
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Trends in Germany are different: while unemployment was relatively low at the end of the 
eighties in Germany, after unification unemployment rose rapidly to nearly 10% in 1997. In the 
beginning of the 21st century it faced the highest unemployment of the larger countries, but from 
2006 onwards the situation turned positive relatively quick. Remarkably, statistics show only a 
modest crisis effect for the German unemployment, although forecasts predict that 
unemployment will go up after all in 2010, to 9.2%. 
Figure 10 Most larger EU-countries kept the average up till 2005, but not anymore 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (une_rt_a, 2010; une_rt_m, 2009) 
 
In Figure 11 the rapid decline of unemployment during the nineties is set out for some smaller 
EU countries. From 2005 onwards these countries showed a decline, and in the summer of 2008 
Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands all met the Lisbon target of 4%. Portugal went in the 
wrong direction since 2000 and now has an unemployment rate of more than twice the target 
level. In Austria and Denmark unemployment went up sharply, and also in the Netherlands 
unemployment is rising again in 2009, and will continue to do so in 2010. The Lisbon target will 
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Figure 11 Smaller EU-countries have lower, but rapidly rising unemployment 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (une_rt_a, 2010; une_rt_m, 2009). 
Little hope might be gathered from the latest figures in Figure 12. It also shows that non-
European countries like Japan and US have always had lower unemployment than Europe, Only 
the economic crisis caused the US unemployment to rise above EU-levels momentarily.  
 
Figure 12 EU unemployment was falling since 2005 but target was never within sight 
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In recent years unemployment has been higher in the Western European countries (EU15) than 
in the new member states. That changed drastically when the economic crisis struck, as can be 
seen from Figure 13. This figure does not include Poland which is already shown in Figure 9. 
Over the last decades, before 2008, we can see Eastern Europe in two categories: Czech Republic 
and Hungary where unemployment was relatively constant, and the other countries where huge 
improvements were made since 2001. How vulnerable these countries still are can be seen since 
the recent economic downturn. In all three Baltic stat the reaction of the labour market is 
dramatic: in Latvia unemployment was over 22% at the end of last year. 
Figure 13 Unemployment in Eastern European countries 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (une_rt_q, 2010). 
1.5.1 Job search methods 
Which methods do unemployed people employ in their search for a new job? How important is 
the role of private employment agencies? These are not simple and straightforward questions, as 
the use of temporary work agencies differs strongly between countries. From the EU Labour 
Force Survey it is known what methods unemployed people have used recently to find a job. The 
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Table 5 Methods used for seeking work, (EU-27, 2009) 
  
Contact public employment office 58.7% 
Contact private employment office 22.7% 
Apply to employers directly 57.0% 
Ask friends, relatives, trade unions 65.2% 
Publish or answer advertisements 41.1% 
Study advertisements 68.9% 
Took test, interview, examination 15.7% 
Look for land, premises, equipment 1.4% 
Look for permits, licenses, financial resources 1.2% 
Other method 16.5% 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ugmsw, 2009). 
In the EU-27 on average, 20 percent of the unemployed uses private employment agencies in 
their search for a new job. But clear differences exist between the member countries, which is 
illustrated in Figure 14 below. In the Netherlands and Belgium private employment agencies play 
an important role in the matchmaking between unemployed and employers, with usage of over 
40 percent. However, the use of private employment agencies is still very limited in Scandinavian 
and many Eastern European countries. 
Figure 14 Unemployed searching through private employment agencies, 2009 (%) 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ugmsw, 2009). 
Developments over time are presented in Figure 15 and Figure 16. On average the use of private 
employment agencies among jobseekers in Europe has grown steadily, from 12% in 2000 to 23% 
last year. On the country-level however we do not see gradual movements, but sudden increases 
in 1999-2000 in the Netherlands & Belgium, as well as slow decreases in Ireland and Switzerland 
since 2003. In Germany and France we do not see spectacular changes, while in Italy private 
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here must be regulatory reforms: it was not allowed in every sector in every country to use 
temporary agency workers. In fact, in some countries bans on the use of temporary agency 
workers are still in place for specific sectors. 
 
Figure 15 Use of private employment agencies by unemployed, 1998-2008 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ugmsw, 2009). 
Figure 16 Use of private employment agencies by unemployed, 1998-2008 
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1.5.2 Long term unemployment 
Although no special target was formulated for long-term unemployment by the Lisbon Agenda, 
this subject is worth a special section. It is an empirical fact that the chance of getting back in a 
job becomes smaller and smaller the longer one stays unemployed. That means that high 
unemployment alone does not have to be a problem, as long as mobility is high so people don’t 
stay unemployed for too long. In Table 6 we can see the percentages of all unemployed persons 
that are looking for a job for more than 12 months. It is obvious that in the US long-term 
unemployment is limited, while in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Germany, Czech Republic, Poland, 
Belgium, Romania and Greece about half or more of unemployment is long-term unemployment. 
The EU-average was mostly around 40% of all unemployed persons, but now the share is falling. 
These figures constitute a real problem because this kind of unemployment is persistent. Chances 
that these people will return into employment have become quite low during the unemployment 
period, and it will take a lot of extra effort to make labour market policy work for this group.  
Table 6  Long-term unemployment rates (% of unemployed for >12 months) 
 1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria 26.8 27.7 27.5 25.3 27.4 26.8 23.6 19.4 
Belgium 60.1 54.2 49.0 51.7 51.2 50.4 52.6 47.5 
Germany 48.2 51.2 56.3 53.0 56.4 56.6 53.4 45.9 
Denmark 29.3 21.7 21.5 23.4 20.8 16.2 16.1 7.4 
Spain 55.9 41.7 32.0 24.5 21.7 20.4 17.6 21.5 
Finland  28.2 24.0 25.8 25.2 22.9 14.9 12.3 
France 39.4 38.8 40.6 41.0 41.9 40.2 40.4 35.2 
Greece 50.7 54.7 53.1 52.2 54.3 50.0 49.6 41.3 
Ireland 61.9 37.3 34.9 33.4 32.3 30.0 29.4 24.0 
Italy 63.4 61.8 49.2 49.9 49.6 47.4 47.5 45.5 
Luxembourg 24.6 24.0 21.0 26.4 29.5 28.7 38.1 26.3 
Netherlands 47.4 26.5 34.2 40.2 43.0 39.4 36.3 25.4 
Portugal 43.3 42.3 44.3 48.2 50.2 47.1 48.3 43.6 
Sweden 25.9 25.0 19.3 17.6 15.2 13.8 10.9 10.9 
United Kingdom 41.9 26.7 20.5 21.1 22.3 23.8 25.5 22.9 
Cyprus  25.2 26.2 23.5 19.3 18.6 11.8 8.7 
Czech Republic  48.6 51.0 53.0 54.2 52.2 51.1 28.6 
Estonia  45.8 52.2 53.4 48.2 49.5 34.8 23.5 
Hungary  48.0 44.0 45.0 45.1 46.8 47.6 41.1 
Lithuania  48.7 51.2 52.5 44.3 32.0 16.9 20.6 
Latvia  57.8 43.8 46.0 36.2 26.4 26.8 24.1 
Malta  65.8 46.7 46.4 40.6 41.9 39.6 45.6 
Poland  46.1 54.0 57.7 56.1 51.3 35.0 29.4 
Slovenia  61.4 51.5 47.3 49.3 45.7 45.7 30.4 
Slovakia   54.7 64.7 71.9 76.3 74.2 72.8 52.2 
Bulgaria   57.0 59.5 59.8 55.7 58.8 50.7 44.6 
Romania   51.5 58.9 56.3 57.8 50.0 41.0 36.5 
Switzerland   26.9 31.8 36.4 37.2 39.3 32.5       
Norway   10.2 18.1 18.7 23.2 18.5 11.1 16.4 
Canada 16.8 11.2 9.5 9.6 8.7 7.5 7.1  
Japan  18.1 25.5 33.7 33.3 33.0 32.0 33.3  
Turkey   21.3 39.4 39.4 30.2 26.2 24.3 23.8 
United States  9.7 6.0 12.7 11.8 10.0 10.0 10.6  
EU27  46.1 46.1 45.9 45.5 42.7 38.5 32.3 
Source: Eurostat LFS (une_ltu_a, 2008; une_ltu_a, 2009); OECD LFS (2009). 
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1.6 Road to Lisbon blocked by crisis? 
Lately, it seems that every economic policy discussion is dominated by the economic crisis, and 
understandably so. The severity of the recession was unforeseen, and we still don’t know how 
deep it will be, what damage it will do or when it will be over. Although we will argue in Chapter 
2 that in the long run the potential employment gap is Europe’s main challenge, it becomes 
evident that the impact of the crisis on the Lisbon strategy is the most important challenge in the 
short run.  
The European Union’s 2010 Lisbon employment targets, originally agreed upon in 2000 by the 
then fifteen Member States, are all affected by the recession in an important way. Just as some 
targets were about to be realized, the economic downturn washed away this possibility. The 
figure below shows how the road to Lisbon of the EU-27 (regarding the overall employment 
target) was blocked by the impact of the crisis.  
 
Figure 17 Road to Lisbon employment target blocked by crisis 
 
Source:  Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ergan, 2009); OECD LFS (2009). 
Although the participation rise since 2004 did not really bring the original 70%-target in clear 
sight already, the movement is clearly in the wrong direction since 2008q2. Even if we would 
allow a correction because the new member states faced a lower employment than the EU15 for 
which the target was originally formulated, the crisis impact rendered it out of reach. 
 
A similar picture is shown by Figure 18 regarding the female participation target.8 
Congratulations were already in the making since 2007, but they appeared premature. Last year 
the average employment rate has fallen, and will not catch up in time, given the outlook in the 
second part of this section.   
                                                        
8 A ‘corrected’ target is not included here, because female participation in the EU15 did not differ very much 
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Figure 18 Road to female employment target bent backwards 
 
Source:  Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ergan, 2009). 
 
In Figure 19 and Table 7 below we present the latest EU forecasts9, to indicate the possible 
short-term impact on two important economic variables. The countries in the table are sorted on 
their projected unemployment level in 2010, from lowest (the Netherlands) to highest (Spain). 
 
Figure 19 EU27 forecasts, GDP and employment growth rates,  
 
Source: EC, EU Autumn forecasts 2009-2011.  
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Table 7 EU Autumn Forecasts 2009-2011 
GDP growth Unemployment level 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
Netherlands -4.5 0.3 1.6 3.4 5.4 6.0 
Denmark -4.5 1.5 1.8 4.5 5.8 5.6 
Austria -3.7 1.1 1.5 5.5 6.0 5.7 
Japan -5.9 1.1 0.4 5.8 6.3 7.0 
Cyprus -0.7 0.1 1.3 5.6 6.6 6.7 
Luxembourg -3.6 1.1 1.8 6.2 7.3 7.7 
Malta -2.2 0.7 1.6 7.1 7.4 7.3 
Czech Republic -4.8 0.8 2.3 6.9 7.9 7.4 
Bulgaria -5.9 -1.1 3.1 7.0 8.0 7.2 
Slovenia -7.4 1.3 2.0 6.7 8.3 8.5 
Italy -4.7 0.7 1.4 7.8 8.7 8.7 
Romania -8.0 0.5 2.6 9.0 8.7 8.5 
United Kingdom -4.6 0.9 1.9 7.8 8.7 8.0 
Portugal -2.9 0.3 1.0 9.0 9.0 8.9 
Germany -5.0 1.2 1.7 7.7 9.2 9.3 
Belgium -2.9 0.6 1.5 8.2 9.9 10.3 
Poland 1.2 1.8 3.2 8.4 9.9 10.0 
USA -2.5 2.2 2.0 9.2 10.1 10.2 
Greece -1.1 -0.3 0.7 9.0 10.2 11.0 
France -2.2 1.2 1.5 9.5 10.2 10.0 
Finland -6.9 0.9 1.6 8.5 10.2 9.9 
Sweden -4.6 1.4 2.1 8.5 10.2 10.1 
EU27 -4.1 0.7 1.6 9.1 10.3 10.2 
Hungary -6.5 -0.5 3.1 10.5 11.3 10.5 
Slovakia -5.8 1.9 2.6 12.3 12.8 12.6 
Ireland -7.5 -1.4 2.6 11.7 14.0 13.2 
Estonia -13.7 -0.1 4.2 13.6 15.2 14.2 
Lithuania -18.1 -3.9 2.5 14.5 17.6 18.2 
Latvia -18.0 -4.0 2.0 16.9 19.9 18.7 
Spain -3.7 -0.8 1.0 17.9 20.0 20.5 
Source: EC, EU Autumn forecasts 2009-2011. Countries are sorted by 2010 unemployment level. 
The severity of the economic crisis that dominates the world economy since the second half of 
2008 illustrates the limitations of any forecasting exercise. In the short run, the only sure thing is 
that the economic indicators will not improve much in 2010. The latest EU forecasts predict an 
average negative GDP growth of 4% in 2009, and a modest growth of only 0.7% in 2010 and 
1.6%. This unfortunate outlook spreads to all countries, although differences are easy to see. 
Forecasts for 2009 range from -18% GDP growth for Latvia and Lithuania, to a positive 1.2% 
for Poland. The Baltic states will also see negative growth in 2010, while the USA and most 
European countries will take up positive growth again.  
 
Unemployment is expected to rise to an average of over 10% in 2010. Spain and the Baltic States 
will be hit extraordinarily hard, with unemployment reaching more than 20% this year. That 
would mean a return to the conditions of the early 1990’s, when Spain faced an all-time high of 
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19.5% unemployment. Even low-unemployment countries, like Cyprus, Austria, Denmark, and 
the Netherlands will face unemployment levels of 5-6%.10 
 
Figure 20 Unemployment target EU27 has never been in sight 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (une_rt_q, 2010). 
1.7 Summary 
Put simply, none of the Lisbon targets will be met in 2010. The average European employment 
rate will remain below 70%, while average employment for women will remain below 60% and 
for elderly below 50%. Unemployment will not only be higher than the target of 4%, it will 
actually be 2-3 times as high.  
Looking per country, only some countries meet the Lisbon targets of employment, none will 
meet the unemployment target. Countries that were unlikely to meet Lisbon targets in 2010 before 
the impact of the financial crisis and economic recession are certainly not going to meet targets 
now that a recession is occurring. But recent forecasts are such that all countries that were getting 
close will not be able to meet the targets anymore.  
 
 
                                                        
10 The forecasts mentioned here are EU forecasts from November 2009. Some countries have published their 
own forecasts, which often deviate considerably. For example in the Netherlands, an unemployment rate of 8 
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2 Demand and supply in the future labour 
market 
Which trends will be the most important for the future European labour market? After studying 
modern labour relations against their historic background, this chapter makes an attempt to look 
forward. After all the economic crisis is deep, but not everlasting. What goes down must come up 
at some point, although not every country will face the same problems. What type of labour 
market imbalances should be expected, when the effects of the current crisis have long 
disappeared? How do these imbalances differ per country, and which solutions appear most 
eligible?   
Two years ago we already reported on long-term labour market frictions (see Berkhout et al., 
2007) by introducing the so-called ‘potential employment gap’. In this chapter we review that 
topic once more (section 2.2) and present an update (2.3). We look at the different impacts per 
country (2.4) and then discuss possible solutions (2.5). 
2.1 Ageing: a long-term trend  
Because the economic recession currently leads to a sharp and sudden decrease of labour demand 
resulting in lower employment rates and an increase in unemployment, it is tempting to focus all 
attention on this short-term problem. But it remains important to remember that during a 
recession population trends do not stop. Focus on the long term remains necessary: once the 
recession has lifted, the long-term issues we were working on before the crisis will still be waiting 
for us. Ironically, although long-term predictions exhibit more uncertainty than short-term 
projections, they are more resistant to specific shocks, such as the current recession and financial 
crisis.  
 
Eurostat has published a recent long-term outlook in which they present population 
development scenarios for the EU Member States for the period 2008-2060 (Eurostat, 2008). 
This section shows some results of this outlook. 11 Figure 21 shows clearly that the number of 
elderly will grow while the number of working-age persons and children will decline. In the 
baseline projection the working age group will decline from over 330 million to just over 280 
million in the next 50 years. The ‘no migration’ scenario is not a realistic scenario, it is a 
hypothetical construct to show the implicit impact of migration in the baseline population 
projection.12 The projections from this scenario are included in the figure, and will be discussed 
in more detail in section 2.3.4.  
 
                                                        
11 We do not discuss the projection in detail, background information can be found in Eurostat (2008) and in 
Berkhout et al. (2007). 
12 All the parameters of the ‘no migration’ scenario are similar to the parameters of the baseline projection, except 
for the projected migration. Each country is assumed to have no outflow and no inflow of citizens, only 
births and deaths. While this is completely unrealistic, it is useful to show the implicit effects of migration. for 
more detail on the methodology see Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 72,2008. 
26   CHAPTER 2 
SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
Figure 21 Youth, working age and elderly population, EU-27, projection 2008-2060 
Source: Eurostat (EUROPOP2008). 
The most relevant implication of the previous figures, is that the relative size of the working age 
group will fall. Figure 22 shows that the share of people in the working age (‘potential 
employment’) will decline, from 67% to somewhere between 54-57%.  
 
Figure 22 Working age as % of total population, EU-27, projection 2008-2060 
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The impact of ageing will be larger in some countries than in others, depending on the 
institutional design of the welfare state and on the national share of elderly. Figure 23 shows the 
current grey rate for European and other countries. It becomes clear that in Japan, Italy, 
Germany and Greece ageing will have a lot more effect (and a lot sooner) than in the non-
Western or Anglo-Saxon countries.  
 
Figure 23 Grey rate per country in 2007 (population 65+ as % of population 15-64) 
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Effects of ageing on potential labour supply 
Figure 24 compares the detailed age distribution in 2008 with the projected distribution in 2050 
(baseline projection EU-27). The height of the bars represents the relative size of the age group 
in the total population, the blue bars for the 2008 population and the grey bars for the 2050 
population. All the blue bars together sum to 100%, as do all the grey bars together.  
 
Figure 24 Age distribution of the EU-27 population, 2008 vs. projection 2050 
 
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat (EUROPOP 2008). 
In the coming decades the bulk -which is now in the middle- will shift to the right. The share of 
people in the working age (15-64) will become smaller, the share of elderly (65 years and over) 
will rise and the share of ‘older elderly’ (aged 80+) will more than double.13  
 
Because most elderly do not want to work anymore, they do not supply any labour on the labour 
market. As such, ageing will bring down the share of the potential labour force (people in the 
age of 15-64): the potential supply of labour will diminish.  
 
At the same time, the effective demand for goods and services is still in place. Both the younger 
and the older population still wants to consume; they all need food & drinks, housing, health 
care, transport, holidays etc. etc. Let’s therefore assume, for the time being, that the demand for 
labour will remain constant. Of course this assumption is simplistic, but it serves an explanatory 
purpose and we will relax this assumption later on. We will also discuss the impact of alternative 
assumptions in section 2.3.6.  
 
A lower supply confronted with a constant demand leads –all else equal- to what we have called a 
potential employment gap. It is not literally a ‘gap’, because over the course of time the 
economic system will inherently try to restore equilibrium. Some economic parameters (that we 
                                                        
13 The figure shows that in 2050 around 11% of our population will have an age of 80 years or higher. The share 
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assumed constant, for the sake of argument) will have to adjust in order to close this potential 
gap. For example, people have to produce more goods per employee (increase labour 
productivity). Or the employment rate has to increase, even when the Lisbon targets have been 
met. Wages will also be influenced by structural imbalances, net wages will be an important 
instrument in both solutions mentioned above. We will discuss which economic parameters are 
most eligible for adjustment, per country, in section 2.5.3. The concept of potential employment 
gap hereby serves as a quantitative measure of tension, it shows how much the economic 
parameters have to adjust.   
 
Notice that we only look at employment issues, not at issues relating to public finance. In our 
calculations we assess how - in an ageing society - labour supply will change, leading to potential 
labour market frictions. We do not deal with other (financial) aspects of an ageing society. For 
example, how to finance the increased demand for health care, state pensions, etcetera. This 
means that even when employment would remain at the current level, the employed population 
will still spend a greater part of their income on financing the elderly population (unless public 
finance arrangements are altered). The question of how to prevent this is part of a separate line of 
research and beyond the scope of this publication.14  
2.2 Potential employment gap revisited 
The concept of a potential employment gap needs an update, for various reasons. The first 
reason for an update is that Eurostat recently published a new outlook in which they present 
population projections for the EU Member States for the period 2008-2060. This new outlook 
builds on the most recent insights on each country’s fertility rate and life expectancy plus on a 
new projection of net migration. It now also presents estimates for the EU-27, whereas the 
former scenario’s contained only the EU-25 countries. Eurostat presents several scenario’s but 
our publication only deals with the so-called baseline projection, because this projection is build 
on the most realistic assumptions given current knowledge. The new results are introduced in 
sections 2.3.1 en 2.3.2. We will use the hypothetical no-migration scenario in section 2.3.4, but 
only to indicate the importance of migration assumptions that are present in the baseline 
projection. 
 
The second reason for an update is an improved method of calculation. Our previous method 
used the (rather strong) assumption of constant total demand. Put simply, total demand for 
goods and services was said not to change between the present and 2050. We now relax this 
assumption, and instead we assume constant demand per capita (section 2.3.3). This implies 
that if the size of the population declines, total demand for goods and services will also decline 
proportionally (and hence the demand for labour). Not that the size of the total population in 
EU27 will not change drastically on average, but there will be differences per country. So in practice 
we allow demand for labour to rise in countries where the total population grows, and we allow 
demand to fall where total population decreases. Under this assumption the ‘standard of living’ 
will not change, the average individual will maintain exactly his current level of consumption.15  
 
                                                        
14 More on the financial aspects of ageing can be found in a recent study requested by the European Finance 
members, see http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/thematic_articles/article14761_en.htm.  
15 Only the sum of all individual consumption in a country will be different, but that is not what is important for 
welfare. 
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The assumption of constant labour productivity is still in place, initially. Some believe 
productivity to rise exogenously. In the first stage we retain the constant productivity assumption 
because of the lack of reliable projections of long term (real) labour productivity growth per 
country. Then (in a sensitivity analysis in section 2.3.6) we show the impact of different 
productivity growth scenarios on the potential employment gap. The same holds for demand 
per capita: many believe it will rise, but reliable long term projections are nearly impossible to 
produce. Notice that the two effects have reverse impacts. For example, if both labour 
productivity and demand per capita grow by 1% yearly, the effects will cancel each other out and 
the combined effect on labour demand will be zero.   
 
For the interested reader, we will explain our calculation in technical details in the next section. 
Without reading this technical section, it is still very much possible to pick up the discussion in 
section 2.4, where we present the results for each country. Finally, we discuss the eligible 
solutions per country in section 2.5.  
2.3 Calculating the potential employment gap (step-
by-step) 
This section is set up as shown in Table 8 below. First we calculate the potential employment gap 
under the hypothetical assumption of a constant total population (section 2.3.1). This implies 
that total demand is constant too. This exercise isolates the effects of ageing on the 
employment gap.  
Next, we allow for changes in total population, just as the baseline scenario predicts. To 
compare this exercise to the one in Mind the Gap, we calculate the potential employment gap with 
total demand fixed (section 2.3.2).  
The final aim of our calculations however is to insert the assumption of constant demand per 
capita. Combined with changes in total population that means changes in total demand and thus 
in the demand for labour (section 2.3.3). In section 2.3.4 we discuss the role of migration, in 2.3.5 
we summarize the results. In section 2.3.6 we present a sensitivity analysis in which we relax the 
assumptions of constant demand per capita and constant labour productivity, to see how it 
influences the outcomes.  
 
Table 8 Assumptions in calculations, step-by-step 
 population (labour supply) (labour) demand 
2.3.1 (ageing only) constant constant 
2.3.2 (baseline old) baseline constant 
2.3.3 (baseline new) baseline proportional to population 
2.3.4 (no migration old) no migration constant 
2.3.4 (no migration new) no migration proportional to population 
2.3.6 (sensitivity analysis) baseline sensitivity analysis 
 
2.3.1 Population and demand remain constant 
To illustrate the principle calculation, we start by assuming that the population size remains 
constant over time. As a consequence, this also means that total demand remains constant. 
This is of course not the most realistic assumption, but for the moment it serves the explanatory 
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principle. The only thing that varies in this example is the age distribution, as shown in Figure 24. 
In this way, we actually isolate the effects of ageing, in both absolute and relative terms. 
 
The effect of a declining working age rate on the potential labour supply is illustrated in Table 9 
below. The first column shows the 2008 employment situation. Out of 495 million people in the 
EU (A) only 67.3% (B) are between the age of 15-64. This amounts to 333 million (C). The 
employment rate among this available labour force is 66.0% (D), which means that actually 220 
million people (E) are currently employed.  
 
In 2050 the working age rate (B) will have dropped from 67.3% to 57.1%, purely as a 
consequence of ageing. Then the ageing effect translates into an available labour force of only 
283 million in 2050 (C) (57.1% of 495 million people). The rest of the population is simply too 
young or too old to be active on the labour market. If European employment rates would remain 
at their current levels, this would imply a labour supply of only 187 million (E) (66% of 283 
million). Because in this example population size is assumed to remain constant, total demand 
(for goods and services and hence indirectly for labour) will also remain at the same level. Using 
these assumptions, the ‘potential gap’16 between labour supply and labour demand will be 
roughly 33 million people.  
 
Table 9  Calculation of the potential employment gap, EU-27 (method 1). 
  supply demand difference to close the 
gap   2008 2050 2050 2050 
Population (M) A: 495.4 constant constant constant  
Working age rate 15-64 B: 67.3% 57.1%    
Available labour force 
(M) C: 333.2 283.1   283.1 
Employment rate D: 66.0% 66.0%   77.7% 
Real employment (M) E: 219.9 186.8 219.9 -33.1 
(15.1%) 
219.9 
Source: SEO calculations based on Europop2008. 
Conclusion is that, all else equal, we would have to find a solution for the output that is currently 
created by 33 million employees in the EU27. This is 15% of all 220 million employed. We will 
discuss potential solutions in section 2.5.  
 
Among other solutions, this potential gap might be closed by raising the employment rate. This is 
reflected in the rightmost column of Table 9. If on average 77.7% of the new labour force would 
participate in employment, labour supply would increase to (77.7% x 283 million) 220 million 
people, thereby again equalling demand. This 77.7% is well above the Lisbon target of 70% and 
will be hard to achieve in all EU-27 countries. However, it does not seem impossible on average 
and might be realistic target for a lot of countries to meet at some point before the year 2050.  
We will turn to differences between countries in sections 2.4 and 2.5. First we improve our 
calculation by relaxing more of the assumptions. 
                                                        
16 We call it a potential gap because in the calculation we have made some rather strong assumptions. Some of 
these will be relaxed later on. 
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2.3.2 Population varies according to baseline projection 
So far we have kept total population constant, we will relax this assumption now, and let the 
population change according to the Eurostat baseline projection while demand is still fixed. This 
is in line with the method used in our previous publication. In the new baseline projection, the 
EU-27 population is expected to grow by 4%, totalling 515 million people in 2050. If we add this 
information to our calculation, it runs as shown in Table 15.  
 
Table 10  Calculation of the potential employment gap, EU-27 (method 2). 
  supply demand difference to close the 
gap   2008 2050 2050 2050 
Population (M) A: 495.4 515.3 constant   
Working age rate 15-64 B: 67.3% 57.1%    
Available labour force 
(M) C: 333.2 294.4   294.4 
Employment rate D: 66.0% 66.0%   74.7% 
Real employment (M) E: 219.9 194.3 219.9 -25.6 
(11.6%) 
219.9 
Source: SEO calculations based on Europop2008. 
As mentioned before, if the baseline scenario actually predicts important changes in the 
population size, it makes sense to allow demand for labour to rise in countries where the total 
population grows, and to allow demand to fall where total population decreases. That leads us to 
the next section, where we relax this assumptions. 
2.3.3 Demand also varies according to baseline projection (constant per 
capita) 
Finally, we only assume constant demand per capita, which in fact means that demand is allowed 
to vary proportionally to the population size. Population is expected to change according to the 
Eurostat baseline projection. Implicit in the assumption is still a constant (real) labour 
productivity which we will discuss in more detail in section 2.3.6. Calculation of the potential 
employment gap under these assumptions is shown in the table below. 
 
Table 11  Calculation of the potential employment gap, EU-27 (method 3). 
  supply demand difference to close the 
gap   2008 2050 2050 2050 
Population (M) A: 495.4 515.3 (+4%) + 4%   
Working age rate 15-64 B: 67.3% 57.1%    
Available labour force 
(M) C: 333.2 294.4   294.4 
Employment rate D: 66.0% 66.0%   77.7% 
Real employment (M) E: 219.9 194.3 228.8 (+4%) -34.5 
(15.1%) 
228.8 
Source: SEO calculations based on Europop2008. 
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We see that for the relative measures of the potential employment gap, the shifting age 
distribution is all that matters. Because demand and supply are both relative to the population 
size, the potential gap in the baseline scenario is 15.1% of total employment needed, which could 
(among other solutions) be remedied by a rise in the average employment rate from 66% to 
77.7%.  
2.3.4 The role of migration 
What is the role of migration? Can extra labour migration serve as a solution to the potential 
employment gap? The answer to that question deserves a special section, because migration is 
already incorporated in the baseline projection, and thus in the potential employment gap 
calculations. Actually, migration is the most important (and uncertain) factor in the projection. 
Country differences in migration are much larger than differences in fertility rates or death rates 
of the current population. In this section we bring the implicit assumptions above the surface by 
confronting the baseline projection with the hypothetical ‘no migration’ scenario. That scenario is 
not a realistic scenario on its own, but it serves the purpose of illustrating which role migration 
plays in the baseline scenario. 17 It enables us to calculate how migration projections influence the 
projected population (Table 12) and employment (Table 13).  
 
The left part of Table 12 shows a comparison of each country’s population size in 2008 with the 
2050 projection in the baseline and no migration scenario, and the growth over this whole period 
in percentages. The right panel shows the difference between the two projections, which can be 
interpreted as the implicit net migration between 2008-2050.18 The rightmost column shows the 
share of net migration between 2008-2050 (let’s call that ‘new migrants’) as a percentage of the 
total population in the baseline scenario. 19  
 
                                                        
17 For more detailed background information on the scenarios, we refer to Eurostat (2008) and Berkhout et al. 
(2007). 
18 To be more precise:  this number includes the effect of net migration of people and the higher birthrate of 
migrants. In this definition, children of migrants are counted as migrants also. 
19 This should not be confused with the ‘number of immigrants’ in a country, which is a stock variable. The last 
columns in this table present flow variables: foreigners who are living in the EU in 2008 already are not 
counted in, but nationals who return to their origin country from outside Europe between 2008-2050 are. 
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Table 12 Impact of migration in the baseline scenario population (mln. persons) 
Population 2050  net migration 2008-2050 
 2008 baseline growth nomig growth absolute relative 
Lithuania 3.4 2.7 -19% 2.8 -17% 0.0 -2% 
Latvia 2.3 1.8 -20% 1.8 -21% 0.0 0% 
Estonia 1.3 1.2 -12% 1.2 -13% 0.0 1% 
Poland 38.1 33.3 -13% 32.8 -14% 0.5 1% 
Bulgaria 7.6 5.9 -22% 5.8 -24% 0.1 2% 
Romania 21.4 18.1 -15% 17.8 -17% 0.3 2% 
Slovakia 5.4 4.9 -10% 4.6 -14% 0.2 4% 
Netherlands 16.4 16.9 +3% 15.8 -3% 1.1 6% 
Finland 5.3 5.4 +3% 5.1 -4% 0.4 7% 
France 61.9 71.0 +15% 65.5 +6% 5.5 8% 
Denmark 5.5 5.9 +8% 5.4 -2% 0.5 9% 
Hungary 10.0 9.1 -10% 8.1 -20% 1.0 11% 
Slovenia 2.0 1.9 -7% 1.7 -18% 0.2 12% 
Malta 0.4 0.4 +1% 0.4 -12% 0.1 13% 
Czech Rep. 10.3 9.9 -4% 8.6 -17% 1.3 13% 
Germany 82.2 74.5 -9% 64.3 -22% 10.2 14% 
Sweden 9.2 10.7 +16% 9.1 -1% 1.6 15% 
UK 61.3 74.5 +22% 62.1 +1% 12.4 17% 
Belgium 10.7 12.2 +14% 10.1 -5% 2.1 17% 
Greece 11.2 11.4 +2% 9.4 -16% 2.1 18% 
Ireland 4.4 6.5 +48% 5.3 +19% 1.3 19% 
Italy 59.5 61.2 +3% 48.5 -19% 12.8 21% 
Austria 8.3 9.1 +10% 7.2 -14% 1.9 21% 
Portugal 10.6 11.4 +8% 9.0 -15% 2.5 21% 
Spain 45.3 53.2 +18% 40.2 -11% 13.0 24% 
Luxembourg 0.5 0.7 +45% 0.5 -3% 0.2 33% 
Cyprus 0.8 1.3 +57% 0.8 1% 0.5 36% 
EU-27 495.4 515.3 4% 443.7 -10% 71.6 14% 
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat (EUROPOP 2008). 
Migration in this definition is ‘net migration’, that is the sum of people moving into the country 
(immigrants) and people moving out (emigrants). An important share of these migration flows 
are intra-EU flows, but migration flows to and from non-EU countries are also important. In 
fact, the EU-27 total on the last row presents ‘net net migration’, which means the net sum of total 
migration from non-EU countries into the EU between 2008 and 2050. 
 
What does this table tell us? Firstly, it shows that in every country except Lithuania net migration 
is projected to be positive over the period 2008-2050. Secondly, it tells us that the baseline 
scenario is build upon the assumption of roughly 70 million net migration in these four decades.  
More people will move from outside Europe into the EU than the other way around. Note that 
this need not all be non-EU nationals: it will also concern people born in the EU but living 
abroad, who return to their home country somewhere between 2008-2050. Thirdly, within 
Europe net migration is obviously higher in the Southern- & Western European countries than it 
is in Eastern Europe. Finally, the table shows that in the baseline projection 14% of the EU 
population in 2050 is expected to consist of ‘new migrants’: people who where not living in the 
EU in 2008 plus their children.  
 
What does this mean for the labour market? Obviously, without migration, labour supply would 
be less. This is reflected in the left panel Table 13, which shows a comparison of each country’s 
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employment supply in 2008 with the 2050 projection in the baseline and no migration scenario. 
The (mostly negative) growth over this whole period is shown in absolute values.20 The right 
panel shows the difference between the two projections, which can be interpreted as the implicit 
net migration of labour between 2008-2050. The rightmost column shows the share of net labour 
migration between 2008-2050 as a percentage of the total employment in the baseline scenario. 
Table 13 Impact of migration in the baseline employment (mln. persons) 
 
Employment supply 2050  Immigrated labour  
2008-2050 
2008 baseline diff. nomig diff. absolute relative 
Lithuania 1.5 1.0 -0.5 1.1 -0.4 0.0 -3% 
Latvia 1.1 0.7 -0.4 0.7 -0.4 0.0 0% 
Estonia 0.6 0.5 -0.2 0.5 -0.2 0.0 2% 
Poland 16.0 11.1 -4.8 10.9 -5.0 0.2 2% 
Romania 8.9 6.2 -2.7 6.1 -2.9 0.2 2% 
Bulgaria 3.4 2.1 -1.2 2.1 -1.3 0.1 3% 
Slovakia 2.4 1.7 -0.7 1.6 -0.8 0.1 5% 
Finland 2.6 2.3 -0.3 2.1 -0.5 0.2 8% 
France 26.3 26.6 0.3 24.0 -2.2 2.5 9% 
Netherlands 8.5 7.6 -0.9 6.9 -1.6 0.7 10% 
Denmark 2.8 2.7 -0.1 2.4 -0.4 0.3 12% 
Hungary 3.9 3.0 -0.9 2.6 -1.3 0.4 13% 
Slovenia 1.0 0.7 -0.3 0.6 -0.4 0.1 15% 
Malta 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 16% 
Czech Republic 4.9 3.7 -1.2 3.1 -1.8 0.6 17% 
Sweden 4.5 4.7 0.2 3.9 -0.7 0.9 18% 
Germany 38.3 29.4 -8.8 24.0 -14.3 5.5 19% 
Belgium 4.4 4.4 0.1 3.5 -0.9 0.9 21% 
United Kingdom 29.1 32.3 3.1 25.2 -3.9 7.1 22% 
Ireland 2.1 2.6 0.6 2.0 0.0 0.6 23% 
Greece 4.7 3.9 -0.7 3.0 -1.7 0.9 23% 
Portugal 4.9 4.5 -0.4 3.3 -1.6 1.2 27% 
Italy 23.2 20.0 -3.3 14.5 -8.7 5.4 27% 
Austria 4.1 3.8 -0.2 2.8 -1.3 1.1 28% 
Spain 20.2 18.9 -1.3 13.1 -7.1 5.8 31% 
Luxembourg 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 39% 
Cyprus 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.2 42% 
EU27 219.9 194.3 -25.6 159.7 -60.3 34.7 18% 
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat (EUROPOP 2008). 
 
While the pattern is similar to Table 12, the implicit role of migration in employment is larger 
than the implicit role in population because migrants are more often of working age 15-64. Of all 
employees in the EU-27 in 2050, 18% will have come from outside the EU somewhere since 
2008. In Austria and the Mediterranean countries migration plays an even more important role in 
the next decades.  
Table 13 again shows that employment in 2050 will have dropped by more than 25 million under 
the baseline scenario, from 219.9 to 194.3. From that 2050 labour force of 194 million people, 
nearly 35 million will be new migrants. Without these labour migrants, the labour supply will be 
only 160 million, which is 60 million less than the labour supply of 2008.  
                                                        
20 Therefor the individual country numbers in this table are comparable with Table 3.7 in ‘Mind the Gap’ 
(Berkhout et al, 2007). 
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However, that does not mean that the employment gap without migration would also be 60 
million. In our updated calculation we now have to account for the drop in demand as well (see 
section 2.3.3). Because without the new migrants demand for labour will be lower as well, only 
not proportionally to labour supply. This means that without migration, quantitative labour 
market frictions will be more prominent, as we demonstrate in Table 14.  
 
Table 14  Calculation of the potential employment gap, EU-27 (‘no migration’ scenario, new). 
  supply demand difference to close the 
gap   2008 2050 2050 2050 
Population (M) A: 495.4 443.7 (-10%) -10%   
Working age rate 15-64 B: 67.3% 54.5%    
Available labour force 
(M) C: 333.2 241.9   241.9 
Employment rate D: 66.0% 66.0%   81.4% 
Real employment (M) E: 219.9 159.7 197.0 -37.3 
(18.9%) 
197.0 
Source: SEO calculations based on Europop2008. 
No migration would mean less population growth (-10% instead of +4%). But in this smaller 
population the absence of migration would also mean a lower share of people in the working age 
(54.5% instead of 57.1%). In other words: without migration the ageing effect will be larger, 
because most migrants are between 15-64. Without the new migrants, the share of elderly will be 
even bigger than in the baseline projection shown in Figure 24. The effect of the population 
decline is offset by a proportional decline in demand (because we would have ‘less mouth to 
feed’) but the lower working age rate would not be offset. It would indicate an even bigger gap 
between supply and demand: 37.3 million people out of a total employment demand of 197 
million means a potential employment gap of 18.9% of employment needed. The average 
employment rate should rise from 66% to 81.4% in order to close this gap on its own.  
 
Finally, we return to the question if migration can be a solution to our potential employment gap. 
The strict answer is no, but only because the effect of migration has been discounted already. In 
fact, migration is already a solution! Migration is a prerequisite (for the potential employment gap 
not being larger), not an extra solution. As such, migration is a very important component, 
because without migration the potential employment gap would be even wider. However, within 
Europe migration is much more prominent in the South and West, which suggests that maybe in 
Eastern Europe higher net migration (than currently projected) might be a solution. That may be 
effectuated with more immigration of foreigners, more remigration of nationals living abroad, or 
just as well with lower emigration of current citizens.  
 
What is not explicitly incorporated in our calculations, but just as well important, is the qualitative 
match (see also the theoretical framework in 2.5.1). Intra-EU labour migration as well as many 
types of extra-EU migration are very important for matching the labour supply to the requested 
type of labour. Such migration functions as the grease that lets the wheel of the economy move 
freely. Without migration, qualitative mismatches will be much higher, and so will be 
unemployment. More unfulfilled vacancies will exist along with higher unemployment. On the 
longer term, as long as (foreign) labour is allowed to move to countries where vacancies are 
abundant, it reduces the need for offshoring production capacity to those countries where labour 
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is abundant. All in all, migration is an essential element of our modern economies, from which 
everyone can benefit. 
2.3.5 Summarizing potential employment gap calculations  
Table 15 briefly summarizes the potential employment gap for all the different methods and 
scenario’s that we mention in the previous sections. The row beginning with ‘Ageing effect only’ 
refers to the calculations made in section 2.3.1. Recall that under the hypothetical assumption of 
a fixed population and a fixed total demand, the potential employment gap was 33.1 million 
people. This amounts to 15% of total employment in 2050 and could be remedied with an overall 
employment rate of 77.7%. For comparability reasons, we also included the employment gaps as 
would be produced using the old method, both for the baseline scenario (see 2.3.2) and the no-
migration scenario (see previous section). 
 
The last two rows, printed in bold, present the updated employment gap calculations. The 
baseline projection calculation in row 4 differs from the calculations in the first row through a 
4% increase of the total population size. With constant demand per capita, this is reflected in a 
larger supply as well as a larger demand. It therefore only affects the absolute size of the 
employment gap, the relative size of the employment gap is not affected. Also in the baseline 
scenario an employment rate of 77.7% will close the potential employment gap.  
 
The last rows concern the (hypothetical) no migration scenario. Because migrants are more 
often of working age, disallowing immigration leads to a smaller potential labour force. This 
means that a larger share of the potential labour force has to be activated, until an employment 
rate of 81.4% is reached. In other words, disallowing immigration worsens the ageing effect, 
because the balance between the working age population and the non-working-age population 
will worsen.21 Notice that migration flows may differ widely between countries. 
Table 15 Potential employment gap 2050 in absolute and relative terms, EU27  
  total demand 
(million) 
Gap in # 
persons 
(million) 
Gap as % of 
total demand 
Employment rate needed 
to close potential gap 
Ageing effect only 220 33.1  15.1%  77.7% 
Baseline (old) 220 25.6  11.6%  74.7% 
No migration  (old) 220 60.3  27.4%  90.9% 
Baseline (new) 229 34.5  15.1%  77.7% 
No migration  (new) 197 37.3  18.9%  81.4% 
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat (EUROPOP 2008). 
Potential employment gaps can be calculated for different points in time. To illustrate, Table 16 
shows the potential employment gap calculations for 2025. Labour market frictions will not wait 
to happen until 2050, they will develop gradually. Although their average impact in 2025 may not 
be very dramatic, some countries already face an important challenge (see also Section 2.4).  
                                                        
21 The implicit assumption here is that in the baseline scenario migrant supply fits the demanded type of labour 
exactly. 
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Table 16 Potential employment gap 2025 in absolute and relative terms, EU27  
  total demand 
(million) 
Gap in # 
persons 
(million) 
Gap as % of 
total demand 
Employment rate needed 
to close potential gap 
Baseline (new) 230 13.5 5.9% 70.1% 
No migration (new) 217 14.6 6.7% 70.7% 
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat (EUROPOP 2008, lfsq_ergan). 
 
2.3.6 Sensitivity analysis: changing demand and productivity 
In the section 2.3.3 we arrived at the baseline scenario calculation being the most plausible. There 
we assumed demand (for goods and services) to be constant per capita. However, this implicitly 
means constant (real) labour productivity and no exogenous (real) GDP per capita 
growth.22,23 In this section, we illustrate what happens if these assumptions are not met. Table 17 
shows the resulting potential employment gaps of several examples. 24 
 
If labour productivity rises at a faster rate than demand for goods and services per capita, the 
employment gap will be smaller (or not exist at all): see the first three rows of the table. If the 
opposite occurs, the employment gap will get bigger: see the last three rows of the table.  
If productivity growth equals the growth of demand for goods and services per capita (middle 
row) we are back at the baseline projection results of the previous section.25 In fact, our 
assumption therefore needs not to be as strict as formulated before: labour productivity and 
GDP per capita growth need not be zero, as long as their magnitude is the same the results will 
be similar to the ones in our calculation method.   
 
                                                        
22 Labour productivity in the economic sense is a measure of the amount of output one worker produces. It is 
usually calculated as (total GDP / number of workers). Real labour productivity means after correction for 
inflation. Real GDP per capita growth is what can be seen as ‘economic growth’ in the sense of the average 
person being able to consume more goods/services than he did last year. It relates to nominal GDP growth 
after correction for population growth (‘per capita’) and for inflation (‘real’). 
23 To be more precise, the two variables do not exactly need to be zero. The argument is similar if only 
productivity and GDP growth are of the same magnitude.   
24 The numbers used in this example are only illustrative. For realistic assumptions at least national estimates 
should be used, and one should calculate demand growth per capita. Productivity growth should be analysed 
preferably on a sectoral level. Sectoral labour shifts  may influence labour productivity.  
25 Results may be different if demand rises for goods and services in some sectors of the economy and labour 
productivity rises in other sectors. 
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Table 17 Potential employment gap 2050 with different demand & productivity parameters, 
EU27 baseline projection 
labour productivity total GDP per capita In number of 
persons 
(million) 




rate needed to 
close gap 
0.2% yearly constant 16.0 7.6% 71.4% 
0.8% yearly 0.6% yearly 16.1 7.7% 71.5% 
1.0% yearly 0.7% yearly 7.6 3.8% 68.6% 
    
productivity growth equal to GDP per capita growth = outcomes equal to baseline projection:  
  34.5 15.1% 77.7% 
    
constant 0.2% yearly 54.5 21.9% 84.5% 
0.6% yearly 0.8% yearly 54.4 21.9% 84.5% 
0.7% yearly 1.0% yearly 64.9 25.0% 88.0% 
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat (EUROPOP 2008, lfsq_ergan). 
Unfortunately, it is clear that the size (and even the existence) of the employment gap is sensitive 
to assumptions about changes in labour productivity and in the demand for goods and services 
per capita. As the above table shows, small (yearly) changes can have large consequences for the 
employment gap.26 Historically, productivity increases may have led directly to increases in GDP 
per capita, but in the future productivity increases might be needed simply to replace the outflow 
of labour (‘fill the employment gap’) in order to keep GDP per capita at a constant level. 
 
Although the most realistic ‘mix’ of changes in labour productivity and demand per capita is hard 
to predict, the publication of Cedefop’s medium-term forecast of future skills needs (Cedefop, 
2008) may give some underpinning. Cedefop projects labour demand to grow faster than labour 
productivity, such that a net additional demand for labour will arise. This complies with the 
scenario’s in the bottom part of Table 17. In Cedefop’s projections, the sectoral shift from 
manufacturing to services will probably have a negative impact on average labour productivity.27  
 
To what extent every assumption is realistic, depends largely on the country and economic sector 
at hand. Therefore we elaborate on the situation per country in the next section. Furthermore, 
our ‘potential employment gap’ exercise’ only looks at quantitative mismatches on the labour 
market. Next to this, qualitative mismatches will be an empirical fact as well, and should also be 
dealt with. We address that in section 2.5.1. 
2.4 Future frictions by country 
Figure 25 repeats our calculations, but now for each country separately.28 Assuming constant 
demand per capita, population development along the baseline projection, and constant labour 
productivity, Figure 25 shows how much employment participation among people aged 15-64 
should increase if it is to close the potential gap all by itself, in 2025 and in 2050.  
                                                        
26 Large differences between labour productivity growth and growth in demand per capita are not to be expected, 
because there is a relation (although not one to one) between productivity growth and growth in demand per 
capita. 
27 The Cedefop scenario’s are calculated by Cambridge Economics, using the econometric model E3ME (see 
www.e3me.com for details). This model differentiates over 40 different economic sectors per country. 
However, the growth rates are only projected until the year 2015.  
28 See section 2.3 for detailed discussion of the method used 
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Figure 25 Potential employment gap widens between 2025 and 2050 
 
 
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat (EUROPOP 2008, lfsq_ergan). 
 
Within the European Union, the employment rate is currently highest in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, with levels close to 80%. Suppose that each country will, in the long term, be able 
to increase their employment participation levels to this level. Would that solve their employment 
gaps, or not? Table 20 shows the answer. The first column presents the employment rate of each 
country. The second column shows how high the employment rate should get if it is to solve the 
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is that enough 
to ‘close the 
gap’? 
remaining gap  
(%-points) 
Austria 72.3 83.7 80 no 3.7 
Belgium 62.0 69.9 80 yes  
Germany 70.3 82.8 80 no 2.8 
Denmark 78.4 87.3 80 no 7.3 
Spain 65.0 81.7 80 no 1.7 
Finland 72.3 83.7 80 no 3.7 
France 65.2 74.1 80 yes  
Greece 62.2 75.4 80 yes  
Ireland 68.1 79.3 80 yes  
Italy 59.2 70.8 80 yes  
Netherlands 77.2 89.1 80 no 9.1 
Portugal 68.6 81.1 80 no 1.1 
Sweden 74.8 83.3 80 no 3.3 
UK 71.6 78.6 80 yes  
Czech Rep. 66.6 83.9 80 no 3.9 
Estonia 69.8 81.7 80 no 1.7 
Hungary 56.5 67.3 80 yes  
Lithuania 64.6 76.6 80 yes  
Latvia 69.5 83.0 80 no 3.0 
Poland 58.9 73.7 80 yes  
Slovenia 68.3 87.4 80 no 7.4 
Slovakia 61.7 78.2 80 yes  
Bulgaria 63.9 78.5 80 yes  
Romania 59.7 72.8 80 yes  
EU27 66.0 77.7 80 yes  
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat (EUROPOP 2008, lfsq_ergan). 
Comparing the fourth column with the third gives some indication as to how much the 
employment rate can do to close the employment gap. For example, if Finland would succeed to 
achieve 80% employment, this is by no means enough to close the gap. So, either a lot has to 
change in terms of labour participation (being like the best in Europe is not enough), and/or 
other parameters will need to change too.  
What we also see here is the ‘curse of the leaders’: once you are in front, there is not much to 
gain anymore (but a lot to lose). Because Denmark and the Netherlands have high participation 
levels already, increasing their levels to the new target won’t help them anymore. The higher 
numbers in the ‘remaining gap’ column should therefore not be too worrying. They merely 
indicate that for these countries either a higher reference level of participation should be striven 
for, or that other solutions should be developed. In the next section we will turn to potential 
solutions to close the gap. 
 
The importance of migration 
To get an impression of the implicit contribution of labour migration between 2008-2050 per 
country, look at Figure 26. The blue bars present the potential employment gap (the shortfall of 
labour supply), shown as the percentage of employment demand. As demonstrated before, the 
EU-27 average is 15.1%. In most Eastern and Southern European countries the shortfall is 
bigger, in most Western EU countries it is smaller. The relatively favourable position of the UK 
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(9%) and Austria (14%) is due to relatively large net migration. The grey bars show that, without 
any kind of migration during the 2008-2050 period, their potential employment gaps would have 
been six to seven percentage points higher. Also in Germany, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain 
future migration will play an important role in reducing quantitative labour market frictions. 
Figure 26 Relative employment gap, by country, baseline & no migration, 2050 
 
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat (EUROPOP 2008, lfsq_ergan). 
Since the EU enlargement, temporary migration is rapidly gaining importance, and has become a 
flexible form of adjustment to potential labour market frictions. Many labourers from the new 
EU Member countries quickly adapt their supply of labour by travelling to there where labour 
demand is highest and vacancies are abundant. But that is only intra-EU migration, with mostly a 
non-structural character. It surely helps to ‘grease the wheel’ and to reduce qualitative 
mismatches of labour, but it will not help to fulfil the more structural potential gap in the EU-27 
as a whole. Migration of labour from outside the EU is a second essential element of a dynamic 
labour market, as shown in section 2.3.4. Extra-EU migration can and should be arranged so as 
to be beneficial to both the host country and the immigrant.  
Unfortunately the less successful migration experience from the past decades, mostly due to 
unsuccessful integration of migrant groups in the Western society, often still prohibits a serious 
analysis of the current migration. Migration policy is often trapped in a much too emotional 
debate, based on populist statements instead of serious arguments. The acknowledgement of the 
‘modern migrant’ is essential to a good understanding of the different characteristics of migration 
nowadays. What is important is that it makes perfect economic sense to attract the immigrants 
who supply the skills that our labour markets need, and that immigration policy reduces the 
physical and cultural distance between immigrant and host country.  
Bloom et al. (2009) confirm that migration alone cannot solve the problem of falling working-
shares in Western European countries in the next decades. It does however play a very important 
role. Migration should always be part of the European labour market policy mix, because without 
migration labour market tensions will be even bigger than currently projected. It is an essential 
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2.5 Closing the potential gap 
In this section, we will first provide a framework for discussing labour supply and labour demand 
effects. Next, we will turn to theoretical options to close the potential employment gap. Lastly, 
we will focus on the options that seem realistic in practice and discuss the room for improvement 
per country. 
2.5.1 Framework: labour supply and labour demand 
Over the years, European labour markets have become more and more dynamic, with more types 
of contractual arrangements, and more complex and more frequent transitions. To illustrate the 
various ways the employment gap can be tackled, we use the analytical framework of Figure 2.1. 
This Figure shows a simplified, and somewhat modified, version based on Schmid & Modrack 
(2008).29  
 
Figure 27 An analytical framework of employment dynamics 
 
In general terms, as have seen earlier in this chapter, labour supply will decline in the coming 
years. Demography (an ageing population) will negatively affect labour supply, and migration can 
only offset a small portion of this. Theoretically, the decline in labour supply could be matched to 
labour demand by stimulating productivity, in which case labour demand will decrease, too. There 
are at least two good reasons why relying on such a strategy alone is not enough. First, 
productivity growth may not be ‘skills neutral’. For parts of the population, it may actually lead to 
increased unemployment, while there is still an overall shortage of labour. Cedefop (2008) 
estimates that by 2015, the share of jobs with low qualification levels will have fallen to 21% 
(1996: 33%; 2006: 26%), while the share of jobs with high qualification levels will have risen to 
29% (1996: 21%; 2006: 25%). So, even if labour demand should equal labour supply (a 
‘quantitative match’), some people may be unable to find a job. They may not have the education 
and skills required to do the work (a ‘qualitative mismatch’). Or people may be tied to different 
sectors than those where vacancies are available. The obvious, but not simple, solution is to 
improve the competencies of those people, and accommodate necessary sectoral shifts of labour. 
                                                        
29 Günther Schmid & Simone Modrack (2008), Employment Dynamics in Germany: Lessons to be learned from 
the Hartz reforms, WZB Discussion Paper, Order number: SP I 2008-102. 
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In section 5.3 we will argue that private employment agencies can play an important role here, for 
several reasons. 
 
Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, labour demand is not expected to fall at all. 
Although productivity growth may help lower labour demand, an increase in consumer demand 
and exports will probably override any advances made.  
 
In the whole story, wage effects will act as a partial correcting force. If labour becomes more 
scarce, wages will go up, which may stimulate participation. This also applies to the skills 
premium30. Higher wages in jobs with higher qualification levels may stimulate more people 
choosing a higher education degree. Insofar as existing institutional settings impair increases in 
labour participation, wage effects alone cannot be enough. Also, notice that the individual 
decision to participate depends on the net wage, amongst others, while the effect on society is 
larger. Individual decisions do not incorporate the effects on others in society. So, to sum up, 
although wage effects may partially correct imbalances, they cannot solve these completely. This 
implies that there is still a role for policies that (further) stimulate labour participation. 
2.5.2 Closing the gap: theoretical options 
As we have discussed in section 3.1, potential employment gaps subsist in all EU27 countries. 
Countries who face the largest challenge are the ones with older populations and/or low net 
migration (see Figure 26: Spain and most Eastern European countries). Several policy options 
might be considered, in theory. The usefulness, eligibility and effectivity of those options will 
differ strongly between countries and between the different sectors of economies. There may be 
structural economic differences, but finding the optimal mix is also subject to national 
preferences and traditions. A ‘one size fits all’ policy solution is not available. Here, we briefly 
discuss and weigh the options in turn.  
 
Stimulating population growth 
Although stimulating population growth is still suggested now and then, it is clearly not 
sustainable in the long run and will only make things worse. Even if it would be possible to 
stimulate population growth, that would only be effective after 25 years, and after 60 years the 
problem will have returned on a much larger scale. This option should not be promoted. 
 
Increasing employment participation 
Increasing employment may be achieved basically in three ways: 
• More people may decide to enter the labour force (raising the employment rate).  
• Elderly employed may decide to take pensions at a later age, or take part-time pensions.  
• Employed people may decide to work more hours (increasing the number of hours worked).  
The latter of course does not raise the employment rate as officially measured, but it does 
stimulate the economic output per employee and therefore decrease the potential employment 
imbalance.  
 
Increasing real labour productivity 
Increasing productivity was always an efficient and realistic option in the manufacturing and the 
agricultural sector. However, increases in productivity are harder to achieve in labour-intensive 
                                                        
30 For example, in the US the growth in the relative demand for more educated workers, together with 
fluctuations in the supply of skills, goes a long way in explaining the evolution of wage differentials (Goldin & 
Katz (2007)). 
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service sectors, which are the growing sectors. Not that service sectors do not experience 
productivity gains, it’s more that these increases might not be skills neutral (see Cedefop, 2008) 
and that such increases might not be able to keep up with rising consumer demand and exports 
(see previous section). Productivity might also increase by labour moving from lower-paying 
sectors to higher-paying sectors (more productive sectors). This of course will not bridge the 
overall employment gap, but merely shift labour from one sector to another while increasing 
overall productivity.  
 
Lower GDP 
If a combination of possible solutions - especially increasing productivity growth and 
employment participation - does not solve the employment imbalances, GDP per capita will fall. 
For economists however, that outcome is not to be preferred, so the mentioned combination 
must solve the imbalance. 
 
In the next section we will discuss the room for improvement per country when it comes to 
participation rates, hours worked and productivity increases. In Chapter 4 we will elaborate on 
the empirical effectiveness of some policy options aimed at increasing employment participation. 
 
2.5.3 Closing the gap in practice: solutions per country 
To investigate the eligibility of the arguments mentioned above, we present a numerical exercise 
in this section. The exercise is based on reference values, constructed to mirror maybe ambitious 
but at least for many countries achievable levels of employment participation, working hours and 
productivity. The reference levels are set so that some countries have already reached them in 
2008, or are very close. The assumption is that convergence will take place in the longer term, 
between now and 2050. Which means in fact that the countries that are lagging behind yet will 
catch up in some way. In the rest of this section, we discuss the eligibility of each solution for the 
individual countries. The reference values are shown in the last line of Table 19. The rest of the 
table shows the deviation of each country from these references: how far below is their current 
situation? Or in other words: how much is there to be gained, if convergence to the reference 
would take place indeed? 
 
For employment participation we chose a reference value of 80%, for both men and women. 
This is the current level for Danish & Dutch males; Danish, Dutch and Swedish females are close 
to this level. As we have seen in Chapter 1, female employment in these countries is already 
above 70%. Employment among elderly tells a different story (see section 1.4): differences 
between countries are huge and on average employment is much lower. Therefore, 60% is a 
more realistic target here. That is below outlier Sweden, but still quite a challenge for most other 
countries like Belgium, France, Italy and the larger New Member States. As for the average length 
of a salaried employee’s working week 38 hours seems a realistic target, given that the New 
Member States will probably converge to the Western European average during the next decades. 
The reference value for productivity is set at 55 $ of GDP per hour for each person employed, 
measured in 2007 US$. This level is comparable to the present Belgian and Irish situation. 
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Table 19 Possible solutions per country: how far beneath reference values? 
 Employment rate (%-points) Hours per 
week 
Productivity 
(GDP/hour, 2007, US$)  men women elderly
Austria        1        14        19              1  10 
Belgium       12        24        27              2  0 
Germany        4        15         6              3  2 
Denmark above        6  -              4  12 
Spain        6        25        14 equal 13 
Finland        5        10  -              1  12 
France       10        19        22              1  2 
Greece        5        31        17 above 24 
Ireland        4        20         6              3   above  
Italy        9        33        25              1  16 
Netherlands above        9         7              8  1 
Portugal        6        17         9 equal 28 
Sweden        3         8  above              2  9 
United Kingdom        3        14  -              1  11 
Czech Republic 5   22        12 above 31 
Estonia        6        14  above above  
Hungary       17        30        29 above 31 
Lithuania       12        19  - above  
Latvia        7        14  - above  
Poland       14        28        28 above 35 
Slovenia        7        16        26 above  
Slovakia       11        26        22 above 27 
Bulgaria       12        21        14 above  
Romania       14        27        16 above  
reference 80 80 60 38 55 
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat (lfsq_ergan; lfsq_ewhun2), OECD (Labour Productivity Total 
Economy; Productivity Levels and GDP per capita). 
Employment participation 
Table 19 shows how much each country deviates from the reference value. For example, the 
employment rate in Austria is 1 percentage points lower than the reference value of 80% for 
men, and 14 percentage points lower for women. That sounds as a realistic target, which could be 
achieved well within the next forty years. But we have demonstrated in Table 18 that for Austria 
matching the current EU maximum participation level will not be a sufficient solution. In others 
words: employment participation in Austria is already quite high, and other solutions should be 
investigated as well. Belgium however is a different example: employment rates are well below 
the current maximum, so there should be room for improvement here. Table 18 showed that 
raising employment to the reference value is more than enough for Belgium to maintain their 
current economic standards under the baseline ageing scenario. 
 
In the case of Austria the participation of elderly for example is 19 percentage points beneath the 
reference (which is set at 60%). Although we did not analyze the correlation between 
employment rate by sex and by age, it is clear that next to an average employment rate increase of 
1 percentage point for men and 14 for women, there is room for an extra increase among the 
elderly.       
 
The columns in the right panel of Table 19 show additional possible solutions: increasing the 
number of hours worked and increasing productivity.  
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Average working hours 
As Figure 28 below shows, large differences in working hours among full-timers do not exist, all 
full-time workers have working weeks of usually 39-42 hours, even in the Netherlands.31 That 
implicates that differences in average hours are due to differences in the share of part-time 
workers. Which also implies that a possible solution is not to increase working weeks for the full-
time employees, but to seduce part-timers to increase their hours or maybe even become full-
timers.  
 
Figure 28 Usual weekly working hours, for full-timers and part-timers. 
 Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_ewhun2, 2009). 
But in many cases, especially women are working part-time deliberately, not so much for 
economic reasons but more often for social reasons; that is to strike a balance between working 
life and family life. In fact, in countries like the Netherlands and Belgium it will be difficult to 
increase the average hours/week, as the pattern of diminishing working hours is a persistent 
long-term trend, which is not only driven by economic but also by sociological factors. On the 
other hand, we will show in section 5.1.1 that in countries like Denmark, UK and Norway the 
share of part-time among women aged 25-59 did actually fall.  
 
Regarding the increase of participation, one might also argue the other way round, and state that 
a lot of the rise in participation is due to the possibility of part-time jobs, which seduced a lot of 
households to participate with both members. Last decennia some countries faced a transition 
from the standard ‘bread-winner household’ to modern ‘1.5 jobs per family’ households, gaining 
popularity among young families with children. Figure 29 demonstrates that at least there is a 
strong correlation between employment participation and the possibility to work part-time. 
Although the exact causality can not be read from this graph, it suggests that the countries in the 
upper right have extended their labour markets by offering more part-time opportunities. In 
                                                        





















































48   CHAPTER 2 
SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
Chapter 6 professor Schmid will argue in a similar way, stating that part-time work was the main 
driver of participation in the last decade. 
 
Figure 29 Correlation between part-time jobs and employment participation  
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_eppga, lfsq_ergan, 2009). 
Although it is clear that institutional arrangements sometimes prevent people from increasing 
their working hours, financial incentives are also still important. It might be possible that among 
part-timers the number of hours can be increased further, if the financial incentives are right. 
That such is not always the case, can be read in the literature study, more specifically in section 
4.1.4. In some institutional arrangements, an accumulation of different financial disincentives (an 
undesirable ‘part-time trap’) might be preventing the increase of hours among wives working only 
a few hours per week while their husband works full-time. 
 
Labour productivity 
One could reason that countries with a relatively low level of labour productivity should have a 
scope to increase productivity. Increasing labour productivity will decrease the demand for 
labour.32 And lower demand for labour means less friction, that is a lower ‘potential employment 
gap’.  
Notice that this solution only works if the supplied labour has mastered the right ‘qualities’ 
(skills) that are demanded. Otherwise, for parts of the population unemployment might occur. 
For example: if manual works gets replaced by a machine, people should master the skills to 
operate that machine.  
The most right column of Table 19 shows how much the level of labour productivity lies behind 
a reference value of 55 (GDP per working hour, US$ 2007). In Figure 30 we plot the productivity 
levels (vertical axis) against their growth over the last ten years (horizontal axis). The emerging 
                                                        
32 Unless labour productivity rises because of capital-saving innovations. If innovations are (only) capital-saving, 
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picture demonstrates the negative relation between both: the higher national productivity levels 
have become, the harder it is to make them grow further.  
 
Figure 30 Productivity, level versus growth 
 
Source: SEO calculations based on OECD (Labour Productivity Total Economy; Productivity Levels and GDP 
per capita). 
It seems that there is scope for productivity improvements especially in countries like Slovakia, 
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Greece and Portugal. Their average productivity level is low, 
but besides Portugal they have all shown above average growth. Slovakia and Poland seem 
particularly to be on the rise here, implying that if they can keep up productivity growth like that 
(in the long run, i.e. ‘after the recession’), this may partially bridge their employment gaps.  
The worrying cases are Portugal, Italy, Spain and Denmark. Portugal’s growth has been below 
average, although their level is also one of the lowest. Somewhat higher up the scale are the other 
three countries: their economies have reached average productivity levels, but progress has been 
very slow. Even in comparison with the ‘high-productivity, modest growth’ countries like 
Belgium, Netherlands, Germany and France.  
2.6 Summary 
Although the current labour market is characterised by high unemployment in many countries, in 
the long run a tight labour market will prevail. The post-Second World War babyboom will cause 
a structural ageing of our society, which lowers the potential supply of labour, relative to the 
potential demand. In order to overcome this ‘potential employment gap’ the main options are: 
• Increase employment participation (beyond the current Lisbon target). 
• Increase labour productivity (in real terms, not just nominal productivity). 
• Allow labour migration, as long as it facilitates the match of labour demand and supply (it 
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In the baseline scenario (based on Eurostat projections and an equal development of GDP 
growth and productivity growth) employment participation gap will be bridged at an average EU 
employment rate of 78% in 2050.  
This is not unrealistic, but apart from a quantitative mismatch, there will also be a qualitative 
mismatch. The lessons that the recent crisis tells us is that important sectoral shifts can be 
expected. Employment in some sectors in the EU will disappear (manufacturing), while ageing 
increases demand in other sectors (health, leisure). Many employees have to be reallocated to 
different sectors of the economy.  
This qualitative mismatch can be combatted by a more effective matching of the requested type 
of demand and type of supply. There is no ready-made solution, huge differences exist between 
countries and between sectors. In some cases only some extra training is required, is some cases a 
more activating welfare system. Inevitable is that institution should focus on ‘employment 
security’ instead of ‘job security’.   
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3 International policies for driving 
participation 
Sonja Bekker & Ton Wilthagen  
ReflecT, Tilburg University, the Netherlands 
3.1 Introduction 
The current world-wide economic crisis has quickly shifted governments’ attention to acute 
problems of restructurings and job losses. They feel the need to respond rapidly and adequately 
to the challenges this crisis brings. Although their actions are justified by the sudden and severe 
labour market problems, a long-term strategy for labour market participation remains essential. 
Such long-term strategies are offered by various international organisations that often have long-
standing traditions and practices (legally based or not) in monitoring and recommending 
strategies on behalf of their member states to improve labour market performance. They have, 
each in their own way, designed policies that drive participation. Their views have proven to be 
inspiring for countries in fashioning solid and broad based solutions to tackle the main 
employment problems, and are characterised by an integrated and long-term perspective. 
 
This chapter will outline the core ideas of the most renowned international organisations in the 
field of employment and the labour market: the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Union (EU) 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Their values, 
views and analyses are often captured in catchy and well-known terms like “decent work” and 
“flexicurity”33. However, what are the main labour market challenges these organisation foresee, 
and which key directions do they advise countries to take in order to increase the overall 
participation in the European labour market? Are there similarities between the roads towards 
participation these organisations propose? These and other questions will be addressed in this 
chapter. 
 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. First, a description of the organisations studied is 
presented, including their role in the international labour market debate and the instruments they 
have to influence the policies of nation states. Within the framework of this contribution it is 
impossible to highlight the full range of all relevant activities and themes these organisations 
cover. In the concluding section the main policy messages of the respective organisations are 
summarized in a comparative manner, along the following dimensions: 
  
                                                        
33 These terms are often not exclusively used by one organisation. Flexicurity, developed in the EU, is for 
instance also referred to by the OECD and the ILO, while the CoE studies how labour market flexibility can 
be reconciled with social cohesion. Likewise decent work, a concept used by ILO, also gets attention in EU 
policies. 
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• Promotion of the quantity of labour market participation 
• Promotion of the quality of labour market participation 
• Preconditions of labour market participation, including: 
• Training 
• Social dialogue 
• Tax system and social security 
• Labour law 
3.2 International approaches to labour market 
participation and employment issues 
This section contains a discussion of the ILO, IMF, CoE, EU and OECD and their approaches 
to labour market participation and employment issues. The fact that these international 
organisations have put participation on their agenda, means that they all find that employment 
issues should, to some extent, be tackled at the supranational level. However, as we will see, this 
should not necessarily be done via law-making, but can also be done by creating policies, 
establishing standards and benchmarking.   
In fact, the international bodies discussed in this chapter do vary significantly with respect to 
their formal power and their possibilities for securing compliance. The EU has clear legislative 
powers, however, less so in the fields of social security and employment. The main EU 
instrument to steer the labour market policies of its Member States is the European Employment 
Strategy (EES), which tries to steer employment policies with non-binding employment 
guidelines. The Member States have to annually report on the progress they have made in the 
respective employment fields and the Council and the Commission evaluate these efforts and 
make country-specific recommendations. The OECD operates likewise with a set of non-binding 
guidelines.  The IMF has the opportunity to link the availability of support and guidance to the 
willingness of countries to engage in reform and restructuring. The ILO and CoE can address 
their member states for not complying with their standard (i.e. in the case of the ILO if the 
standard was ratified by the country). Further impact depends on the extent that national 
legislators and courts take up and adhere to the standards in national legislation and case-law. In 
addition all of the international organisation invest great effort in advice and support.  
Importantly, whereas all policies aim at increasing labour participation, they all take a much 
broader approach to employment than participation as such. 
3.2.1 The International Labour Organisation 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) founded in 1919 and located in Geneva has a 
membership of 183 countries. It has recently celebrated its 90th birthday. The ILO is the only 
'tripartite' United Nations agency. It brings together representatives of governments, employers 
and workers to jointly shape policies and programmes. The ILO is the global organization that 
draws up international labour standards and seeks to ensure, in collaboration with its Member 
States, that these standards are respected in practice. 
 
The ILO is devoted to advancing opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and 
productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity. In the ILO’s 
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vision work is key to people's well-being, as it not only provides an income, but also contributes 
to broader social and economic advancement, strengthening individuals, their families and 
communities. The ILO works to advance the creation of decent jobs. 
 
The ILO Director Juan Somavia introduced the concept of decent work in 1999. The concept 
draws on the concept of social justice that was forwarded as a fundamental principle at the 
establishment of the ILO. The normative framework of decent work is to a significant degree 
based on ILO conventions, some of which were drafted between the First and the Second World 
War. The innovative aspect of the concept lies in its emphasis on the ILO’s fundamental values, 
the unification of all its programmes under one heading and the integration of the ILO’s 
programme with other United Nations programmes (Heerma van Voss, 2008). 
 
Decent work is defined, by the ILO, as opportunities for women and men to obtain productive 
work in conditions of freedom, equity, and human dignity (CEB High-Level Committee on 
Programmes, 2007, vi). It captures opportunities for productive work that provides a fair income, 
security in the workplace, social protection for workers and their families, prospects for personal 
development and social integration, freedom to state one’s concerns, organize and participate in 
decisions affecting one’s lives and equality of opportunity and treatment. 
 
The ILO has identified four components of decent work (Ghai, 2006): 
1) Rights at work represent the normative ethical and legal framework for all elements of decent 
work. Their aim is to guarantee that work is associated with dignity, equality, freedom and 
adequate remuneration, social security and voice, representation and participation for all 
categories of workers. 
2) Employment and work is considered an essential element of decent work. In the ILO’s 
perspective employment is not merely associated with wage jobs, but also with self-employment 
and work from home, part-time work, casual work et cetera. All that seek work should be offered 
adequate employment opportunities and work should produce a reward that meets the core 
needs of the worker and his or her family. Free choice of work, absence of discrimination and 
protection against dangerous working conditions and excessively long hours is also viewed 
crucial.  The same goes for the right to form and join representative associations and to represent 
the worker’s interest and engage in collective bargaining.  The ILO attributes a prominent role to 
governments in developing economic and labour policies that can shape the pattern of work 
opportunities. Work opportunities are enhanced by policies that influence the rate and structure 
of economic growth, labour intensity of production (as opposed to low growth that depends on 
capital intensive production) and labour mobility and flexibility. It is argued that two groups of 
industrialized countries have done relatively well in combating unemployment: countries with 
highly flexible labour markets and limited unemployment and social assistance benefits, 
producing relatively high income inequalities and absolute poverty and those with a tradition of 
powerful unions, social dialogue and generous social security schemes, characterized by more 
egalitarian income distribution combined with active labour market policies (Ghai, 2006, 11). 
For employment strategies to be effective, Ghai (2006, 13-14), an advisor to the ILO, contends, 
they need to be based on a wide array of economic and social policies. This is because 
employment has multiple dimensions but also because it is impacted by a large range of macro 
and micro economic policies. The latter include macro-economic stability, trade and exchange 
rate policies, agricultural and industrial development and technology, credit and labour market, 
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training and education policies. In the age of globalization and especially during a era when the 
world economy is in a recession, the coordination of macro-economic level at the global level is 
thought indispensable to warrant high levels of aggregate demand and to design counter-cyclical 
policies. 
As there is a large variety in state of development among the ILO member states policy 
recommendation to increase labour market participation can not be uniform, but should be 
geared towards specific employment problems. However, as Ghai rightly states, in almost all 
countries there is a need to design women-friendly employment and work policies, including the 
removal of cultural barriers to women working outside their homes, eliminate open or disguised 
discrimination in recruitment, promotion and training. 
3) Social protection serves to provide security against a number of risks, contingencies and 
vulnerabilities, including ill-health, maternity needs, accidents, unemployment and large economic 
fluctuations, but also anxiety, suffering and deprivation in a broader sense, not exclusively work-
related. 
4) Social dialogue refers to workers’ voice and representation in the production process, aimed at 
defending their interests, expressing concerns and priorities and  entering into negotiations with 
other actors. Empowerment of weaker parties and supporting their bargaining power are key 
objectives here. Social dialogue, in the form of tripartite bodies (employers, workers and 
governments), national economic and social councils and planning commissions, including all 
stakeholders, is also seen as a precondition for improved policy-making and implementation. 
3.2.2 The International Monetary Fund 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), that came into existence in 1945, is mandated to 
monitor the international monetary system and the economic and financial policies of its 186 
member countries. This activity is referred to as surveillance. During this process, conducted 
both at the global level and in individual countries, the IMF identifies possible risks to domestic 
and external stability and gives advice on required policy adjustments. In this way, it seeks to 
support the international monetary system in serving its essential purpose of facilitating the 
exchange of goods, services, and capital among countries, thereby sustaining sound economic 
growth.34 
 
In recent years, as part of its efforts to strengthen the international financial system, and to 
enhance its effectiveness at preventing and resolving crises, the IMF has applied both its 
surveillance and technical assistance work to the development of standards and codes of good 
practice in its areas of responsibility, and to the strengthening of financial sectors. No such 
standard has been developed in the area of labour market policy. 
The IMF reviews of global economic trends are reported in two semi-annual publications, the 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR). The WEO 
offers detailed analysis of the state of the world economy, taking up urgent issues such as the 
current global financial turmoil and economic downturn.  
 
In recent years, surveillance has become increasingly transparent. Almost all member countries 
now agree to publication of a Public Information Notice, which summarizes the views of IMF 
staff and the Executive Board. It is difficult to distil general prescriptions from these country-
                                                        
34 See the IMF’s website www.imf.org 
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specific reviews with respect to promoting labour market participation. Yet among the common 
denominators are the need to increase flexibility and mobility in the labour market, activate social 
security systems, limit unemployment benefits, raise the retirement age and avoid heavy taxation 
on labour income. To illustrate this point we quote from the IMF’s 2008 Consultation with the 
Netherlands, the most recent consultation, carried out before financial crisis became manifest.35 
 
“Directors noted that imminent population ageing—which will shrink working age population starting early in the 
next decade—and comparatively low productivity growth could pose considerable challenges to long-term fiscal 
sustainability and external competitiveness. It will therefore be important to make early progress on labour and 
product market reforms aimed at raising the employment rate and stimulating faster productivity gains (…) 
Directors concurred that fiscal adjustment should rely on spending restraint and a broadening of the tax base, given 
relatively large tax wedges on labour income. Possible sources of savings include efforts to control health care 
spending, improvements in public sector efficiency, an increase in the effective retirement age, and a reduction in 
unemployment benefits. (…) Directors welcomed the ongoing efforts and the recent announcement of new measures 
to ease growing labour shortages and the impact of population ageing. In this regard, reforms of the tax system and 
social entitlements should aim to reduce the effective marginal tax rates on second family earners, target tax 
incentives to induce participation by the elderly, and tighten the enforcement of work availability requirements and 
reassessments of disability status. Directors encouraged the authorities to further liberalize the rigid employment 
protection legislation and to adopt other measures with a view to further enhancing labour mobility.” 
3.2.3 The Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe, founded in 1949 and based in Strasbourg, covers 47 member countries.36 
It mission is to develop throughout Europe common and democratic principles based on the 
European Convention on Human Rights and other reference texts on the protection of 
individuals. With respect to labour market participation the following aspects of the Council’s 
agenda can be considered relevant: access to social rights, social security and social cohesion. 
Rather than advocating concrete policies for labour market participation the Council focuses on 
the preconditions for workers and non-workers to participate, especially on the situation of 
vulnerable groups. 
One example concerns the co-ordination of social security for migrants, people who move to 
another country in order to live or work there. Co-ordination provisions aim to counteract some 
of the disadvantages of moving from one state to another, particularly in respect of long-term 
benefits such as old age pensions.  
In the area of social rights there is the European Social Charter, adopted in 1961 (ETS No. 035), 
and revised in 1996 (ETS No. 163). The European Social Charter guarantees fundamental social 
and economic rights of all individuals in their daily lives.  It includes various rights to are deemed 
indispensable for people to adequately and safely function in the labour markets. The charter 
includes the following rights: 
the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion; right to housing; right to protection in cases of 
termination of employment; right to protection against sexual harassment in the workplace and other forms of 
harassment; rights of workers with family responsibilities to equal opportunities and equal treatment; rights of 
workers’ representatives in undertakings; reinforcement of principle of non-discrimination; improvement of gender 
                                                        
35 Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 08/64,  June 3, 2008. 
36 Including e.g. Ukraine, Albania and the Russian Federation, that are not a member of the European Union. 
56   CHAPTER 3 
SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
equality in all fields covered by the treaty; better protection of maternity and social protection of mothers; better 
social, legal and economic protection of employed children; better protection of handicapped people.37 
 
In the area of social cohesion the Council of Europe has developed reports, recommendations 
and targeted support programmes seeking to improve public policies and services and thus 
strengthening social cohesion in Europe. Many of these efforts concentrate on the most 
vulnerable people, such as the unemployed, the homeless, refugees, orphans, discriminated 
minorities or people in poverty. One of the instruments developed is the Methodological Guide 
to the Concerted Development of Social Cohesion Indicators.  
 
As understood by the Council of Europe, social cohesion is ‘the capacity of a society to ensure 
the welfare of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding polarisation’ (Council of 
Europe, 2004:3). This definition implies that social cohesion can not be attained and established 
once and for all, but has to be (re)produced continuously. New developments in society can put 
its capacity to minimise inequalities to test. Flexibilisation of the labour market is such a trend, if 
not properly managed, that has the potential to undermine social cohesion. With its project 
“Forum 2005 – Reconciling labour flexibility with the need for job security” the Social Cohesion 
Development Division of the Council of Europe (CoE) addressed the challenge to initiate new 
policy frameworks in this field. 
 
The Council’s ‘Tree Model’ of social cohesion has been applied to processes of labour market 
flexibilisation (Wilthagen et al., 2006). This model can be used to benchmark labour market and 
employment reform and includes the following key dimensions: 
  
a) Equity: workers affected by labour market flexibilisation should have/keep or at least get the 
perspective of similar income, working/health conditions and access to social security compared 
to standard/core workers. Labour market flexibility can help to ensure this access by creating 
employment but it can also endanger this access when some (vulnerable) groups of workers have 
to bear all the negative aspects of flexibility. Labour flexibility should thus strengthen the 
permeability and transitional nature of the labour market, but be accompanied with measures to 
guarantee decent work. 
b) Dignity: workers affected by labour market flexibilisation should not be positioned and treated 
as a specific, less-worthy segment in the labour force and labour market. Job or employment 
insecurity can be identified as affecting someone’s dignity. Depending or other conditions, it 
brings along feelings of stress that, especially on the long run, can affect the quality of life of 
individuals and their families.  
c) Participation: all (affected) workers (or their representatives) should be able to participate, to be 
involved and/or be represented (either directly or indirectly) in the flexibilisation process and its 
outcomes, and to be provided with the necessary information and facilities to adequately do so. 
This is easier said than done because insecurity about their chances to stay employed may make 
workers less eager to use their legal possibilities to participate in for instance work councils.  
d) Autonomy: workers affected by labour market flexibilisation should be provided with 
opportunities to further training, education and career- and personal development, also to 
possibly make transitions to more permanent jobs (if they wish so). So, flexibility should not limit 
                                                        
37 See the CoE’s website: www.coe.int 
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career opportunities but broaden them. An example of a negative effect of flexibility on the 
labour market on autonomy is the ‘budget restriction’ used by banks, due to the fact that a 
flexible worker cannot prove evidence that he will be employed in the future (which can create 
housing problems). 
 
3.2.4 The European Union 
The publication of the ‘White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment’ in 1993 
greatly advanced the discussions on employment issues at the European level (Regent, 2003). At 
that time, Europe faced high levels of unemployment, causing the European Commission and 
the Member States38 to undertake joint efforts to strengthen the economy and increase 
employment levels. This primarily meant the need to reform the labour market by increasing 
flexibility in work organisation and working time distribution, reducing labour costs, increasing 
skill levels and making pro-active labour market policies. Simultaneously, most Member States 
acknowledged the need to maintain the social protection system, although a re-examination of 
the existing social systems was regarded essential to give leeway to more active and less passive 
solidarity (European Commission, 1993).  
In 1998 the European Employment Strategy (EES) was launched, consisting of employment 
guidelines that address a broad range of labour market issues. These guidelines are communicated 
to Member States, who each have to report annually on their progress in National Reform 
Programmes. The European Commission evaluates these reports, and may give 
recommendations to the Member States to improve their efforts. As of 2001 the EU has set 
distinct employment targets (the so-called ‘Lisbon targets’), such as an average employment rate 
of 70% by 2010, including an employment rate of 60% for women and 50% for older workers. In 
2005 the employment guidelines were integrated with micro and macro economic guidelines. 
Together, these guidelines should contribute to achieving the overall EU objectives of sustainable 
growth and employment and strengthening social cohesion. Thus, a strongly articulated focus on 
growth and jobs emerged. The Member States are asked to cooperate with the social partners and 
other stakeholders, in order to reach the goals. Underlying challenges driving the aim to improve 
labour market outcomes are globalisation, rapid technological developments and the ageing of 
society.  
 
Concerning the employment guidelines, the overall aim is to achieve full employment, improve 
quality and productivity at work, and strengthen social and territorial cohesion. There are three 
priority areas in meeting the objectives: 
• Attract and retain more people in employment, increase labour supply and modernise social 
protection systems; 
• Improve adaptability of workers and enterprises; 
• Increase investment in human capital through better education and skills (European Council, 
2008). 
 
                                                        
38 Currently, there are 27 European Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
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Throughout the years, the guidelines that address the adaptability of workers and enterprises have 
become more important in the EES. The accomplishments of Member States in making their 
workers and organisations more adaptable to economic and labour market developments were 
lagging behind, although the European Commission judged that adaptability had become more 
and more important in order to meet the challenges of globalisation, technological development 
and the ageing of society (European Commission, 2006). This culminated in 2006, in the 
development of the concept ‘flexicurity’ (Wilthagen et al, 2007). Lately, the Commission has also 
paid a great deal of attention to new skills for new jobs (European Commission, 2008a). 
 
Flexicurity 
Flexicurity has been actively discussed at the EU the past years. This discussion resulted in the 
adoption of a set of common principles of flexicurity by the Council (European Council, 2007). 
These principles were the result of the efforts of the European Commission to develop a 
European flexicurity strategy, also in a debate with the social partners, civil society and experts 
(see e.g. European Commission, 2007, European Social Partners, 2007; European Flexicurity 
Expert Group). The Council found flexicurity a means to help reaching the Lisbon goals and 
distinguished four interlinked flexicurity components: flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements; comprehensive lifelong learning strategies; effective active labour market policies; 
and modern, adequate and sustainable social protection systems. It also emphasised that there 
was no single European flexicurity model, but that Member States should rather develop their 
own flexicurity arrangements. 
Another important aim of flexicurity was to reduce labour market segmentation and promote 
more open, responsive and inclusive labour markets. All workers should have better 
opportunities, economic incentives and supportive measures to access work or have stepping-
stones to progress into stable and legally secure employment. However, workers should also find 
support in their transitions at the labour market and in their efforts to stay employable. In this 
respect both internal and external flexicurity were found important, meaning flexicurity measures 
within as well as between organisations. Moreover, flexicurity should offer gender equality, 
making sure that women can access quality employment and that workers are able to combine 
work and care. 
The Council was also aware that flexicurity does not emerge without the efforts of various 
stakeholders. Flexicurity, they concluded, requires a climate of trust and broadly-based dialogue 
among all stakeholders, such as social dialogue. These stakeholders should be prepared to take 
the responsibility for change and willing to come to socially balanced policies. Therefore, apart 
from the public authorities, the social partners have a key role in the design and implementation 
of flexicurity strategies. Lastly, the Council concluded that the financial aspects of flexicurity are 
relevant as well and require a cost effective allocation of resources and be compatible with sound 
and financially sustainable public budgets. Moreover, the costs and benefits of flexicurity should 
be equally spread among the parties involved (European Council, 2007). 
 
Key items of the EES 
Whereas the EES of the EU is clearly directed towards getting and keeping more people at the 
labour market, quality of work is addressed as well. Efforts to raise employment rates go, 
according to the EES, hand in hand with improving the attractiveness of jobs, quality at work, 
labour productivity growth, the reduction of the labour market segmentation, and a decrease of 
gender inequality and in-work poverty. In order to improve quality and productivity at work the 
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EES asks Member States to fully exploit the synergies between quality at work, productivity and 
employment. Job quality encompasses pay and benefits, working conditions, access to lifelong 
learning and career prospects, as well as support and incentives stemming from social protection 
systems. Attached to career prospect is the right set of conditions to facilitate progress in 
employment, whether it is first-time entry, a move back to employment after a break or the wish 
to prolong working lives. It also encompasses a lifecycle approach to work and the reconciliation 
between work and family life. Thus, enterprises must not only be flexible enough to be able to 
respond to changes in demand, adapt to new technologies and innovate constantly, they must 
also respond to the increasing demand for job quality related to workers' personal preferences 
and family changes, and the ageing workforce. Effective investment in human capital and lifelong 
learning may support quality at work (European Council, 2008). Moreover, due to the expected 
rise in job-to-job transitions, policies to enhance mobility and matching on the labour market will 
become more essential. 
 
The EES has as one of its priorities investing in human capital through better education and 
skills. For one, skills which are needed at the labour market should be better monitored and 
predicted. However, there should also be more investments in skills of people. The Commission 
finds that currently the lack of skills is too often the reason why people have difficulties to enter 
and remain at the labour market. Moreover, a sufficiently skilled work force contributes to 
productivity levels, innovation and quality at work. Lifelong learning is for instance needed in 
order to update workers on new technological developments and innovation. In addition, 
workers require new skills in order to remain and progress in work and to be prepared for 
transition and changing labour markets. However, the basis for lifelong learning is solid initial 
education, and thus government need to make sure that it provides a good education system that 
equips young people with the competences they need to successfully enter the labour market. 
Moreover, governments should reduce the number of early school leavers, so that no more than 
10% of pupils leave school early. Moreover, at least 85% of 22-year-olds should have completed 
upper secondary education by 2010. In addition, lifelong learning should be open to all, in 
schools, businesses, public authorities and households, encompassing for instance incentives and 
cost-sharing mechanisms. The goal is to increase the participation in training throughout the life-
cycle, particularly for the low-skilled and older workers. In total, at least 12,5% of the adults aged 
25 to 64 should participate in lifelong learning. 
 
The EES addresses at several occasions the position of disadvantaged groups. Equal 
opportunities and combating discrimination is seen as essential for progress towards the 
employment goals. Here, the EES refers to other EU programmes, such as gender mainstreaming 
and the promotion of gender equality as dealt with in the European Pact for Gender Equality. In 
line with the EU’s intergenerational approach and the European Youth Pact, attention is directed 
to the situation of young people and to promoting access to employment throughout working 
life, including for older workers. Moreover, the employment perspectives for disabled people, 
and third-country nationals should be improved (European Council, 2008). Part of the active 
inclusion target also refers to the (labour market) position of marginalised groups, with a special 
focus on low-skilled workers. Most of the references to disadvantaged groups are made in the 
explanatory texts concerning the target to reach full employment, however, also concerning 
education and training targets groups are addressed. Concerning participation, the message seems 
clear: full employment means having inclusive labour markets. Some Member States face high 
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employment gaps between men and women, which obviously have to be reduced, as should, for 
that matter, the gender pay gap. Moreover, the employment rates of older workers and young 
people have to increase as well as the employment rates of those most excluded from the labour 
market. Youth unemployment is now on average double the overall unemployment rate. 
However, having work is not the only goal. Also the situation at work of young people, especially 
for the low skilled should be improved. A lifecycle approach to work and the reconciliation 
between work and family life, should contribute to the increase of employment rates, especially 
that of parents and single parents. Moreover, support for active ageing, including appropriate 
working conditions, improved (occupational) health status and adequate incentives to work and 
discouragement of early retirement, should contribute to a prolonged working lives. 
 
Tax system and social security system 
In the EES the tax system may also affect the inclusiveness of labour markets. In this respect, the 
tax and benefit systems should be reviewed regularly to see which incentives and disincentives it 
contains, such as the management and conditionality of benefits and the reduction of high 
marginal effective tax rates, especially for those with low incomes. However, while reviewing the 
tax system Member States should bear in mind the need of adequate levels of social protection.  
Thus, the role of the (changing) social of the social security system is also addressed. One of the 
most important new EU employment policies, flexicurity, emphasises for example the role of the 
social security system in achieving full employment. Flexicurity policies simultaneously address 
the flexibility of labour markets, work organisation and labour relations, reconciliation of work 
and private life, and employment security and social protection (European Council, 2008). In this 
respect, the EES often refers to the importance of having a ‘modern’ social security system. This 
means that a social security system should not only be a safety net for those who are unable to 
work, thus providing access to basic social services and an adequate level of minimum resources 
for all. It must also contribute to people’s ability to progress at the labour market. Social security 
systems, including pensions and health care, can fulfil this function (often in addition to other 
measures) in several ways, focussing at first-time labour market entry, a move back to 
employment after a break, or the wish to prolong working lives. The call for a modern social 
security is not only made to add these extra features to it, but to also make sure that the social 
security system is sustainable. One of the features of a modern social security system is its’ active 
inclusion policy. Concrete targets are for example that by 2010 every unemployed person should 
be offered a job, apprenticeship or additional training. For young persons who have left school, 
this offer should be made within 4 months and for adults within 12 months. Activation can 
moreover consist of training, retraining, work practice, a job or other employability measures, 
sometimes combined with on-going job search assistance. Here, the local level could contribute 
to offering such support. Another feature of social security is to provide sufficient support for 
people who are temporarily out of employment. This latter feature will allegedly become more 
important, because of the growing need for workers and organisations to be adaptable and the 
subsequent prediction of a growth in job-to-job transitions. 
 
The EES also addresses facilities that could improve the match between job seekers and job 
vacancies, for instance by suggesting to optimise the labour-market infrastructure at national and 
EU level. Ideally, job-seekers throughout the EU should be able to access all European job 
vacancies. Moreover, the mobility of workers across EU Member States should be supported by 
the Treaties. Employment services could play an important role in increasing the transparency of 
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employment and training opportunities, both at the national and the European level. Moreover, 
the knowledge and anticipation of skill needs, labour market shortages and bottlenecks, should be 
improved. 
 
In the EES the role of the social partners is emphasised, also in relation to wage setting. The 
Commission asks Member States to ensure good governance of employment and social policies 
and calls for a broad partnership approach by fully involving parliamentary bodies and 
stakeholders, including those at regional and local levels and civil society organisations, and giving 
a central role to European and national social partners. Such a system of good governance may 
very well be seen as another institutional feature that drives participation. The support and active 
involvement of the social partners is especially needed to improve the adaptability of 
organisations and workers and to provide employment-friendly labour costs developments. 
Concerning this latter goal, Member States are asked to encourage social partners to set the right 
framework for wage bargaining in order to reflect productivity and labour market challenges. 
3.2.5 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
In 1994 the OECD countries39 endorsed a set of policy guidelines as a response to the high and 
persistent unemployment that many countries faced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These 
guidelines have been collected in the OECD Jobs Strategy (1994). The aim was to gather the 
factors underlying the perceived deterioration of labour market performances. Moreover, policy 
recommendations were designed to improve the adaptability of economies and societies to the 
rapid structural changes. The Strategy’s eventual aim is to create more and better jobs. 
The policy guidelines out of which the Jobs Study exists, covers a broad range of areas, including 
macroeconomic policy, innovation, entrepreneurial climate, skill development in the labour-force, 
various aspects of labour-market policies and institutions (wage-setting institutions, 
unemployment benefit systems), and the promotion of product market competition.40 These 
broad policy guidelines consist of a large number of detailed policy recommendations (OECD, 
2006). After ten years, the OECD Jobs Strategy was reassessed in order to adjust it to the new 
challenges in the OECD labour markets, such as the ageing of societies and globalisation. 
However, the majority of the guidelines and indicators remained intact. The Strategy builds on 
four pillars (OECD, 2006b):  
• Sound macroeconomic policies; 
• Removing obstacles to participation and job creation; 
• Tackling labour-market obstacles to employment while providing adequate security to 
workers; 
• Enhancing workers’ skills. 
 
The labour market trends of OECD countries are published in the OECD Employment 
Outlook, providing an in-depth analysis of policies, labour market institutions and a monitor of 
                                                        
39 Currently, there are 30 OECD member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
40 According to OECD (2006), analytical findings point at the hampering employment effect of what it calls anti-
competitive product-market regulations. Such regulations obstruct the creation of new businesses, keep prices 
artificially high and subsequently depress average real wages for the economy as a whole. Moreover, by 
restricting output, they tend to reduce employment levels. 
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the employment reforms of OECD countries, and policy indicators. From experience the OECD 
learned that there is ‘no single golden road to better labour market performance’. However, 
according to OECD, successful performers share some common features, such as 
macroeconomic stability, adequate incentives for all labour market participants and a strong 
product market competition. Moreover, the OECD learned that benefit systems do not 
necessarily form an obstacle to job search and job creation (OECD, 2006b). 
 
The OECD Jobs Strategy suggests a focus on more jobs rather than on the quality of jobs. 
However, it does address training opportunities for workers. The underlying premise is that a 
growth of human capital contributes to economic growth and social objectives. Therefore 
governments should strive for a high quality initial education. Moreover governments should, if 
this is part of the national practice in coordination with the social partners, create conditions that 
improve the skills of the labour force. Governments can do this in a number of ways, such as by 
creating a system by which newly acquired competences can get recognised, for example skills 
acquired by adults (e.g. new immigrants) through training or work experience. Moreover, training 
needs to be more geared towards market demands and thus respond to the skill needs of firms. 
Training provisions should strive for a higher quality for instance by monitoring training 
providers. Next, governments can support training programmes by facilitating training vouchers, 
training leave, schemes that allow for combining work and training, among other by co-financing 
from private agents. Training inequalities should be addressed by providing effective learning 
opportunities for disadvantaged groups, particularly the low-educated. Next, governments could 
expand the scope of apprenticeships by easing age limits and allowing flexible compensation 
arrangements. Moreover, employment programmes should meet the specific needs of 
disadvantaged groups. A second topic regarding this training goal, specifically addresses school-
to-work transitions, which should be supported. This can be done for instance by reducing early-
school leaving and by making sure that young people can acquire the skills they need at the 
labour market. Therefore, the links between general and vocational education could be improved, 
and career guidance could be offered. Moreover, governments could facilitate the combination of 
work and education for instance by improving apprenticeship systems. 
 
The OECD Jobs Strategy addresses some vulnerable groups that in its recommendation that 
could and should benefit from the proposed measures. For one, these are the low wage workers 
and the low skilled workers, who could, according to the OECD, benefit from the removal of 
wage-related-taxes so that they are not regarded as too expensive by employers to hire. In this 
respect, also the recommendation to guard the level of the minimum wage should be seen. 
Moreover, OECD countries should create facilities or frameworks to make it easier to combine 
work and care, which could be explained as a special focus on the position of women (or other 
carers) on the labour market. The attention for the transition from school to work reveals a focus 
on the position of young people ,whereas the recommendation to attribute (equal) rights to 
people with an atypical contract points at attention for people that find themselves in the 
disadvantaged section of the segmented labour market. Also regarding skill accumulation there is 
attention for low skilled groups and young people. 
 
Macro-economic policies and taxes 
One of the pillars which support job creation is, according to the OECD, an appropriate 
macroeconomic policy. As this is the first pillar mentioned, the OECD seems to attach a great 
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deal of importance to this aspect. Macroeconomic policies should aim at economic stability, price 
stability and sustainable public finances in order to keep interest rates low and encourage 
investment and labour productivity and stimulate growth and employment. The economic 
growth will thus be strengthened, resulting in the growth of employment, according to the 
OECD. One of the recommendations in pillar B of the Jobs Strategy is to Adjust taxes and other 
transfer programmes to make work pay, all to make it financially (more) attractive to people to 
accept a job. This could involve changes in the tax system. 
 
Social security system 
Pillar B in OECD’s Job Strategy addresses the removal of obstacles to labour market 
participation and job search and scrutinises the role of social security systems and taxes in the 
performance of the labour market. A new-style social security system could support transitions to 
jobs, although the OECD keeps stressing the risk of slowing down job search. Especially in the 
old OECD Jobs Strategy the existence of unemployment and other benefits and active labour 
market programmes were perceived as a potential barrier to job search and job creation. 
However, in the revisited Jobs Strategy of 2006, the OECD has changed its view on the role of 
these social security provisions. Therefore, the first key recommendation in this pillar is: 
Implement well-designed unemployment benefit systems and active labour market policies. 
Although the OECD still remarks that a cut in benefit levels and their duration has indeed 
succeeded in raising work incentives, it also may have compromised social objectives. Now, the 
opinion of the OECD is that innovative benefit systems may achieve a combination of 
reasonably generous benefits, low unemployment and high labour market participation. Such 
innovative benefit systems are generally linked to intensive assistance to and monitoring of 
jobseekers, i.e. activation measures, encompassing “mutual obligations”, employment services 
that are in close contact with people on benefits, and tax-benefit reforms that ensure that work 
pays (OECD, 2006b). A second recommendation in this pillar is: Make other non-employment 
benefits more work-oriented. Gate-keeping measures should prevent that people unnecessarily 
leave the labour market via sickness or disability systems, while keeping up the level of protection 
for people who cannot work. Here also, job-search support and financial incentives to go back to 
work can be in place. Moreover, early retirement facilities should be gradually phased out and 
other retirement provisions should be cleared from incentive for early retirement. Another 
recommendation in this pillar is: Facilitate family-friendly arrangements that make it easier to 
combine work and care, such as childcare support or working-time arrangements. 
 
Labour law and wage-setting 
Pillar C of the OECD Jobs Strategy addresses to a large extent the legal system, however, in this 
particular pillar to improve labour demand. The pillar tells OECD-countries to tackle labour- and 
product-market obstacles to labour demand. The first recommendation of this pillar is: Ensure that 
wages and labour costs respond to labour market developments. This means that the level of 
minimum wages should not hinder job creation, especially when it involves low productivity 
workers. Also, if payroll taxes on labour are too high, they should be reduced, in particular on 
low-wage earners. Health and pension contributions should be kept under control. Moreover, in 
countries where uncoordinated sectoral collective agreements prevail and where these have 
adverse effects on employment, individual firms, through collective agreement, should be allowed 
to opt-out from sectoral agreements or the administrative extension of sectoral agreements 
should be reformed. The second recommendation in this pillar is: Enhance competition in 
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product markets, which involves the improvement of the entrepreneurial climate, by the removal 
of legislation that hinders the entry of new firms in all areas where competition is feasible, the 
reduction of administrative burdens on business start-ups, lowering start-up costs, and 
simplifying the administrative procedures for the creation of new businesses. OECD countries 
should move towards open international trade and investment in goods and services and state 
control that restrains competition should be reduced. A third recommendation addresses the 
facilitation of the adoption of flexible working-time arrangements, a topic which is also addressed 
from a national legislative perspective. Labour legislation should be cleared from any rules that 
limit options for flexible working-times arrangements, concluded by employers and employees. 
Moreover, tax and social security provisions should not discriminate against part-time work or 
other flexible arrangements should support the reconciliation of work and family life and should 
promote a gradual transition from work to retirement. The fourth recommendation is to Make 
sure that employment protection legislation helps labour-market dynamism and provides security 
to workers. Overly strict EPL should be reformed. Although unfair dismissal should be 
sanctioned, dismissals for economic reasons should be freed from restrains. Severance costs and 
administrative procedures should be more predictable and reasonable dismissal notice periods 
should be provided, the latter being necessary to assist redundant workers in finding new jobs. 
Moreover, in some countries the regulations on fixed-term and temporary contracts may need to 
be relaxed; in order not to avoid or aggravate labour market segmentation, which ultimately 
undermines labour market performance. Furthermore, there needs to be a more balanced 
treatment of temporary and permanent contracts for instance by increasing dismissal protection 
rights in line with seniority. The last recommendation says to Promote transitions to formal 
employment, which means that taxes on low paid employment should be lowered, while 
increasing the compliance of other taxes. Moreover, reforms of labour regulations and business 
registration requirements, could improve firms’ willingness to create formal jobs, whereas closer 
ties between social protection entitlements and work can encourage workers to declare their job. 
3.3 Conclusions 
Although all international organisations acknowledge that there is no-one-size-fits-all model for 
all countries, the discussion above reveals that they do present general directions for the 
development of the labour market and the promotion of participation. For the member states of 
these organisations these policy recommendations, conventions, regulations, guidelines or 
standards serve as driving policies.   
In this concluding section we summarise the key messages of the policies into a matrix (Table 
20). The matrix shows the major concerns of each International Organisation on a limited range 
of policy issues, namely quantitative employment targets (for the increase of labour participation), 
the quality of participation in work, and the preconditions for promoting labour market 
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Table 20 Key messages from international organisations on labour market participation and its 
dimensions 
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The matrix indicates varying messages, emphasizing either a social rights and human conditions 
approach (CoE, ILO), a mixture of economic and social goals (EU, OECD) or a predominantly 
economic and financial perspective (IMF). This difference in approach also explains why some of 
the organisations place more emphasis on enhancing labour market participation (“more jobs”) 
whereas others see the quality of participation in work as a core aspect (“better jobs”). 
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The organisations that specifically address the need to raise labour market participation always 
view this as an aim targeted at the entire labour force. Specific target groups are distinguished, 
but not merely to recommend how to raise their labour market participation. They are also 
singled out to address their vulnerable position at work (e.g. having relatively often fixed-term or 
other atypical employment contracts) or participating less often in training and education. 
Solutions for further driving the participation of these groups are therefore often sought in the 
preconditions of participation: training, social dialogues, tax systems, social security and labour 
law. 
 
The target groups mentioned in earlier chapters (women, elderly and unemployed) are often also 
mentioned in the policies of the respective international organisations. Concerning women the 
policies that drive participation often refer to policies that allow women (and men) to combine 
work and care (ILO, EU, OECD) or demand more gender equality (ILO, CoE, EU). Part of the 
suggestions is to provide accessible and affordable child care facilities, to take a life-cycle 
approach to work, or to make sure that social security provisions do not discriminate against 
part-time work. 
 
Regarding the unemployed, active labour market policies are often recommended in order to 
bring people back to work (EU, OECD, CoE). For the elderly gradual transitions from work to 
retirement are suggested (OECD). Other vulnerable groups are migrants (who for example have 
poor access to social security provisions) (CoE, EU), low skilled people (that often lack access to 
training and are more frequently unemployed) and handicapped persons (who also often face 
severe difficulties finding a job) (CoE, EU). One suggestion is for instance to remove wage-
related taxes (EU, OECD). Also young people are seen as a vulnerable group, especially those 
who drop out of school early or have difficulties in making the transition from school to work 
(EU). 
 
Although, as stressed in the beginning of this chapter, these international organisations advocate 
a structural and long-term perspective, all of them are currently very active in responding to the 
current financial and employment crisis. It remains to be seen to what extent this will eventually 
impact their key policies for labour market participation and employment in a more fundamental 
way. The European Commission e.g. has already stated that it considers its flexicurity policy no 
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4 Policy solutions in the empirical 
literature 
In a previous chapter we discussed the decline of labour supply caused by ageing and the 
resulting potential employment gap. This gap can be closed in different ways. One channel is the 
employment participation rate. In this Chapter we present an extensive literature study which 
reviews different instruments to increase participation: the ‘drivers of participation’41. We focus 
on policy instruments that have been empirically tested in scientific literature. Although 
experiences from the past are no guarantee for the future, they can give valuable insights into 
how to model future policy. We make a distinction between the target groups of the Lisbon 
agenda: women, the elderly, and the (long-term) unemployed. Often, women and elderly citizens 
who are not working are not considered unemployed, but rather not part of the active labour 
force, if they do not receive unemployment benefits. Note that unemployment, in and of itself, is 
not the real problem. Long-term unemployment is, however.  
 
Evaluations of policies aimed specifically at increasing female and elderly participation are 
generally more conclusive than evaluations of policies aimed at increasing the participation of the 
unemployed in general. For that reason, tailor-made approaches to increase participation in these 
two groups tend to be more effective than general measures to increase overall participation. 
Recent research confirms that there is no one common policy that works the same for all 
European countries and regions (Elhorst & Zeilstra (2007)). 
 
Section 4.1 discusses research on the instruments that may increase female labour supply. Section 
4.2 focuses on the participation of the elderly. Section 4.3 shifts attention to the (long term) 
unemployed. Section 4.4 concludes this chapter by giving some ‘best practices’ in stimulating 
participation for various countries. 
4.1 Drivers for women  
Female participation rates have been identified as the most important factor in explaining the 
current variation in participation rates across countries. They have also been identified as the 
most important factor in overall participation growth. In most EU countries, female labour 
participation has increased strongly over the past thirty years. The timing has varied, with some 
regions, such as the Scandinavian countries, showing earlier increases in female participation. In 
the last two decades, the largest increases have been observed in some southern European 
countries (Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal) as well as in some northern European countries 
(the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, and Ireland).  
 
A major consideration for female labour force participation is finding the optimal balance 
between work and family responsibilities. Female employment rates generally decrease around 
childbirth. In the past, mothers with young children were traditionally characterized by a low 
labour force attachment. Younger generations of women on the other hand tend to keep on 
working, with or without a short interruption around childbirth. At the same time there is an 
                                                        
41 Although the study is elabourate, we do not claim that it is comprehensive or exhaustive.  
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increased awareness in most countries that balancing work and family responsibilities is 
important for women and appropriate policies have been adopted.  
 
The studied evaluations of female participation policies point towards the following: 
• an effective way to increase participation is to introduce an equal tax treatment plan, under 
which non-single women are taxed the same as single women, and as men; 
•  child care availability (in the right place and for the right hours) is more important than price; 
•  (paid) parental leaves have varying effects, depending on the type of institution, but excessive 
leave periods lead to fewer returns, and lower wages are a negative side-effect; 
• availability of part-time opportunities can prove effective, at least in countries with a strong 
female preference for part-time work (like Denmark, France, and the Netherlands); and 
• studies on temporary agency work show positive effects. It is often more flexible and 
provides more opportunity to combine work and family responsibilities, resulting in a higher 
female labour force participation. 
 
Female education, cultural attitudes and gender discrimination remain major factors in female 
participation rates.  
 
In the following sections, we discuss cost and provision of child care, (paid) parental leave, equal 
tax treatment for married women, part-time work opportunities, fixed-term contracts and 
temporary agency work, education, cultural attitudes, and gender discrimination. 
4.1.1 Cost and provision of child care 
In the Netherlands the effect on female labour supply of subsidized child care has not been 
analyzed yet. In the recent past Dutch child care policies focused on increasing the availability of 
child care, and on involving employers in sharing child care costs. What has been established in 
Dutch empirical research is that changing prices of child care has no or comparatively small 
effects on labour supply. For example, Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2006) find that labour 
supply is more sensitive to changes in the wage rate than to changes in the price of child care. 
This implies that at current prices the labour supply of women can be influenced more effectively 
through changes in wages than through changes in child care prices. For example, if the 
government’s aim is to stimulate female labour supply, it seems more effective to allow tax 
reductions on labour income for women with children as is the case in the US, rather than to 
further subsidize child care. Such a tax policy measure is included in recent Dutch governmental 
child care policies. Wetzels (2005) shows that there is a positive and significant correlation 
between the labour force participation of Dutch women and the use of paid child care. Women 
with a pre-school child will most likely decide simultaneously on using child care and 
participating in the labour force. Wetzels also concludes that the price paid for formal child care 
by the household depends solely on the husband’s income, whereas the mother’s working hours, 
her income, education, and age have no influence. A plausible explanation for this result is that 
the cost of child care has an effect on the switch from formal (expensive) care to informal 
(cheaper) care, but has no influence on the labour force participation of the mother. Fouarge et 
al. (2005) have studied the effect of the availability of child care on labour market entry of 
women in the Netherlands. They conclude that the availability of child care has no effect on the 
re-entrance of women aged 20 to 44 with children under the age of 8. More child care provision 
has stopped the outflow of women from the labour force, but has had no influence on the 
inflow. 
  
POLICY SOLUTIONS IN THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 71 
SEO ECONOMISCH ONDERZOEK 
US studies find various effects of child care costs and subsidies. Hofferth and Wissoker (1992) 
show that American parents are very sensitive to the costs of child care. Policies that reduce the 
price of child care increases demand for child care. Policies that increase the quality of child care 
centres on the other hand do not increase demand. Leibowitz et al. (1992) examine the 
relationship between the mother’s decision to return to work in the two years following 
childbirth and the type of child care she chooses. Women with higher wages are more likely to 
return to work by the time their child is three months old. Women with high family income on 
the other hand delay return to work. Wages and income did not significantly affect the choice of 
market (formal) versus nonmarket (informal) child care. Women who receive a high subsidy for 
child care are far more likely to return early (within three months). Michalopoulos et al. (1992) 
find that more generous subsidies will increase labour supply, but that the primary beneficiaries 
are current users of high-quality free care who will buy slightly higher-quality market care. 
According to Ribar (1995), the suppression of the main public policy for income assistance to 
child care in the US (Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit), would have only a tiny effect on 
female labour supply. The participation rate of mothers with children younger than 15 years 
would slightly reduce from 52.6% to 51.1%. Neither does Ribar predict large transitions from 
full-time to part-time jobs. On the contrary, according to Averett et al. (1997), suppressing the 
Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit would have a positive effect on the number of hours 
worked by young mothers. A possible explanation for the sometimes large difference in empirical 
results might be the difference in methodology and data sources used. 
 
For Canada, Powell (1997) finds a significant effect of child care cost on labour force 
participation of married women. She calculates that if child care costs were subsidized by 50% 
the probability of labour force participation of married women would increase from 46% to 56%. 
If child care costs were fully subsidized, 63% of married women were expected to participate. In 
a follow-up study (Powell, 1998) shows that the increase in participation rate will be mainly 
driven by full-time workers.  
 
For Italy, Chiuri (2000) and Del Boca (2002a, 2002b) conclude that household labour supply 
depends on the availability of child care rather than its costs. Child care for young children can be 
restricted or is rationed in two ways: in the number of places available and in the number of 
hours. Ferrera (1996) and Addabbo (2001) show that expanded child care with more hours 
encourage women to work more. Del Boca (1993) finds an effect of lower child care costs on the 
probability of part-time employment, but not on full-time. Chiuri (2000) does not find a 
significant effect of child care costs on female labour supply. The overall conclusion for Italy 
appears to be that policies that reduce the financial cost of child care are not enough to increase 
the participation of women. A sufficient provision and expansion of the child care system 
combined with financial relieve could have a more positive impact. 
 
For England, France and Germany little impact has been found. Chevalier and Viitanen (2002) have 
examined the causality between female labour force participation and the supply of child care in 
England. They show that an increase in the availability of child care has led to an increase of 
female participation with a certain delay. An increase in the participation of women does not lead 
to an increase in the supply of child care, but only to higher prices for child care and larger 
queues. Choné et al. (2003) have simulated different policy reforms in France with respect to 
child care costs. They show that the influence of the tax credit on child care expenditures 
(CCTC) on mother’s labour supply is weak. Increasing the subsidy rate from 25% to 50% would 
only result in a slight increase in total female participation and a bigger increase in paid care use. 
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Suppressing the CCTC would only result in a weak reduction in total female participation. For 
Germany, Wrohlich (2004) find significant but small effects of child care costs on mother’s 
labour supply: a 1% increase in private child care costs would result in a decline of the labour 
force participation of mothers of 1% points in West and 0.5% points in East Germany. If child 
care were free of charge for all households, mothers’ labour force participation would rise by 3% 
points in West and 1.5% points in East Germany. She notes that compared to other countries 
such as the US, Canada or the UK, the effects are rather small, which can be explained by the 
fact that child care costs are already heavily subsidized in Germany. For England and Germany it 
is expected that expansion of the availability of child care will have more impact of the 
participation of females than (further) decreasing its costs. 
4.1.2 (Paid) parental leave 
For the US and Canada many studies show that (unpaid) parental leave results in lower wages and 
worsens job opportunities. According to various studies wage penalties in US can be as high as 
7% per child. Taking into account other effects which are also related to parental leave such as a 
lower investment in human capital, part-time work and a reduced seniority function, wages are 
only 2/3 of what they would have been without taken parental leave. These effects are probably 
due to reduced productivity and discrimination by employers. Waldfogel (1998) shows that a 
parental leave combined with a guarantee of re-entrance improves job opportunities but wages 
are still lower. He also shows that women with children typically pay a wage penalty of 10-15% 
compared to equally educated and experienced women without children. This phenomenon is 
sometimes called the ‘family pay gap’ or the ‘price of motherhood’. This gap establishes that 
women with children consistently earn less compared to unmarried women and to married men.  
 
European studies are not as clear as American studies on the re-entrance opportunities for women 
after parental leave. Gustafsson et al. (1996) show that re-entrance behaviour is dependent on the 
provisions of the welfare state. They compare re-entrance behaviour of women in Sweden, UK 
and Germany. These countries represent respectively a social-democratic, a liberal and a 
conservative welfare state. The Swedish welfare state has the most favourable arrangements for 
parental leave compared to the other countries. Swedish women with children have the highest 
probability to re-enter the labour market. A similar conclusion can be found in Mandel and 
Semyonov (2006) and in Stier et al. (2001). Countries with policies that encourage the 
combination of work and caring responsibilities have a higher re-entrance rate after taken 
parental leave. Ruhm (1998) finds evidence that paid parental leave increases employment rates in 
nine OECD countries42 covered by his study. His analysis shows that short paid parental leave 
(not longer than 3 months) increases the employment-to-population ratio with 3-4%, and long 
paid parental leave (not longer than 9 months) increases this ratio with 4%. Note however that 
his conclusion could (partly) be caused by the simultaneous introduction of other measures 
balancing work and care. Taking parental leave for an extended period may deteriorate labour 
market skills and damage future career paths and earnings (Edin and Gustavsson, 2001).  
 
There is some evidence that very long parental leaves makes it more difficult for women to 
return to the labour market. For example, research by Ondrich et al. (1998) concludes that an 
increase in the parental leave from 6 to 10 months has a substantial negative effect on the female 
participation in Germany. The probability of re-entry for full-time working mothers decreases by 
50%. The reduction would be even higher if paternal leave is extended to 18 months with a 
                                                        
42 Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and Sweden. 
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guaranteed return to the job. Part-time working mothers have a higher re-entry probability than 
full-time working mothers. But probabilities of re-entry would also decrease for part-time 
working mothers with longer paternal leave and a guaranteed return to the job. Their re-entry 
probability after 6 months is 60% and it decrease to 47% after 10 months of parental leave and to 
21% after 18 months. Roman (2006) also finds that the length of parental leave correlates 
negatively with the participation and wages of women, particularly if full-time leave is taken. An 
OECD analysis (Jaumotte (2003)) shows that beyond 20 weeks the marginal effect of additional 
parental leave on female participation becomes negative. Ruhm (1998) and OECD (2002a) 
confirm that extended parental leaves have a negative impact on wages of returning mothers. 
Román and Schippers (2006) find for Belgium that full-time (paid) parental leave decreases the 
participation rate of women, but increases their wage after re-entry. They suggest that employers 
appreciate the full availability of those mothers which translates into higher wages. 
 
Tijdens (2002) shows for the Netherlands that a career break has a great impact on female wages. 
The effect is related to the break itself, while the duration of the break is of less importance. Kok 
et al. (2007) examine the effect of introducing paid maternity leave on the participation of 
mothers in the Netherlands. They find that the participation rate of mothers with children under 
the age of 12 will increase by 7.3% when they receive paid parental leave compared with the 
situation in which they do not receive paid parental leave.  
4.1.3 Equal tax treatment for married women 
In most OECD countries married women are effectively taxed more heavily than men and single 
women. There is much international evidence that high marginal tax rates reduce labour supply. 
Also labour supply elasticity is higher for women than for men as women react more to a change 
in the net wage and hence the impact on female labour participation of a change in tax rate is 
significant higher than on male participation.  
 
Jaumotte (2003) shows that a high marginal tax wedge between second earners (i.e. married 
women) and single individuals has a negative impact on female participation. Her conclusion is 
covered by seventeen OECD countries over the period 1985-1999. She also shows that if women 
and men are taxed separately and equally, women will participate more. Gustafsson (1992) 
compares the tax systems of Germany and Sweden. Sweden introduced separate taxation in 1971, 
and ever since the labour force participation of married women has increased. Germany has 
separate income taxation, but couples are jointly taxed at a lower rate than single earners. 
Gustafsson predicts the labour force participation for German and Swedish wives aged 25-59 
when confronted with the tax system of the other country. The participation rate of German 
women who work part time in that case increases from 50.3% to 60.0%. Full-time female 
workers’ participation rates move from 27.8% to 30.6%. Similar results are found in a 
comparable study done by Holst et al. (1988). Swedish women who are confronted with German 
taxation react completely opposite. Participation rates for part-time women decrease from 80.2% 
to 60.4%. For full-time working women participation rates decrease from 45.4% to 38.5%. 
Clearly the difference between the Swedish and German tax systems is an important factor in 
explaining why Swedish women participate more in the labour market than German women. Paid 
parental leaves and subsidized child care provide additional explanations for the Swedish 
situation. 
 
These and other studies (e.g. O’Donogue & Sutherland (1998)) show that separate taxation has a 
positive effect on the participation of second earners (mainly women). Under joint taxation, the 
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second income earner often starts at a much higher marginal tax rate than in the case of separate 
taxation. 
4.1.4 Part-time work opportunities  
In OECD countries about one-quarter of female workers at age 25-54 have part-time jobs 
(Jaumotte (2003)). The highest share of part-time work can be found in the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Countries with the least women in part-
time jobs are in Eastern Europe, Korea, Finland, and Portugal. The share of part time work 
declined significantly in Nordic countries (as women moved to full-time jobs) and increased in 
other European countries and in Japan. 
 
Part-time work is often seen as a way to facilitate the integration of women in the labour market, 
by allowing them to combine market work with family responsibilities. Figure 31 provides 
information on reasons for women to work part time. In a number of countries a large 
percentage of women works part time because of family responsibilities. The availability of part-
time jobs may be crucial to female labour force participation even in a country like the 
Netherlands, where part-time work is fairly common. Euwals (2001) finds that the flexibility of 
working hours in the Netherlands is often low, and women who would like to work substantially 
fewer hours have a higher propensity to leave the labour market. In countries with high 
preferences for part-time work, an increase in part-time work opportunities would most likely 
raise female participation43.  
 
Figure 31 Reasons for working in part-time job, women age 15-64, 2005 (in percentages) 
 
Source:  EU (Labour Force Survey 2005). 
 
                                                        
43 Elhorst & Zeilstra (2007) confirm the importance of part-time work and a favourable industry mix for the 
participation of women. As regards the demand for part-time work by companies, Anxo et al. (2009) find 
that, in Europe, country-specific features (such as societal and institutional factors) play a larger role than 
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4.1.5 Fixed term contracts & temporary agency work 
For some workers, mostly women, temporary contracts offer opportunities to combine work and 
family responsibilities. This is especially true for temporary agency work and on-call work. In 
these types of contracts, workers have more flexibility in designing their own working hours.  
 
Albert and Bradley (1998) analyze the accountant profession using a sample of 175 professional 
accountants permanently employed in a large London accountancy firm and 50 employees of a 
London-based temporary employment agency specialized in accountants. They find that women 
working via temporary work agencies experience much more control over their working 
conditions than those working in regular jobs. This might be an indication that temporary agency 
work allows women greater latitude for combining their work and care. On the other hand, some 
researchers suggest that job instability negatively influences family formation. Ahituv and Lerman 
(2005), for instance, show that higher perceived job instability leads to lower probabilities to 
marry and also lower probabilities to remain married for US men. De la Rica and Iza (2005) 
estimate duration models of time until marriage and time until birth of the first child in Spain. 
They find that having a temporary contract delays motherhood, particularly for young women. 
Non-participants do not delay motherhood. This is consistent with a career-planning motive that 
delays motherhood for those women who wish for a professional career.  
4.1.6 Education 
During the 20th century, many Western countries have experienced a strong increase in the 
female labour force participation and at the same time a substantial increase in the number of 
women with more and higher education. In general, education is correlated with employment 
probabilities, especially full-time employment. Elhorst & Zeilstra (2007) confirm that higher 
education and higher participation rates go together in European countries and regions. 
4.1.7 Cultural attitudes 
A Dutch study by SCP (2008) titled ‘The Netherlands part-time country’ shows that in the 
Netherlands most women prefer to work in part-time jobs. In fact 75% of all working women do 
so. Most striking about this is that this choice is independent of having young children. One 
should expect that women who just gave birth to a child reduce their working hours, but will 
increase them again when children go to elementary school. Dutch women hardly ever shift back 
to working more hours. The results of the SCP study are consistent with an earlier study in 2006 
on stated preferences and attitudes in society towards the employment of women. In that study 
96% of women who work part time and have a working male partner prefer to work part time. 
The number of individuals with a negative attitude towards women combining full-time work 
and raising children stayed stable for all generations starting from the generation born in the early 
1950s. These findings suggest that full-time work is not expected to become a standard model for 
Dutch women in the near future.  
 
The SCP (2008) study also shows that Dutch women are not alone in having a strong preference 
for part-time work in combination with taking care of the children. Women in former West 
Germany, Spain and France share this attitude and the desire to combine work and care. The 
non-availability of part-time jobs might hinder female participation rates.  
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Table 21 Answer to the statement “A household will suffer if the woman has a full-time job”, 
percentage that (strongly) agrees  
 Women Men 
Spain 53% 51% 
Former East Germany 45% 46% 
The Netherlands 43% 41% 
Former West Germany 32% 35% 
Denmark 27% 27% 
Sweden 24% 27% 
France 22% 27% 
Source:  International Social Survey Program 2002 
SCP (2006) also has insight into the attitudes towards (formal) child care. The study briefly 
reviews research on the effects of formal child care on the children. SCP mentions that American 
research suggests that children who were in formal child care are slightly more aggressive than 
other children. Dutch studies find neither positive nor negative effects of formal child care. They 
are also too limited to make strong general conclusions. Compared to the US quality of Dutch 
formal child care seems to be higher. American children make more and longer use of formal 
child care. The SCP study shows that most Dutch women prefer to take care of their children 
themselves. Next in line is family in particularly grand-parents. Only 33% of the mothers choose 
formal child care as a possible (third) option and even then mothers do not want to use child care 
that often. 75% find it acceptable to send their children for a maximum of two days to a child 
care centre. These attitudes obviously restrict the willingness to use formal child care. Higher 
educated mothers are more in favour of formal child care then mothers with a lower education. 
There are no differences in attitudes towards child care between younger and older mothers. 
4.1.8 Gender discrimination 
Gender discrimination in pay and promotion opportunities might have a negative effect on 
female labour participation. Empirical evidence on the existence of gender discrimination is 
difficult to obtain. Gender differences in pay and promotion can be explained to a large extend 
by differences in observed characteristics and whatever cannot be explained might still be related 
to unobserved characteristics (OECD, 2002b). It has also been suggested that women are under-
represented at higher job levels (glass ceiling) because they voluntarily choose for jobs that offer 
fewer opportunities for promotion, and not because of discrimination. On the other hand one 
cannot proof that there is no discrimination against women either.  
 
Some countries have introduced gender-specific anti-discrimination laws. These have been 
relatively effective in lowering the gender pay gap. This occurred more rapidly in countries that 
had centralized wage bargaining structures at the time of introduction of the law.  
4.2 Drivers for the elderly 
With an increasing share of elderly persons in the population, and a large decline in the share of 
the prime working-age population, countries are facing substantial pressures on public finances. 
This is especially relevant to old age benefits that are financed through a pay-as-you-go system. 
The most obvious solution is to encourage people to work longer and retire later. The primary 
way to encourage this is to get the financial incentives right. Financial incentives embedded in 
pension systems (or other welfare benefits) play an important role in work-retirement decisions. 
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It is essential that older people do not face a large implicit tax if they chose to continue to work. 
Raising the statutory retirement age one year, while leaving in place existing early retirement 
schemes, could raise the participation rates of older workers. An actuarially neutral social security 
system44, in which social security wealth is independent of the retirement age and therefore does 
not distort the retirement decision, could increase participation rates for older males in OECD 
countries. Linking pension contributions to pension benefits also seems to stimulate participation 
among older workers. The same conclusion can be made for different reforms in early retirement 
schemes.  
 
Nevertheless, financial incentives in pension systems alone are not sufficient to promote 
employment opportunities of older workers. It is important that other welfare benefits, like 
unemployment and disability benefits, are not used as alternative pathways to an early exit from 
the labour market. Restricting access to these benefit systems reduces early retirement and causes 
older workers to participate longer. Recent research confirms the effect of economic incentives 
in the pension system and alternative, early retirement systems (Elhorst & Zeilstra (2007)). 
 
One should also keep in mind that an increased willingness of older workers to work longer will 
have to be matched by a sufficient number of job opportunities if unemployment is to be 
avoided. This requires a major change in the attitude of employers towards hiring and retraining 
older workers. 
 
The health status of older Europeans has a major influence on their probability of employment. 
People with health problems or severe restrictions in activities have a much higher probability of 
being out of the labour market. Improving the employability of older workers also is important. 
On-the-job-training for older workers, in particular those with a lower education level, has been 
found to reduce the probability to retire. For older people, alternative employment models, such 
as part-time retirement, could provide more opportunities to extend their working lives and 
ensure maintenance of their skills, experience, and know-how. In particular, part-time retirement 
provides them with a bridge between employment and retirement. 
 
The following sections discuss policies raising the statutory retirement age, the creation of an 
actuarially neutral social security system, linking individual pension contribution to pension 
benefits, reforming early retirement schemes, and introducing lump-sum bonuses to delay 
retirement. We also look at the effect of health on participation, and the effects of stricter access 
to non-employment benefits, training-on-the-job and alternative employment modes.  
4.2.1 Raising the statutory retirement age 
A first option is an (gradual) increase in the age at which workers become eligible for retirement 
benefits. Some countries have already implemented this and a number of other countries are 
making plans to introduce it. Blöndal & Scarpetta (1997) have quantified the effects on labour 
force participation of an increase in the statutory retirement age of entitlement for many OECD 
countries. They find that an increase of one year in the age of entitlement, while leaving in place 
different early retirement schemes, could raise the participation rates of older workers by 1 to 2 
percentage points. Using the same model they are also able to quantify what has been the effect 
on participation rates of older workers in the past (period 1971-1995). They find for France that 
                                                        
44 Such a neutral system means that if people decide to retire later or earlier than the statutory retirement age, 
their social security wealth will increase or decrease, accordingly. 
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the reduction in the statutory age of retirement entitlement from 65 to 60 has caused a decline in 
the participation rate of 7.5 percentage points. For Ireland the decline in participation rate was 6 
percentage points as a result of reducing the statutory age of retirement entitlement from 70 to 
66.  
 
Increasing the minimum pensionable age might not always be socially acceptable. There could be 
a very strong preference among the population to keep open the possibility to retire early, 
certainly for workers in poor health or who have been working for many years in physically or 
mentally demanding jobs.  
4.2.2 Create an actuarially neutral social security system 
A good alternative for raising the statutory retirement age would be to combine neutrality with 
flexibility. This would be a policy that allows people to retire at the age of their own choice but 
with an adjustment to the pension level so that the pension system is neutral. Earlier retirement 
would result in lower yearly pension benefits. Under such a system, the increase in pension 
benefits per year due to an additional year of work would make up for additional pension 
contributions and for loss of a year of benefits. Within such a neutral system, people would be 
given the opportunity to retire at the age of their own choice.  
 
Blöndal & Scarpetta (1997) simulate an actuarially neutral social security system for different 
OECD countries. A neutral system implies that the social security wealth is independent of the 
retirement age and therefore does not distort the retirement decision. So if people retire later or 
earlier than the statutory retirement age, their social security wealth will be increased or declined 
accordingly. Their simulation shows that most countries could reach a participation rate for older 
males of at least 60%. The largest increase would be in Italy, but the highest participation rate 
would be obtained by the United States (70%) and Japan (89%). A similar exercise by Duval 
(2003) using 1999 data for almost the same OECD countries arrives at the same conclusions as 
Blöndal & Scarpetta. Heywood & Siebert (2009) investigate retirement age across countries and 
find that tax laws that make little allowance for fair pension increases if retirement is delayed 
partly explain the age of retirement.  
4.2.3 Link pension contributions to pension benefits: moving from defined 
benefit towards defined contribution 
Broadly, there exist two types of pension systems: defined benefit or defined contribution. The 
level of the pension benefit in a defined benefit system is fixed. In most countries this is a fixed 
percentage of last earned income or of average lifetime earnings. The retirement contributions 
are flexible: they are chosen in such a way that pension benefits are guaranteed. The defined 
contribution principle works differently. Here pension contributions are fixed and the pension 
benefits are flexible. This means that employees save for their own pension. The pension benefit 
in a defined contribution system can be either higher or lower than in a defined benefit system. 
The most important difference between the two systems is about who owns the pension risk. In 
a defined benefit system the risk is owned by the pension fund (this actually means the younger 
working generation). In a defined contribution system the employee bears his or her own pension 
risk.  
 
The pension system can have an effect on the effective retirement age of older workers. The 
defined contribution principle stimulates working longer: the longer someone works, the higher 
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the expected pension benefits. Defined benefit pension systems do not have this incentive: the 
level of the pension benefit is fixed. American research by Freidberg and Webb (2003) finds that 
employees in a defined contribution pension system on average retire two years later than 
employees in a defined benefit pension system. Also Groot and Heyma (2004) show for some 
European countries that defined contribution pension plans are related to higher participation of 
older workers.  
Table 22 Differences between defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans 
Pension principle Pension contribution Pension benefit Pension risk owner 
 Defined benefit flexible fixed pension fund 
 Defined contribution fixed flexible employee 
 
4.2.4 Reforming early retirement schemes  
Early retirement schemes are often employer provided schemes, initially designed as programs to 
induce older workers to retire early to make place for young unemployed workers (during the 
high unemployment period of the eighties). Over the past decades early retirement has become 
more widespread in many OECD countries. In as far as this trend reflects mainly the effect of 
higher income (as a society grows richer it prefers earlier retirement) and higher preferences for 
leisure, it reflects what the population wants and would not be a policy concern from a social 
welfare point of view. But this is not always the case and many OECD countries have recently 
changed their policies with respect to early retirement. A number of policy reforms are 
highlighted below. 
 
CPB (2005) examines the effect of the transformation of the generous and actuarially unfair pay-
as-you-go occupational early retirement schemes (VUT) into a less generous and actuarially fair 
capital funded pre-pension schemes for the Netherlands. This new pre-pension scheme is a 
collective savings arrangement in which workers save for their own early retirement. Important 
differences with the VUT retirement scheme are the eligibility requirements and the replacement 
rates. The VUT required a 10 year contribution to the scheme for full benefit, less or longer 
contribution has no effect. In the new pre-pension scheme a 35-40 year contribution is required 
for maximum benefit. If the employee has a shorter employment history, then the early 
retirement benefits will be lower pro rata. Another difference is that early retirement wealth is 
considerably lower in the new scheme (at least 10%-points). Model simulations show that the 
first phase of transition has already led to an average retirement postponement by 4 months for 
elderly workers. Postponement will become about 9 months when transition is fully completed. 
 
Schils (2008) shows that a shift from public to private early retirement schemes will lower the 
incidence of earlier retirement. Yet, at the same time, early retirement might become more 
selective as only the higher paid are able to afford it. It is also possible that older workers use 
other exit routes to withdraw from the labour market (e.g. disability schemes). This is especially 
true for Germany and the Netherlands.  
 
Gruber and Wise (2002) have simulated the effect of a 3-year eligibility age delay for all early exit 
routes (early retirement, unemployment and disability benefits) for 12 countries45. The simulation 
shows that the out of the labour force percentage of men aged 56-65 would decline in all 
countries (between 23 and 36 percent), but the magnitude of the effect differs from country to 
                                                        
45 US, Spain, UK, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. 
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country. The effects are highest for Germany and Sweden, and lowest for Canada. The (main) 
reason for the differences in effects between countries is the substantial differences between the 
exit routes.  
In another simulation they predict the effect of a change of the early retirement age to 60 and the 
normal retirement age to 65. Benefits taken before age 65 are reduced by 6 percent for each year 
before age 65. Benefits taken after the age of 65 are increased by 6 percent for each year the 
receipt of benefits is delayed. The replacement rate at age 65 is set at 60 percent of (projected) 
age 60 earnings. The simulation result shows that for some countries this change has negative 
effects. This is because the earliest age at which early retirement becomes available reduces when 
compared to the base situation (for example the US and Japan). The effect of this change is most 
positive for the Netherlands: a reduction of men in the out of the labour force status by 95%.  
 
Another way to decrease the financial incentives for early retirement schemes is to decrease the 
replacement rates. Theeuwes and Zijl (2001) estimate that a 10% decrease of the (former) Dutch 
public early retirement scheme (VUT) leads to a 5-10% participation increase for older workers.  
4.2.5 Introduce lump-sum bonuses to delay retirement  
Another option is to introduce lump-sum bonuses to delay retirement. Van Dalen and Henkens 
(2002) investigate the effect of a lump-sum bonus of a half year’s wage on the willingness to work 
up to the age of 67 in the Netherlands. They use data from a 2000 survey on ‘Opinions and 
attitudes on aspects of population and welfare’ carried out by the Netherlands Interdisciplinary 
Demographic Institute (NIDI). The results show that people who are planning to retire at the age 
of 55 or younger are the least tempted by the bonus: 72% is not expected to change their 
decision. The effect of the bonus is highest among people who plan to retire at 65 or 66: 42% 
may consider working till 67, 38% will consider working till 67 and only 20% will not change 
their decision. The same survey also explains the differences in planned retirement age. Those 
who initially chose a retirement age below the age of 60 have private financial assets earmarked 
for the purpose of retiring early.  
4.2.6 Health of the elderly 
Barnay and Debrand (2006) find that the health status of older workers in Europe has a major 
influence on the probability of being in employment. At the European level the employment rate 
of persons aged 50 and higher is much lower for persons self-reporting a health problem or 
severe restrictions in activities of daily living. Although the relationship between health status and 
unemployment may seem obvious, the causality is not. Two effects counteract each other: 
working conditions may reduce the health status at the end of working life (Volkoff et al, 2000), 
and poor health may result in early departure from the labour market (Barnay, 2005). The Barnay 
and Debrand study shows that there is a statistical correlation between health status and labour 
force participation. Reporting a restriction in activity reduces the employment rate by 36 points 
for men (from 63% to 27%) and by 19 points for women (from 43% to 24%). Their study shows 
that health status cannot explain the international differences in employment rate for men 
between European countries. These are more likely related to national economic idiosyncrasies 
and to specific national regulations governing retirement. 
 
Kalwij and Vermeulen (2005) use similar data from an earlier period as did Barnay and Debrand 
(2006). Instead of using the self-reported health status, Kalwij and Vermeulen use more objective 
health status variables to explore the effect of health on participation decisions. Their results for 
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men and women are quite similar: the overall impact of five combined health status variables46 
on participation is negative in most of the 1147 countries included in the analysis.  
4.2.7 Ease of access to out-of-work benefits  
Numerous studies have shown that social security systems in many countries provide very 
significant and strong incentives to leave the labour market before the statutory retirement age 
(e.g. Gruber and Wise, 2004b; Duval, 2003; Schils, 2008; Blöndal & Scarpetta, 1997). These 
studies also show that there is a strong correspondence between social security incentives to 
retire early and the withdrawal of older workers from the labour force. Abolishing early 
retirement incentives could raise labour force participation rates of older males (55-64) by almost 
15 percentage points and substantially delay the retirement decision in most continental 
European countries. A very important conclusion of the studies is that removing financial 
incentives to early retirement would involve both changing the old-age pension system and the 
various income-support programs like early retirement schemes and disability programs. In fact, 
tackling the latter is an essential ingredient of a successful pension reform, as the effectiveness of 
a neutral old-age pension system in itself will be undermined if large incentives to early retirement 
are continued. 
 
Financial incentives to retire early are higher in countries where it is easier to get access to public 
income support prior to the pensionable age. Disability schemes and unemployment programs 
can be used as ad hoc early retirement systems. Unemployment schemes are especially interesting 
as an ad hoc early retirement route if the job search requirement is dropped for older workers. 
Early retirement programs have been established in many countries, to assist older people to 
retire before the pensionable age. These schemes have offered relatively high replacement rates 
and impose an implicit tax on work. Generous private occupational pension schemes in 
combination with severance payments of firms have also stimulated early retirement. In recent 
years a large number of countries (Germany, Belgium, Italy, Finland, Netherlands, Hungary, 
United Kingdom and Canada) have started to tighten access to early retirement pension, disability 
benefits and/or unemployment-related schemes. They have reduced the generosity of 
unemployment benefits and have reintroduced or strengthened job-search requirements for older 
unemployed workers.  
 
An OECD (2002) study shows that in many countries there are almost no incentives left for early 
retirement since pension reforms have been introduced and other pathways out of the labour 
force have been retightened for older workers. The same study also shows separate incentives 
from unemployment and disability systems and from private employer-employee arrangements. 
They have been examined for different countries, and they all have such a replacement rate that 
participating in these schemes is not attractive.  
 
The figures we presented in Chapter 1 indeed reflect this growing unattractiveness of 
unemployment and disability schemes for early retirement purposes. In most EU countries the 
participation of elderly was very low until 2000, but has increased considerably since.  
                                                        
46 These are: a severe health condition (e.g. cancer), a mild health condition (e.g. diabetes), restriction in activities 
of daily living (walking 100m), obesity (BMI) and grip strength. 
47 Germany, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. 
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4.2.8 Training-on-the-job for older workers 
A recent European study by Fouarge and Schils (2008) examines the effects of on-the-job 
training for older workers. One of the questions they try to answer is whether on-the-job training 
can delay the moment at which workers go into (early) retirement. They find that European 
countries have a higher participation rate of older workers if more older workers have received 
on-the-job training. Estimation results show that older workers (aged 50 and over) who do not 
receive training on-the-job have a probability of 25% to retire. Retirement probability of older 
workers who did receive training is 10% lower. The effect of training on participation is higher 
for older workers with low education.  
4.2.9 Skills and alternative employment modes for older workers 
The Commission of the European Communities (1999) stresses that older people are an 
important potential source for future job creation. The realization of this employment objective 
depends on the level of aggregate labour demand and on the skills required in newly created jobs. 
Keeping up of improving skills of older workers is a precondition. Given future labour demand 
pressure employers may find it profitable to exploit the increasing numbers of older workers. 
This may require the use of alternative employment modes, like part-time employment or part-
time pensions. Heywood & Siebert (2009), for example, find that tax laws that prevent people 
from working and at the same time receiving a pension partly explain the age of retirement.  
4.3 Drivers for the unemployed 
Policies aimed at reintegrating the unemployed can be defined as Active Labour Market Policies 
(ALMPs). Properly designed ALMPs improve the efficiency of the job-matching process and 
enhance work experience and skills, and therefore can reduce short- and long-term 
unemployment. Other policies might not have positive effects, such as the substitution of a 
regular worker by a worker eligible for an employment program, or applying programs to 
workers who do not really need it. 
 
Studies on the effect of ALMPs on employment probability therefore show mixed outcomes: 
among different programs and also between countries. Most studies on monitoring show 
desirable effects on the exit rate or duration of unemployment. Studies that do not show 
desirable effects were targeted at people who had a good chance of finding a job on their own. 
Studies show that benefit sanctions and/or bonuses show positive effects on the unemployment 
exit rate. Job search assistance and other public employment services have mixed effects. In 
America, positive effects are found, but only among disadvantaged women. In the Netherlands, 
the effect of public employment services is not uniformly positive or negative. The same can be 
said about training programs and wage subsidies. Although wage subsidies are often found to be 
positive, most studies are incomplete. They do not take into account substitution effects and 
long-term effects, which makes them unsuitable for general conclusions. For training programs 
and wage subsidies to be effective, the policy must fit the actual problem. One-size-fits-all 
measures are certain to fail, while tailor-made approaches are a precondition, but no guarantee, of 
success.  
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Subsidized work in the public sector (‘artificial jobs’) has hardly had any positive effects. Only 
one study indicates that ethnic minorities in the Netherlands profit from subsidized work 
experience.  
 
The ‘stepping stone effect’, a gradual re-entry into the labour market through temporary work, is 
shown to bring outsiders into permanent employment. This effect has been found in many 
countries, including Italy, Germany, Belgium, the UK, and the Netherlands. Temporary work 
includes increasingly more agency work, and evidence shows that temporary work agencies are 
more effective than public agencies in getting the unemployed back to work. 
 
The following sections highlight the empirical literature on five different ALMP categories. They 
are very much based on a review study done by Koning et al. (2005). We also discuss the role of 
temporary employment (fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work) for the unemployed.  
4.3.1 Employment incentives: monitoring, sanctions and bonuses 
Employment incentives encompass all measures aimed at increasing the efficiency of the job 
matching process. These incentives are often targeted at disadvantaged groups and long-term 
unemployed. Compared to the other measures discussed later these are the least expensive to 
implement.  
  
A first category of employment incentives is monitoring. Monitoring forces people to register at a 
monitoring office, and to visit it regularly to talk about their job search behaviour, i.e. the 
attempts they have made to search for a job. Monitoring aims to create incentives for people to 
search and accept a job or to make it less attractive to stay unemployed. Although monitoring by 
itself can reach these goals, it is often more effective when combined with sanctions for those 
who do not comply. The study by Koning et al. (2005) reviewed seven studies on monitoring 
(three in the Netherlands, two in the UK and two in the US). Five out of these seven studies 
show positive effects of monitoring on the exit rate and on duration of unemployment. The two 
studies that do not show positive effects of monitoring were targeted at people who already had a 
good chance of finding a job without monitoring. 
 
A second category of employment incentives are benefit sanctions. Benefit sanctions are imposed in 
some countries if the monitored job search behaviour of an unemployed person is not sufficient 
or if he or she refuses an acceptable job offer. Although only few sanction regimes have been 
evaluated, studies generally find a positive effect on re-employment rates. Koning et al. (2005) 
examined three studies (two in the Netherland and one in Sweden). All three studies find a 
significant positive effect of the sanctions on the exit rate of unemployment for the different 
target groups. The Swedish study could also distinguish between the sanction itself and the threat 
of the sanction. Both the sanction and the threat have significant effects. The same study also 
showed that there are spill-over effects of the threat of a sanction: not only the target group 
reacts but also the other job searchers. Also for the Netherlands it has been established that the 
threat of a sanction is as effective as the sanction itself (Van der Klauw et al. (2008)). 
  
A third category of employment incentives are financial bonuses. Financial bonuses can be given to 
people when they are able to find and accept a job within a certain time limit (usually before the 
end of the benefit period). Koning et al. (2005) examined four American studies on bonuses. All 
four studies show a significant effect on reducing the duration of unemployment. The higher the 
bonus the higher the effect. A cost-benefit analysis shows that bonuses are more cost-effective if 
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they are targeted on groups that do have more difficulties in finding a job. Bonuses might also 
have less desirable effects, such as changing behaviour to become eligible for the bonus. The 
Back to Work Allowance (BTWA) in Ireland, which entitles long term-unemployed a continued 
part of their unemployment benefit when they take a job, shows positive effects. 62 to 65 % of 
the recipients have been employed without interruption for at least three years and there are 
indications that the BTWA is not being paid to large numbers of people who would probably 
have found a job even without the program. Unfortunately, there is no information available on 
the reduction in unemployment payments and the effect on overall employment rates. 
4.3.2 Job search assistance 
Job search assistance directs job searchers to job vacancies. These job vacancies are either 
publicly available or are reserved for specific groups and require certain skills and experiences. 
Koning et al. (2005) evaluates 22 studies on the effects of job search assistance (mostly Dutch 
and American studies). Fourteen out of the 22 studies show positive effects on finding a job, six 
studies have no or even negative effects and two studies only show positive effects for certain 
target groups. 
 
Most American studies are based on experiments on job search assistance and show positive 
effects. The American programs which are evaluated are usually targeted on disadvantaged 
women. The Dutch studies do not show a clear result. In three studies a positive effect on 
finding a job is found, two studies have no effect, and one has a (slightly) negative effect. The 
other three have mixed outcomes.  
 
Card et al. (2009) perform a meta-analysis of ALMPs and find that job search assistance 
programs have relatively favourable short-run impacts. 
4.3.3 Training programs 
Training programs may consist of classroom training, on-the-job training and work–related 
experience. It can either provide general education or specific vocational training. The main 
objective is to enhance the productivity and employability of the participants and to enhance 
human capital by increasing skills. Training programs are the most widely used active labour 
market measure in Europe. Evaluation of their effectiveness leads to rather mixed results. 
Although there are negative and often insignificant effects, there are also several indications that 
training programs do increase post-treatment employment probability. Koning et al. (2005) 
examined 85 studies on training programs (mostly Dutch, Swedish, German and British). Less 
than half of them, 36 out of these 85, show a significant positive effect of training on the 
probability of getting a job. 32 find no or negative effect. The effects in the other 17 studies 
depend on the kind of target groups or training programs that is evaluated. A meta-study by 
Kluve (2006) examined 70 evaluations of training programs in Europe in the 1990s. His study 
showed that 38 programs have a positive impact on post-program employment probabilities, 14 
are zero, and 18 are negative. Card et al. (2009) perform a meta-analysis of ALMPs and find that 
classroom and on-the-job training programs tend to show better outcomes in the medium run 
than in the short run.  
4.3.4 Wage subsidies  
The objective of wage subsidies is to encourage employers to hire new workers or to keep 
workers instead of laying them off. Wage subsidies can either go directly to the employer or 
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provide a financial incentive to the worker (often workers who are disadvantaged on the labour 
market). 
 
The findings of wage subsidy evaluations are generally positive. Virtually all studies that evaluate 
private sector wage subsidy programs establish beneficial impacts on individual employment 
probability. These positive results however are not very robust, as most of the studies disregard 
potential substitution effects or deadweight losses.  
 
Of the 13 studies that Koning et al. (2005) examined, 8 show significant positive effects on the 
probability of finding work. Two show insignificant or negative effects, and three show different 
effects depending on the target group under consideration. These studies only look at the short-
term effects of the wage subsidy. Long term effects might differ. Martin (2000) also evaluated 
wage subsidies across OECD countries. He claims that evaluations of wage subsidies in Australia, 
Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands have suggested combined deadweight and substitution 
effects amounting to around 90 per cent. This implies that for every 100 jobs subsidized by these 
schemes only 10 were net gains in employment.  
4.3.5 Subsidized work 
Subsidized jobs are often specially created jobs in the public sector to the benefit of 
disadvantageous job searchers. These jobs often aim to keep disadvantageous groups in contact 
with a work environment and aim to avoid a loss of working skills during an extended period of 
unemployment.  
 
Subsidized job programs rarely have positive effects on employment probabilities for regular 
jobs. The evidence across studied countries48 suggests that the effects of public sector job 
creation on individual employment probabilities are often insignificant, and frequently negative. 
Card et al. (2009) perform a meta-analysis of ALMPs and find that subsidizes public sector 
employment programs have the least favourable impact of the studied program types.  
 
A study by SCP (2003) claims that subsidized employment is a very important policy for ethnic 
minorities in the Netherlands. A large share from the ethnic minority group can be found in 
subsidized jobs and according to the SCP study this improves their employment opportunities. 
Most participants profit from it in the long run, since the subsidized job often functions as a 
stepping stone to a regular job. A point of concern is the high lay off rate of these participants in 
regular jobs. 
4.3.6 Temporary employment contracts 
Temporary employment has been on the rise in many Western societies (but not all). Here we 
describe how temporary contracts affect the unemployed. It is often argued that the existence of 
temporary contracts is especially beneficial to unemployed workers, because it provides them 
with opportunities to gain work experience, acquire human capital and enlarge their social 
network. These arguments imply that temporary contracts might act as a stepping-stone towards 
more regular employment, as it increases the opportunities for unemployed workers to find stable 
employment and earn higher wages in the future.  
 
                                                        
48 Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland and Denmark. 
86   CHAPTER 4 
SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
Research on Australia and European countries shows that a stepping-stone effect indeed exists. The 
main pitfall when analyzing the stepping-stone effect is that individuals who choose temporary 
work are not representative for the total group of unemployed workers. Individuals opting for 
temporary work could for instance be more eager or better qualified to find a job. Most 
researchers correct for these observed differences, but one cannot tackle the theoretical problem 
of unobserved differences.49  
 
For Germany, Hagen (2003) finds that having a fixed-term contract increases future employment 
probabilities (including both fixed-term and regular contracts) and the probability of obtaining a 
permanent contract. It decreases the probability of leaving the labour force. Having held a fixed-
term contract also increases the probability of entering into fixed-term employment once more 
and of holding fixed-term contracts in the future. McGinnity and Mertens (2004) find that many 
temporary workers in Germany – at least 40 percent – move into permanent jobs, often with the 
same employer. This is not the case for those with low human capital. 
 
In Italy, the stepping-stone effect has been shown to exist for temporary work in general and for 
temporary agency work in particular. Gagliarducci (2004) finds that time spent in temporary jobs 
increases the probability of getting a permanent position in Italy. But whereas one temporary job 
experience is helpful, repeated experiences may have a negative effect in the search for stable 
jobs. Ichino et al. (2005) find that a temporary agency work assignment increases the probability 
of finding a permanent job after 18 months by 19 percentage points in Tuscany and by 11 
percentage points in Sicily. These effects are also highly heterogeneous with respect to observable 
characteristics such as age, education and firm’s sector. 
 
For Australia, Chalmers and Kalb (2001) find that disadvantaged unemployed job seekers could 
increase the probability of finding regular employment by accepting casual work, at least during 
periods of relatively strong employment growth.  
  
Research for the UK (Booth et al., 2002) shows that the median duration of fixed-term contracts 
before exits into permanent jobs is about 3 years. They find that especially young men make the 
transition from temporary to regular work. 
 
In the US labour market the stepping stone effect is not so clear. Autor and Houseman (2002) 
use a policy experiment in Michigan and find that moving welfare clients who otherwise have 
been unemployed into temporary agency jobs does not help them to obtain steady employment. 
It also does not help to reduce program recidivism over the longer term. On the other hand, 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2003) find that holding a contingent job does not by itself 
increase an individual’s likelihood of being in poverty in the future, nor does it increase the 
likelihood of being on welfare once other characteristics have been accounted for. Instead, it is 
low pay and few fringe benefits, limited weekly working hours and limited weeks worked that 
lead to poverty and being on welfare. 
 
Like the US, Spain shows little evidence of a stepping-stone effect of temporary jobs. Amuedo-
Dorantes (2002) finds very low exit rates from temporary employment to permanent 
employment. Güell and Pertolongo (2003) draw the same conclusion. Their overall transition rate 
                                                        
49 One can not tell in which direction such bias would occur. If the better equipped unemployed are more willing 
to take a temporary job, the effect is overestimated. If the better equipped are less willing to accept a 
temporary job because they aim for a permanent job, then the stepping stone effect is underestimated.  
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from fixed-term to permanent contracts is less than 10 percent. In contrast to that, Casquel and 
Cunyat (2004) show that for high-educated workers fixed-term contracts lead to permanent 
positions. Young workers, women, less educated workers and workers with a history of 
unemployment still get stuck in fixed-term contracts. 
 
For the Netherlands, De Graaf-Zijl et al. (2004) and Heyma and van Klaveren (2008) show that the 
job search duration until a regular job is found, is not affected by accepting a temporary job in 
the meantime. People with a temporary agency work job have almost the same perspectives on a 
more permanent job as people who directly obtain a regular job. The main difference is that the 
persons with a temporary agency work job more frequently change jobs and spend less time in 
unemployment. As such, they impose less of a burden on the welfare system, and gain more job 
experience. These effects are the same for almost all workers, including those with a relatively 
weak labour market position. Men from ethnic minorities do have a high stepping-stone effect on 
the transition rate to regular work, but they rarely flow into temporary jobs, and hence do not 
benefit as often as could be.  
 
Research on Belgium data also confirms the existence of the stepping stone function of temporary 
work. Göbel and Verhofstadt (2008) show for a sample of unemployed Flemish school-leavers 
that in the short run temporary employment delays the school leaver’s transition to permanent 
employment. However, in the long run temporary employment acts as a stepping stone and 
decreases the duration until permanent employment. Forrier et al. (2004) confirm that it is more 
profitable to accept a temporary job instead of staying unemployed, since this increases the 
opportunities to finding a permanent job.  
4.4 Drivers in practice 
This section gives some best practices of drivers of participation in different countries. We make 
a selection of countries that have made progress in the participation among the distinguished 
groups. For each of these countries we give an example of policy interventions that (may) have 
contributed to the increase in total employment rates. 
 
Table 23 displays the selection of countries that showed significant progress in their total 
employment rates. Table 24 shows the best practices that we will discuss. 
Table 23 Selection of countries that have scored high on participation rates 
Country Employment rate 1990 Employment rate 2008  Increase in percentage 
points 
The Netherlands 61.1% 77.2% +16 
Ireland 51.9% 68.1% +16 
Finland 59.7% (1995) 72.3% +12 
Sweden 70.7% (1995) 74.8% +5 
Belgium 54.4% 62.0% +8 
Latvia 59.8% (1998) 69.5% +10 
Estonia 60.3% (2000) 69.8% +10 
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Table 24 Selection of drivers in practice 
Country Target group(s) Drivers 
The Netherlands women, in part-time 
 
elderly 
Cultural attitudes, education, child care 
 
Financial incentives early retirement 
Ireland women 
  
Moving towards equal tax treatment for married 
women. 
Still to improve: availability and subsidizing child 
care, more equal tax system 
Finland (long-term) unemployed 
 
Labour market training 
 




Closing early retirement routes 
 
Subsidized jobs (service cheques) 
Latvia & Estonia elderly 
 
Defined contribution pension scheme. Raising the 
statutory retirement age (especially for women), 
introduce funded pension system 
 
We discuss, in turn, some ‘best practices’ for women, for the elderly and for the (long term) 
unemployed. 
4.4.1 Best practices for women 
Sweden: equal tax treatment for married women 
Married women are effectively taxed more heavily than men and single women in most OECD 
countries. Sweden is a good example of the transfer from joint to separate and equal taxation 
leading to more participation by married women (most probably in combination with other 
family-friendly policies).  
 
The Netherlands: high (part-time) participation, cultural attitude & child care 
The past two decades have witnessed an ongoing increase of labour market participation of 
women in the Netherlands. A cultural explanation for this change is a shift in the dominant 
ideology of the ‘best’ way to organize work and care in society. According to the dominant 
conservatism in the 1950’s and 1960’s the man should be the principal breadwinner, whereas the 
women should be responsible for caring activities (at home). This is the so-called “male 
breadwinner/female home caretaker model”. In the past decades this dominant conservative 
model has changed in the direction of a “male breadwinner/female part-time caretaker model”. 
This change is reflected in the increase of female (part-time) labour market participation. Other 
causing factors are amongst others the higher average educational level of women and the 
improvement of child care facilities. 
 
Ireland: moving towards separate taxation 
Also in Ireland women’s labour force participation have risen dramatically during the last two 
decades, particularly during the 1990’s. It has been shown that 90% of total employment growth 
is due to the increase in (part-time) female participation. Unfortunately, research has not yet 
demonstrated why. In the last decade, reforms in the Irish tax system have probably stimulated 
the participation of married women. Before the reform married couples were taxed jointly. Tax 
bands were totally transferable between spouses in case of a non- or very low earning (female) 
partner. In 2000 a move towards greater independence of taxation was introduced by restricting 
the extent to which tax bands are transferable between spouses. This would stimulate the 
participation of the lowest earner, in most cases the female. 
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Although the reform has taken place, the income tax system still contains elements of individual 
and joint taxation. Therefore, marginal tax rates on second earners are higher than they need to 
be. This may explain why a relatively small number of second earners work full time. The 
government may consider moving to complete individual taxation to make the system simpler 
and more neutral. Besides reforming the tax system, Ireland could stimulate female participation 
for example by improving the availability of child care (Cournède, 2006).  
4.4.2 Best practices for older workers 
Belgium: closing early retirement routes and reforming retirement incentives 
The Belgian government has recently taken a series of steps to discourage early exits from the 
labour market and encourage re-entry of those out of activity. These measures included the 
closing of some early-retirement paths as well as activation measures in the form of 
individualized road maps for returning to work, follow-up interviews and possible sanctions in 
case of insufficient job search activities. Since 1997, the compulsory age of retirement for women 
has gradually been raised from 61 in 1997 to 65 in 2009. A recent reform to retirement incentives 
was introduced by benefitting workers working beyond the age of 62 or beyond 44 years with a 
pension supplement of 2 euro per day worked. Although Belgium has moved forward, it still 
needs to put more emphasis on making work pay (e.g. through the unemployment benefit 
system). 
 
The Netherlands: reforming occupational early retirement schemes 
The increase in participation among older workers in the Netherlands has partly been caused by 
reforming the occupational early retirement scheme (VUT). A generous and actuarially unfair 
early retirement scheme has been changed into to a less generous and actuarially fair capital 
funded pre-pension scheme. This shift has caused a lower incidence of early retirement. 
 
Sweden: pension reform 
In 1999 a major reform of the Swedish pension reform has taken place. The pension system 
before 1999 consisted of a state pension of 60% of past earnings and was financed on a pay-as-
you-go principle. The state pension could be supplemented by a work-related pension, which was 
also based on past earnings. The work-related pensions for civil servants were financed on a pay-
as-you-go basis, while the work-related pensions for private workers were funded. The pension 
reform altered the state pension in a defined-contribution pension. The contribution is set at 
18.5% of the pension base, and the benefit depends on the accumulated contributions, the life 
expectancy of the retiring cohort and economic growth. The retiring age is flexible, but the loss is 
twofold for the individual. Leaving early implies lower pension capital and a longer period of 
payments. The pension reform is probably one of the reasons why participation of older workers 
has increased over the past few years, and why it is the highest of all countries studied. 
 
Latvia & Estonia: pension reform and increasing retirement age 
The Baltic countries recently reformed their pension systems and increased the retirement age. 
Latvia made the most radical reform: they moved from pay-as-you-go to defined contribution 
pension. Estonia opted for a less radical change in the pension system: they added certain 
income-related elements to their pay-as-you-go pension system. A wanted side-effect of 
reforming the pension system was to encourage working in the formal rather than in the informal 
economy, since pension payments were not very high because of a bad contribution discipline. In 
both countries the statutory pension age has been increased and existing legislation will raise it 
further in the years to come, especially for women. Latvia and Estonia have also begun to 
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introduce funded pension systems, a so-called “third pension tier”. This option has until now 
been followed by less than 10% of the workers in Estonia and Latvia.  
4.4.3 Best practices for the (long-term) unemployed 
Belgium’s subsidized service cheques 
Since the beginning in 2003, private household workers in Belgium can be paid for their services 
with a ‘household service cheque’. These cheques have three objectives: job creation, service 
creation, and tackling undeclared work. In five years’ time, around 90,000 jobs have been created 
for (long-term) unemployed people, people with low education and ethnic minorities. It has been 
shown that most employees eventually find a fixed job. Around 60% starts with a fixed contract 
immediately. Temporary work agencies play an important role in matching supply and demand of 
the service cheques. Besides Belgium also Austria and France use service cheques. 
 
Finland: labour market training  
Since the 1970s, labour market training and subsidized employment have been key method of 
active labour market programs in Finland. During the 1990s the number of labour market 
trainees reached 90,000 and because of an increase in the demand for training only about half of 
all applicants were accepted to training. An empirical study (Nätti et al. (2000)) showed that 
participation in training produced more months in employment during three subsequent years 
compared to non-participation. 
4.5 Summary 
Table 25 presents a schematic overview of the policy programs and incentives discussed in 
section 4.1 and provides an indication of the expected employment effect of each program.  
Table 25 Increasing participation of women 
 Employment effect on target group  
Costs and provision of child 
care 
+/0 US, Canada, +;  
the Netherlands, Italy, UK, Germany, France no/small effect 
Availability more important than price 
(Paid) parental leave +/-
-  
Europe mixed, depends on type of institution. 
Might strengthen connection to labour market. 
But longer leave means lower return; larger effect for full-
timers. 
Negative effect on wages. 
Equal tax treatment for married 
women 
++ 17 countries (the Netherlands, UK, Belgium, Australia, 
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Ireland, Austria, France, 
Canada, Sweden, Denmark, US, Spain, Portugal, Finland) 
Part-time work opportunities + Denmark, France, the Netherlands 
Many women want (only) part-time jobs 
Temporary agency work + UK, US, Spain 
Flexibility in combining work & family 
Education + Higher educated women participate more often and more 
hours/week 
Cultural attitudes +/- part-time preference: more women in East-EU, less hours in 
west-EU. 
Gender discrimination - Female jobs & gender pay gap; ‘glass ceiling’ 
+ = positive, - = negative, 0 = zero, +/- = mixed  
Among possible incentives aiming to improve better balance of work and family responsibilities, 
equal tax treatment for married women seems to have the most positive effect on the female 
employment rate. Married women are effectively taxed more heavily than men and single women 
in most OECD countries. Sweden is a good example of where the transfer from joint to separate 
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and equal taxation has led to more participation by married women (most probably in 
combination with other family-friendly policies). Jaumotte (2003) has tested this hypothesis. She 
shows for seventeen OECD countries that women will participate more when they are being 
taxed separately and equally compared to men.  
 
Incentives concerning child care and (paid) parental leave have mixed effects in different countries. 
For the US and Canada a reduction of child care costs would stimulate labour force participation 
of women, but for the Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom, Germany and France a reduction of 
child care costs alone is not enough to change employment rates of women. Availability of child 
care centres is more important in those countries. (Paid) parental leave shows mixed effects of 
the re-entrance behaviour of women. For the US and Canada many studies show that (unpaid) 
parental leave results in lower wages and worsens job opportunities. For Europe the effect seems 
to depend on the type of welfare state. Social-democratic welfare states often encourage the 
combination of work and caring responsibilities (more) than liberal welfare states. These states 
show higher re-entrance rates after taken parental leave, because often there is a guaranteed 
return to the same job. But the re-entrance probability depends on the length of the leave: the 
longer the leave, the lower the return. Part-time working mothers have a higher re-entrance 
probability than full-time working moms. Re-entering after taken parental leave does seem to 
lower wages.  
 
Flexible contract types for women have mainly positive effects on their employment probability. An 
increase in part-time work opportunities would most likely raise female labour force participation. 
Studies on temporary agency work show positive effects. Agency work is often more flexible and 
provides more opportunity to combine work and family responsibilities, resulting in a higher 
female labour force participation. Women with fixed-term contracts tend to postpone 
motherhood. As such, there is a by-effect of increased participation.  
 
Higher education levels are positively correlated with the employment probability of women, in 
particular full-time employment.  
 
Cultural attitudes have an important effect on female employment rates. In countries such as the 
Netherlands, women prefer to work part time, whether they have children or not. It would be 
very hard to stimulate these women to switch to working full time. On the other hand, we will 
show in Chapter 5 that part-time work is not yet an important part of the labour market in 
Eastern Europe, and that female participation in these countries is also below average. 
Convergence of cultural attitudes might in this case have a positive effect, at least for the women 
that are only looking for a part-time job.  
 
Gender discrimination in pay and promotion opportunities for women negatively affects 
employment opportunities for women. Much of the gender pay gap is caused by typical ‘female 
jobs’ with relatively low wages (Berkhout et al. (2008)). Some countries have introduced gender-
specific anti-discrimination laws, which seem to effectively lower gender pay gaps and have a 
positive influence on the participation of women.  
 
Table 26 presents a schematic overview of the policy programs and incentives discussed in 
section 4.2 and provides an indication of the expected employment effect of each program.  
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Table 26 Increasing participation of older workers 
 Employment effect on target group 
Raising the statutory retirement age + many OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Norway, Sweden, UK, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, 
Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Belgium) 
Creating an actuarially neutral social 
security system 
+ many OECD countries (Austria, Norway, New 
Zealand, Belgium, Korea, Luxembourg, Australia, 
Canada, Japan, Norway, Sweden, UK, US, 
Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Finland, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Iceland) 
Linking pension contributions to pension 
benefits 
+ European countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, UK, Sweden, Denmark) & America 
Reforming early retirement schemes 
(various) 
+ the Netherlands, US, Spain, UK, Sweden, 
Denmark, Germany, Japan, Canada, France, 
Belgium, Italy 
Introducing lump-sum bonuses to delay 
retirement 
+ the Netherlands 
Stricter access to non-employment benefit 
systems 
+ Germany, Belgium, Italy, Finland, the Netherlands, 
Hungary, UK, Canada 
Less misuse 
Training-on-the-job + EU; lowers outflow 
Alternative employment modes (e.g. part-
time retirement) 
+ no ‘all-or-nothing’ decision;  
knowledge transfer to younger colleagues 
Health ++ many European countries (Germany, Belgium, 
Austria, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland) 
+ = positive, - = negative, 0 = zero, +/- = mixed  
All the financial incentives we have studied, aimed at encouraging older workers to postpone 
retirement and thereby increase participation rates, have positive effects. Blöndal & Scarpetta 
(1997) show for many OECD countries that raising the statutory retirement age by one year, 
while leaving in place existing early retirement schemes, could raise the participation rates of 
older workers by 1 to 2 percentage points. They also show that an actuarially neutral social 
security system could increase the participation rate for older males to at least 60%. Duval (2003) 
supports this conclusion with more recent data. American and several European countries 
benefit from linking the pension contributions to pension benefits (Freidberg and Webb, 2003; 
Groot and Heyma, 2004).  
 
Reforming early retirement schemes has positive effects on the participation rate of older workers. 
Different reforms have been discussed: a change in generosity, actuarial fairness, a shift from 
public to private provision of pensions, a delay in eligibility age, and a decrease in the 
replacement rate. A study on the effects of a lump-sum bonus in the Netherlands established that 
older workers will participate longer.  
 
The health status of older Europeans has a major influence on the probability of being in 
employment (Barnay and Debrand, 2006; Kalwij and Vermeulen, 2005). People with a health 
problem or severe restrictions in activities of daily living have a much higher probability of being 
out of the labour market. Restricting access to non-employment benefit systems reduces early 
retirement and makes older workers participate longer.  
 
Training-on-the-job for older workers, in particular those with lower education, reduces the 
probability to retire from 25% to 10% (Fouarge and Schils, 2008). For older people alternative 
employment opportunities could provide more opportunities to extend their working lives and 
ensure maintenance of their skills, experience and know-how. This will provide them with an 
employment bridge between employment and retirement.  
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Table 27 presents a schematic overview of the policy programs and incentives discussed in 
section 4.3 and provides an indication of the expected employment effect of each program.  
Table 27 Increasing participation of the (long term) unemployed 
 Employment effect on target 
group 
 
Monitoring + the Netherlands, UK, US. More effective if combined 
with bonus/malus 
Benefit sanctions + the Netherlands, Sweden. Threat of sanction has 
positive spill-over effects 
Financial bonuses + US proportional effect. Sometimes negative side-
effects.  
Job search assistance 
(public employment 
services) 
++/0/- No general conclusions possible. Mostly positive, 
but also negative. 
US positive, but very specific groups. 
the Netherlands mixed. 
Training programs ++/0/- No general conclusions possible.  
the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, UK. Mostly 
positive, but also negative. 
Most widely used labour market policy in EU. 
Wage subsidies +/- More comprehensive studies needed. 
Substitution effects and deadweight losses are high. 
Subsidized work in the 
public sector 
- the Netherlands: if present, stepping stone-effect is 
only short-term. 
Many countries: zero or negative.  
Temporary work + Australia, Germany, Italy, UK, the Netherlands, 
Belgium clearly positive stepping stone. Italy also 
temporary agency work. US unclear. 
Spain only effect for higher educated. Spain is odd 
case: very much fixed term contract, very low 
agency. 
+ = positive, - = negative, 0 = zero, +/- = mixed  
Most of the financial drivers designed to reintegrate job searchers and the unemployed have mixed 
effects on the employment probability, as far as scientific literature can tell. Various reintegration 
policies such as monitoring, benefit sanctions, financial bonuses, job search assistance, training 
programs, wage subsidies and subsidized work have been reviewed.  
 
Most studies on monitoring show desirable effects on the exit rate or duration of unemployment. 
Studies that do not show desirable effects were targeted at people who had a good chance of 
finding a job on their own. All studies on benefit sanctions and/or bonuses show positive effects 
on the unemployment exit rate. 
 
Job search assistance has mixed effects: in America positive effects are found but these are restricted 
to disadvantaged women only. In the Netherlands the effect of job search assistance is not 
uniformly positive or negative on employment. The same can be said about training programs 
and wage subsidies. Although wage subsidies are often found to be positive, most studies are 
incomplete. They do not take into account substitution effects and long-term effects, which 
makes them unsuitable for general conclusions. For training programs and wage subsidies to be 
effective, all that matters is how well a policy fits the actual problem. One-fits-all measures are 
certain to fail, tailor-made approaches are a precondition but no guarantee for success.  
 
Subsidized work in the public sector does not seem to have any positive effects. The exception is the 
study of SCP (2003) which mentions that ethnic minorities in the Netherlands profit from 
subsidized work experience.  
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The stepping stone effect is the effect that people from the labour market margins are brought into 
permanent employment, through a gradual entry via temporary jobs. This effect is indeed found 
in many countries, i.e. Italy, Germany, Belgium, UK and the Netherlands. For the US labour 
market the stepping stone effect was not so clear, but negative labour market effects have been 
disproved. In Spain a positive effect has only been found for the higher educated. Less educated 
and long-term unemployed seem to get stuck in a spell of fixed-term contracts. Spain is an odd 
case, because the importance of fixed-term contracts in the current labour market is the highest 
in Europe (over 30%), with only Poland coming close. Flexibility here is more external flexibility: 
at every end of the term an employee has to renegotiate a contract with a (possibly different) 
employer. In Germany and the Netherlands the labour market is a bit different, because a larger 
share of ‘temporary work’ consists of agency work, implying that more stakeholders are present. 
Both the employee and the agency have incentives to reallocate the employee into a new job, and 
the agency thus acts as a sort of intermediary between employer and employee. It is important to 
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5 Modern labour relations 
Although the ‘traditional’ labour contract is still very common, in many countries important other 
forms of labour relations have developed during the last two decades. The report starts with a 
closer look at these new labour market trends, especially those concerning ‘modern’ labour 
relations and flexibility. The most commonly mentioned non-standard forms of labour are part-
time work and temporary work. Additionally, this chapter also investigates the role of temporary 
agency work. While all three factors are often labelled as indicators of ‘labour market flexibility’, 
important differences exist between part-time work, temporary (fixed-term) contracts and 
temporary agency work.  
Part-time work has strong socio-cultural explanations, and is very popular in some countries (see 
section 5.1). Part-time work does not increase flexibility per se: it might increase flexibility from 
the employees point of view, but it might just as well decrease flexibility from the employers 
point of view. Temporary work -in the commonly used Eurostat definition- is a heterogeneous 
mix of mainly fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work (see section 5.2). The very 
different characteristics of these components for the employee (and the lack of Eurostat statistics 
on temporary agency work) justify a separate analysis of the latter (see section 5.3).  
5.1 Part-time work 
First let us note that different definitions of ‘part-time work’ are used by Eurostat and OECD. 
This difference stems from compatibility issues: OECD recalculates most national statistics to 
improve comparability50, based on a definition of part-time work as ‘usually working less than 30 
hours per week in their main job’. Eurostat does no recalculation, so definitions differ slightly between 
national Statistics offices.51 Therefore, if the only interest is to compare part-time levels between 
countries the OECD figures are preferred. But when focus is on the development of part-time 
work over time Eurostat figures are just as useful. The latter have the advantage that they are 
more frequent, more recent and that they have more detail on the characteristics of part-time 
employment. They can tell what the main reasons are for working part-time, thereby revealing 
structural differences between national labour markets. Is part-time work the preferred choice of 
employees, or is it a second-best choice forced by lack of fulltime jobs? These are the kind of 
questions that can only be answered using the more detailed Eurostat data. For completeness we 
show both forms of part-time work, according to OECD definition in Table 28 and according to 
national Eurostat definitions in Table 29. In most countries the OECD produces lower numbers 
than Eurostat; the largest difference between both definitions exists in Sweden and the 
Netherlands. Apparently in these countries relatively many people work for days per week 
(normally 32 hours).   
 
                                                        
50 OECD (2002). 
51 For most countries part-time is a self-reported variable, based on the judgement of the respondents themselves. 
In the Netherlands, Iceland and Norway, part-time is determined on the basis of whether the usual hours 
worked are fewer than 35. In Sweden this criterion is applied to the self-employed persons as well. “It is 
impossible to establish a more precise distinction between full-time and part-time employment, since working 
hours differ from one Member State to the next and from one branch of activity to the next.” 
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Table 28  Part-time employment according to OECD definition (less than 30 hours/week) 
 1983 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria   11.1 12.2 16.0 17.3 17.2 17.6 
Belgium 9.8 13.5 14.6 19.0 18.5 19.3 18.3 18.7 
Germany 13.4 13.4 14.2 17.6 21.8 22.0 22.2 22.1 
Denmark 20.6 19.2 16.9 16.1 17.6 18.1 17.7 18.0 
Spain  4.6 7.0 7.7 11.3 11.1 10.9 11.1 
Finland  7.6 8.7 10.4 11.2 11.4 11.7 11.5 
France 10.3 12.2 14.2 14.2 13.4 13.3 13.4 13.4 
Greece 7.2 6.7 7.8 5.5 6.1 7.5 7.8 7.8 
Ireland 8.0 10.0 14.3 18.1 19.6 19.9 20.3 21.0 
Italy 8.0 8.9 10.5 12.2 14.6 14.9 15.1 16.3 
Luxembourg 7.3 7.6 11.3 12.4 13.9 12.7 12.7 12.7 
Netherlands 18.5 28.2 29.4 32.1 35.7 35.5 36.1 36.1 
Portugal  7.6 8.6 9.4 9.8 9.3 10.0 9.7 
Sweden  14.5 15.1 14.0 13.5 13.4 14.4 14.4 
United Kingdom 18.4 20.1 22.3 23.0 23.4 23.3 23.0 22.9 
Czech Republic   3.4 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.5 
Hungary   2.8 2.9 3.2 2.7 2.8 3.1 
Poland    12.8 11.7 10.8 10.1 9.3 
Slovak Republic   2.3 1.9 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.7 
Switzerland   22.9 24.4 25.1 25.5 25.4 25.9 
Norway  21.8 21.4 20.2 20.8 21.1 20.4 20.3 
Turkey  9.3 6.4 9.4 5.8 7.9 8.4 8.4 
Canada 16.8 17.0 18.8 18.1 18.3 18.1 18.2 18.4 
Iceland   22.5 20.4 16.4 16.0 15.9 15.1 
Japan 16.1 19.2 20.1 22.6 18.3 18.0 18.9 19.6 
Korea  4.5 4.3 7.0 9.0 8.8 8.9 9.3 
New Zealand  19.7 20.9 22.2 21.7 21.3 22.0 22.4 
United States 15.6 14.1 14.0 12.6 12.8 12.6 12.0 12.2 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (2009) 
When looking at the incidence of part-time work in Europe in Table 28 we see that the 
Netherlands take a special position. More than 36% of all employed Dutch persons are working 
in a part-time job of less then 30 hours/week, mostly women. Also the Swiss and UK workforce 
have a relatively large share of part-time workers. At the other side of the Atlantic part-time rates 
are fairly stable. Overall the use of part-time work in Europe has increased during the last 
decades. In the Eastern European countries (Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic) part-time jobs 
are found only incidentally. Apparently part-time work is not (yet) an important aspect of the 
labour market structure in these countries. Table 29 shows that the above division still holds true 
when the Eurostat definitions are applied, be it that the shares itself are often higher.  
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Table 29  Part-time employment according to Eurostat definition 
 1983 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria - - 13.3 16.7 20.4 21.5 22.0 22.7 24.1 
Belgium 7.9 10.9 13.6 20.6 21.7 22.9 22.5 22.4 23.0 
Germany 12.2 14.9 16.0 19.1 23.6 25.4 25.6 25.5 25.5 
Denmark 23.6 22.7 21.4 21.4 21.5 22.9 23.6 23.9 25.1 
Spain - 4.8 7.2 8.0 12.6 12.1 11.8 11.9 12.8 
Finland - - 11.4 11.9 13.2 13.0 13.0 12.3 12.7 
France 9.4 11.8 15.5 16.8 17.0 17.2 17.2 16.9 16.9 
Greece 5.7 3.6 4.4 4.4 4.6 5.6 5.5 5.2 5.8 
Ireland 6.5 8.0 12.0 16.6 16.8  17.6 18.0 20.4 
Italy 4.2 4.7 6.4 8.7 12.6 13.2 13.3 14.4 14.2 
Luxembourg 6.6 6.8 7.9 11.2 17.4 17.1 17.5 16.3 17.0 
Netherlands 21.0 31.3 37.0 41.0 45.8 45.8 46.3 46.7 47.6 
Portugal - 5.0 6.3 8.1 8.4 8.1 8.9 8.8 8.6 
Sweden - - 25.4 21.8 24.3 24.3 24.3 26.1 26.0 
UK 18.2 20.8 23.2 24.4 24.6 24.3 24.2 24.2 25.0 
Cyprus - - - 7.6 7.5 6.7 6.1 6.6 7.3 
Czech Rep. - - - 4.8 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.8 
Estonia - - - 6.3 6.8 7.1 7.0 5.6 10.6 
Hungary - - - 3.4 4.1 3.9 3.8 4.1 5.2 
Lithuania - - - 8.9 6.3 8.6 7.9 6.3 8.2 
Latvia - - - 10.5 8.9 6.0 6.4 5.7 7.6 
Malta - - - 6.1 8.8 9.6 10.7 11.4 11.0 
Poland - - - 9.3 9.7 9.0 8.5 7.6 7.8 
Slovenia - - - 5.3 7.8 8.4 8.8 8.1 9.7 
Slovakia - - - 1.8 2.3 2.7 2.6 2.1 3.8 
Bulgaria - - -  2.3 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.3 
Romania - - - 14.0 9.6 8.6 8.6 8.8 8.6 
Switzerland - - - 29.3 32.2 32.4 32.5 33.3     - 
Norway - - 27.3 25.7 28.0 28.5 27.7 27.8 28.3 
Turkey - - - - - 7.3 8.1 8.9 10.6 
EU27 - - - 15.8 17.4 17.7 17.7 17.7 18.2 
EU25 - - - 15.9 18.0 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.8 
EU15 - - 15.6 17.5 19.9 20.3 20.4 20.5 21.0 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_eppga, 2009) 
Apart from the Netherlands and Switzerland a second group of ‘part-time countries’ can be 
distinguished in Table 29, namely Denmark and the UK (and probably Sweden). In 1983 in these 
two countries about 20% had a part-time job, just as much as in the Netherlands at that time, but 
far more than in the rest of Europe. But part-time employment did not really become more 
popular since then in the UK and particularly Denmark, so that in 2009 still 25% of all jobs are 
part-time jobs.  
In the other Western European countries working part-time wasn’t so common in the beginning, 
although among these ‘fulltime countries’ there are some interesting developments in the last 10-
15 years. A steady growth from 11-16% to 17-23% in the Central European countries (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany); a more modest growth from 5% to 10% or more in the Southern 
European countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain), and a special case for Ireland that  was ‘promoted’ 
from the Southern European level to the Central European level during the nineties. Between 
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1999 and 2000 the structure of the Eurostat Labour Force Survey suffered some serious changes. 
This hampers comparability of the period before and after the structural change, specifically in 
the time series of Belgium and Portugal.  
5.1.1 Characteristics of part-time work 
Gender  
When looking at gender differences in the popularity of part-time work, Figure 32 demonstrates 
clearly that part-time work is a female phenomenon. Denmark and the Netherlands are the only 
countries where the part-time rate for men comes somewhere near 1/3 of the female part-time 
rate. Dutch female employment is not only relatively high in 2009, it has also increased relatively 
fast since 1990 (see Figure 33). This confirms that most of the increasing female participation 
during the nineties was through women entering the labour market in part-time jobs (remember 
Figure 4). On the other hand, in the Scandinavian countries many women went from part-time 
jobs to full-time jobs, so there was no net increase in part-time work there. 
Figure 32  Part-time work is a female phenomenon, 2009 
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Figure 33  Development of female part-time work, 1990-2000-2009  
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_eppga, 2009). 
Age  
Another characteristic of part-time work is that it is more popular among young people. That 
might be because they are still in education, because they like the flexibility more or because it is 
just all they can get without qualifications.  
 
Figure 34  Part-time growth strongest amongst youth (NL as clearest example) 
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A clear example is given in Figure 34, where part-time rates are plotted by sex and age group for 
the Netherlands. Although young women are more often in part-time jobs than young men, the 
difference between the sexes is far less than it is for the other age groups. Figure 35 shows that in 
other countries similar patterns can be found: a rising part-time share among youth. But for 
employees aged 25-59 such a rising share is not seen everywhere. In fact, in Denmark, UK and 
Norway part-time became less common among women in this age group, in contrast to Belgium 
and the Netherlands.  
 
Figure 35  Part-time growth in other countries 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_eppga, 2009). 
Preferred choice or not ? 
Several reasons can explain why people work in a part-time job instead of in a ‘traditional’ 
fulltime job. Some people might be looking for a fulltime job but are not able to find it, while 
others might prefer to work part-time in the first place. These people might be in education, 
taking care of young children or performing other household tasks. If an employee wants a 
fulltime job but cannot find it, part-time work is considered as second choice. If an employee 
does not want to have a fulltime job at all, part-time work is considered as preferred choice. 
The high and rising share of part-time work in some countries together with rising participation 
suggest that not all (new) employees are preferring fulltime jobs. Figure 36 confirms this 
proposition; the higher the share of part-time workers in a country (x-axis), the lower the share of 
people actually preferring fulltime jobs (y-axis).52 Thus, differences in part-time rates between EU 
countries are mainly employee-driven. They are not so much related to economic differences but 
rather to cultural differences. 
                                                        











1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Belgium Germany Denmark
United Kingdom Switzerland Norway
Men 15-24 Women 15-24 Men 25-59 Women 25-59
MODERN LABOUR RELATIONS 101 
SEO ECONOMISCH ONDERZOEK 
Figure 36  Working part-time is a deliberate choice 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_eppga, lfsq_eppgai, 2009). 
 
Skill differences 
If we would look at the skill distribution of part-time workers, we would see that the 
Mediterranean countries are characterized by high shares of low-skilled part-timers. But the share 
of low-skilled workers among part-timers is not bigger than it is among fulltime workers. 
Therefore it is better to focus on the incidence of part-time work within each skill group.  
 
In Table 30 we see the share of part-timers for each educational level. When we compare each 
skill group with the average part-time share in a country, we see that in all countries part-time is 
less frequent among high-skilled and more frequent among low-skilled. So part-time work is 
clearly correlated with educational level: the higher the education of an employee the lower the 




















































0 10 20 30 40 50
% part-time workers
102   CHAPTER 5 
SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
Table 30 Part-time work by skill level, (% of total employment) 
 low middle high Average 
Austria 20 65 16 29.2 
Belgium 27 42 31 28.7 
Germany 18 63 20 32.3 
Denmark 39 37 24 37.2 
Spain 44 27 29 13.8 
Finland 26 50 24 20.6 
France 29 43 28 21.3 
Greece 40 40 20 6.8 
Ireland 28 45 27 28.1 
Italy 36 49 16 13.9 
Luxembourg 24 43 33 22.5 
Netherlands 29 43 28 54.5 
Portugal 75 12 13 9.7 
Sweden 22 49 29 33.8 
United Kingdom 25 47 28 31.4 
Cyprus 32 34 34 10.3 
Czech Republic 10 71 19 9.1 
Estonia 10 53 38 11.7 
Hungary 21 63 16 9.3 
Lithuania 12 68 20 16.4 
Latvia 21 60 18 16.3 
Malta 65 22 14 11.8 
Poland 18 63 19 17.4 
Slovenia 23 64 12 18.2 
Slovakia 15 74 11 15.0 
Bulgaria 33 54 14 5.1 
Romania 55 44 1 21.2 
Norway 29 45 26 39.9 
Turkey 83 9 8 14.1 
EU27 27 49 23 21.7 
Source: SEO calculations based on Eurostat LFS (lfsq_epgaed, 2009). 
The results from this table are copied graphically in Figure 37. The black dot represents the 
countries overall share of part-time employees, as taken from Table 29. The dark blue arrow 
shows how far away the part-time share among low-skilled is from the overall part-time share;  
the grey arrow shows how far away the part-time share among high-skilled is from the overall 
part-time share. If the arrow points to the right, the group has an over-representation of part-
time workers. If the arrow points to the left, the group has an under-representation of part-time 
workers. As nearly all blue arrows are pointing to the right, we can see directly that part-time 
work is more popular among low-skilled. This effect is most prominent in Poland, Norway and 
Denmark. At the same time we see that all the grey arrows are pointing to the left, indicating that 
high-skilled are less frequently working part-time. 
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Figure 37 Part-time work is more prominent among low-skill workers 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_epgaed, 2009) 
5.2 Temporary work (fixed-term contracts) 
Compared to part-time work, an even more flexible form of labour is temporary work. But what 
exactly is temporary work? In the Eurostat’s definition ‘temporary work’ is a heterogeneous 
variable: it does include employees working for a temporary work agency but consist mainly of 
fixed term contract workers, hired directly by the employer. Unfortunately there is often no 
distinction possible between these different forms of flexible labour, although their 
characteristics differ strongly. Eurostat’s Labour Force Survey (LFS) does not measure agency 
work separately; so in the current chapter we look only at ‘temporary work in general’ using 
Eurostat data, while in the next section we focus specifically on ‘temporary agency work’ using 
other sources.   
 
Fixed term contracts versus agency work 
That a difference exists between both concepts can be seen in Figure 38 below, where the relative 
size of agency work is compared with the relative size of temporary work in each country.53 It is 
clear that the size of temporary work in general is not determined by the size of temporary 
agency work: in that case the data points would line up from the bottom left to the upper right.54 
The implication of the graph is that national differences in ‘temporary work in general’ (as 
defined by Eurostat and used in the rest of section 5.2) are not caused by differences in 
temporary agency work  but by differences in fixed term contracts. Put differently: the concept of 
                                                        
53 Unfortunately the definitions are somewhat different, because they are taken from different sources. This 
means that the absolute numbers on the axes can not be compared directly. The agency work penetration rate 
for example is measured in full-time euivalents in most countries, whereas the percentage of temporary 
workers is calculetd by number of persons.  
54 In fact, if the graph suggests a negative relation but that is not statistically significant without the extreme 
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‘temporary work in general’ is not representing temporary agency work, we will address the latter 
in section 5.3. 
 
Figure 38 ‘Temporary work’ is not the same as ‘temporary agency work’ 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_etpga, 2009), Ciett (2009). 
 
Temporary work in general  
In many countries temporary work has been an important component of employment growth in 
the last one or two decades. As outlined earlier, the increase in part-time work may be a response 
to the wish of women to combine work and family life (often because of caring responsibilities). 
Likewise, temporary contracts may facilitate job matching, by providing an initial work 
experience especially for youths (either during their educational period, for starters or for drop-
outs) while also allowing employers to screen suitable candidates. For employers temporary jobs 
also offer the opportunity to adapt the size of their workforce to the economic conditions. In our 
literature study in Chapter 4 we present some empirical evidence of the ‘stepping stone’ function, 
where for the unemployed in some countries temporary work serves as a first step on their way 
to a permanent job. In Chapter 6 professor Schmid analyzes the characteristics of temporary 
work in a more theoretical way, in the current subsection we present the official statistics. 
Table 31 shows the incidence of temporary work in European countries since 1983. Regarding 
temporary contracts the role of exceptional case in Europe is traditionally played by Spain, with 
recent developments being most dramatic in Poland. Since the early nineties around 30% of all 
Spanish workers had a temporary contract, nearly all of them fixed term contracts. A share that 
only dropped recently as a consequence of the economic crisis, which struck the Spanish labour 
market more than most other countries. 
In Poland temporary work increased from less than 6% in 2000 to around 26% recently. In 
Portugal temporary contracts lost importance in the early nineties but rapidly became popular 
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Table 31  Percentage of employees with a temporary contract 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria  6.0 8.6 8.8 8.7 8.8 8.7 8.6 
Belgium 5.3 5.3 9.0 9.1 8.8 8.8 7.7 8.2 
Germany 10.5 10.4 12.8 13.8 14.2 14.3 14.7 14.3 
Denmark 10.8 12.1 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.0 8.5 9.1 
Spain 29.9 35.0 32.4 33.3 34.4 31.9 29.4 25.3 
Finland  16.5 17.7 18.1 18.0 17.3 16.9 15.9 
France 10.6 12.2 15.4 14.3 14.4 14.4 14.3 13.5 
Greece 16.5 10.2 13.8 12.1 10.9 11.2 11.6 12.2 
Ireland 8.5 10.2 5.3 2.5 4.1 9.0 8.0 8.1 
Italy 5.2 7.2 10.1 12.4 13.0 13.4 13.9 12.8 
Luxembourg 3.4  3.4 5.3 6.1 6.9 7.7 7.4 
Netherlands 7.6 10.8 13.8 15.1 16.1 17.9 18.0 17.9 
Portugal 18.4 10.1 19.8 19.5 20.2 22.2 23.3 21.7 
Sweden  13.0 14.3 16.0 17.3 17.7 16.4 15.5 
United Kingdom 5.1 6.9 6.6 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.2 5.4 
Cyprus   10.7 13.9 13.9 12.9 14.4 14.2 
Czech Republic   7.2 8.0 8.1 7.9 7.4 7.4 
Estonia   2.3 3.3 3.3   2.3 
Hungary   6.8 7.2 6.7 7.5 7.8 8.2 
Lithuania   3.8 5.1 4.7 3.7 2.7 2.7 
Latvia   6.7 8.4 7.1 5.3 2.8 3.7 
Malta   3.9 4.0 3.8 5.5 4.1 4.8 
Poland   5.6 25.4 27.1 28.1 26.9 26.5 
Slovenia   12.8 16.8 17.9 18.5 16.9 16.4 
Slovakia   4.0 4.9 5.0 5.3 4.0 4.1 
Bulgaria    6.3 6.2 5.7 5.1 5.2 
Romania   2.9 2.6 1.9 1.6 1.3 0.9 
Switzerland   11.6 12.8 13.5 12.9 13.2  
Norway  13.2 9.7 9.6 10.2 9.7 9.3 8.1 
Turkey     14.2 13.7 12.9 11.3 
EU27   12.2 13.9 14.3 14.5 14.1 13.4 
EU25   12.5 14.4 14.9 15.1 14.7 14.0 
EU15   13.6 14.3 14.7 14.8 14.5 13.6 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_etpga, 2009) 
Other interesting trends in temporary work can be seen in Figure 39, which shows graphically the 
developments in the two periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2009. Once again Poland springs into sight 
because it is the only country where temporary work became significantly more popular since 
2000. In the beginning of the eighties France had the lowest share of temporary contract 
workers, but by the end of the eighties and during the nineties temporary work gained 
significance so much that France was listed third at the turn of the century, with 15% temporary 
contracts. But since then the share of temp work dropped back, just behind Germany and just 
above the EU-27 average.  
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Figure 39  Recent growth in temporary work impressive in Poland 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_etpga, 2009). 
5.2.1 Characteristics of temporary work 
Age, not sex 
The following graphs show the share of temporary work, by age class through time (Figure 40) 
and by sex in 2009 (Figure 41). It is clear that temporary work does differ by age group (the bars 
in Figure 40 differ considerably) but not by sex (the two bars in Figure 41 do not differ much). 
As expected, temporary work is more common among youth. Part of this effect is caused by the 
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Figure 40 Temporary work does differ between age classes…  
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_etpga, 2009). 
Figure 41 …but less between the sexes, 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_etpga, 2009). 
Figure 42 focuses on Poland, being the most interesting example currently because of the large 
growth in the use of temporary work. The figure shows the percentage of employees with a 
temporary contract. It confirms our conclusion that within each age group differences between 
men (red line) and women (blue line) are absent, while within the sexes differences between 
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however should not hide the fact that in both age groups temporary work has become more 
important. 
 
Figure 42 Temporary work in Poland also: age matters, not sex 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_etpga, 2009). 
 
Duration of temporary work contracts 
The type of temporary contracts differs between countries in the average duration. Figure 43 
shows that in Ireland, Scandinavia and the German-speaking countries temporary workers have 
longer contracts than in other countries, especially the Baltic countries and Spain. The average 
duration of a temporary contract in the EU is 15 months. However, if we would look at the 
distribution we see that 60% of the contracts agree on a duration of less than 12 months, in fact 
38% is even for less than six months.55 We see no important differences in duration by sex or by 
age group.  
                                                        
55 Although one person can have several sequential short-term contracts even within one year, the number we 
present is measured at some point in the second quarter of the year, so the chances of counting one person 
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Figure 43 Average duration of temporary contracts, 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_etgadc, 2009). 
 
Preferred choice or not? 
Just as with part-time work we also know for temporary workers what was their reason for not 
being in a ‘traditional’ job. Did they look for jobs with a regular contract without success, or did 
they make a deliberate choice? If an employee wants a permanent job but cannot find it, 
temporary work is considered as a second choice. If an employee does not want to have a 
permanent job at all, temporary work is considered as a preferred choice.  
 
Figure 44 shows that the reasons for working in a temporary job differ substantially between 
countries. Roughly speaking: in the German-speaking countries, the Anglo-Saxon countries 
(Ireland, UK), Scandinavia and the Netherlands temporary work was a voluntary choice in 2008 
for the majority of temporary workers. In Belgium and the Mediterranean countries at the other 
hand the majority consists of temp workers who opted for temping as a second choice. Little 
difference exists in reasons between men & women, except for Czech Republic (women more 
voluntary), Denmark (men more in education/training). Age also doesn’t make a lot of 
difference: understandably, among the youth ‘education’ is somewhat more important and ‘couldn’t 
find a permanent job’ somewhat less important. 
 
A correlation exists between employment participation and the voluntariness of tempwork: the 
countries with higher participation have less people working involuntary in a fixed term contract. 
Or, to formulate it more positively: the higher participation comes hand in hand with more 
voluntary tempworkers (see Figure 45).56 Apparently some part of the higher participation of 
some (Scandinavian & Anglo-Saxon) countries might be connected to their labour markets 
providing ‘good quality’ temporary jobs.   
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Figure 44 Reasons for working in a temporary job, 2008 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_etgar, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 45 Voluntary tempwork is correlated with higher participation, 2008 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_etgar, 2008; lfsq_ergan,2009).  
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Skill differences 
Temporary work is not only characterized by relatively young workers, it is also characterised by 
overrepresentation of low-skilled workers (see Figure 46). Two possible explanations can be 
thought of. Firstly, if people are still in education, their skill level is not measured correctly by 
‘highest successfully completed education’ because they have not completed their educational 
track yet. Secondly, early school leavers (‘drop-outs’) do not get a permanent job easily because 
they lack certain minimum qualifications, therefore starting with temporary jobs is often their 
only option. In Spain and Portugal temporary work is not distinguished as ‘typically low-skilled’: 
high-skilled temporary work is also very common in these countries. 
 
Figure 46 Temporary work, by educational level (% of total employment in category), 2009 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_etgaed, 2009; lfsq_egaed,2009).  
 
Sector and occupation 
Table 32 shows the distribution of the temporary workforce over the different sectors of the 
economy. There is no clear overall-pattern, temporary workers can be found in very different 
sectors depending on their country. But most often do they work in manufacturing, 
wholesale/retail/trade, health care, education, construction and business services. Manufacturing 
is the most important sector for temporary workers in the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy and 
Hungary, while construction is dominant in Spain, Portugal and Sweden. In Belgium that is the 
education sector while health care is the most important temporary employment sector in 
Denmark, France, Poland & the UK. In Ireland, Netherlands and Austria most temporary 
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Agriculture  3 0 3 3 2 5 2 2 7 7 3 2 3 4 1 
Manufacturing  12 15 27 11 19 12 13 6 17 24 12 14 11 15 8 
Public utilities 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Construction 8 3 6 9 5 20 8 8 7 12 4 11 6 16 3 
Trade & repair 10 11 11 14 13 11 10 18 12 12 17 16 10 13 9 
Hotels, rest. 
etc. 6 3 4 3 4 9 4 12 9 5 10 12 4 8 7 
Transport & 
com. 4 5 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 7 3 4 5 4 
Financial 
services 1 1 2 0 2 1 1 3 2 0 2 2 1 1 2 
Business 
services 8 9 9 5 10 9 9 7 9 4 12 6 10 7 11 
Public sector 6 6 11 5 7 6 14 3 5 17 4 6 4 6 6 
Education 8 20 10 12 10 6 10 15 14 5 6 11 11 9 23 
Health & care 9 13 8 26 14 8 14 13 7 4 12 9 23 7 15 
Misc. services 5 6 5 8 7 4 7 7 6 4 4 7 9 4 9 
Unknown 20 8 0 1 1 5 5 4 1 2 5 1 3 5 2 
Total  
(million pers.) 25.6 0.3 0.3 0.2 4.9 4.9 3.3 0.1 2.4 0.3 1.3 0.3 3.2 0.9 1.3 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_etgana, 2009) 
Table 33 shows the distribution of the temporary workforce over different occupational 
categories. Same things can be said here: there is no clear overall pattern, temporary workers can 
be found in very different occupations. 


































































manager 1 4 4 0 1 0 1 4 1 13 0 3 2 0 4 
Professional 12 23 11 16 13 11 12 19 10 7 14 13 9 12 23 
Technician & 
assoc. prof. 14 9 17 18 21 8 16 6 17 8 14 16 9 9 13 
Clerk 11 10 9 7 12 8 12 13 14 0 16 10 10 11 15 
Service, shop 
& sales  18 18 14 0 14 18 0 37 18 0 0 21 0 19 25 
Skilled 
agricultural 2 0 1 3 2 1 3 0 2 4 2 2 1 2 0 
Craft & related 
trades  15 8 11 15 16 21 12 8 13 16 7 24 22 21 2 
Plant/machine 
operators 8 9 17 3 5 8 11 0 8 14 6 3 13 7 4 
Elementary 
occupations 16 19 16 12 9 24 15 14 17 23 18 9 16 19 14 
Armed forces 1 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Unknown 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Total (million 
pers.) 25.6 0.3 0.3 0.2 4.9 4.9 3.3 0.1 2.4 0.3 1.3 0.3 3.2 0.9 1.3 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_etgais, 2009) 
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Temporary workers are predominantly found in elementary occupations, as service & sales 
worker, as craft & trades worker and (surprisingly) as ‘technician or associate professional’. That 
last category is often used as proxy for ‘knowledge economy occupations’. It contains relatively 
many temporary workers in the Central European countries. In Belgium temporary work is most 
prominent among professional occupations, which are also popular among British and Irish 
tempworkers. Craft & related trades occupations are often temporary jobs in Austria, Poland and 
Portugal; Czech Republic is the country which employs relatively most temporary workers for 
plant & machine operation. In Ireland and the UK the temporary workforce is also found in 




Many publications have already shown that immigrants (foreign-born) are overrepresented in 
temporary jobs. This is still true, even though such statistics concern mainly structural migrants: 
people who intend to live in the host country for longer periods, and who are therefore officially 
registered as inhabitants of the host country. But in Europe, traditional migration patterns have 
changed drastically during the last years, particularly since the accession of ten new EU Member 
States in 2004 and two more in 2007. Because free movement of people within the EU suddenly 
meant free movement from Eastern Europe to Western Europe, new patterns of migration 
emerged.  
 
Traditionally migrants came to Western Europe from other continents (Morocco, Turkey, former 
colonies) and stay in their host country on a permanent base. As it happens, this type of 
migration is getting more uncommon lately. In fact outflows (return migration) of Turkish- and 
Moroccan-born people are often bigger than inflows.  
Modern migration patterns are more fluid: not only are they intra-EU, they are also characterized 
by a very temporary character, and much more driven by work opportunities. As distances 
between origin country and home country are smaller, return migration is much more frequent. 
Return migration is less costly, and the possibility of re-entering the host country is guaranteed. If 
work opportunities disappear, migrants prefer to move back to their home country or move on 
to another EU-country. Many Polish workers left the UK at the end of 2008 when the effects of 
the financial crisis struck that country relatively hard. Some returned to Poland, others moved on 
to prove their luck in some other EU country. 
 
This new ‘circular migration’ is of course increasing the overrepresentation of migrants in 
temporary jobs, but this effect is hardly measured in official statistics. Because the modern 
migrants are free to travel within the EU, most of them do not officially register themselves in 
the host countries. As many even do not require a work permit anymore, keeping track of these 
‘temporary’ labour migration flows is much more difficult than it is to keep track of the 
traditional ‘structural’ migration flows. In the last edition of IDEAL we spend a special topic on 
the role of migration, stating that it is becoming more and more an essential and necessary 
element of our (flexible) labour markets.57 Recent Dutch research was designed specifically to 
include temporary labour migration, as well as structural migration (see Heyma et al, 2008). The 
main conclusion was that the increase of (temporary labour) migration from Eastern European 
countries had a modest impact on the Dutch economy. Displacement of national workers hardly 
                                                        
57 See also Berkhout (2008). 
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takes place on average, a lowering effect of wages is found but barely noticeable, and for the 
public sector the net contribution of this generation of migrants is slightly positive.  
5.3 Temporary agency work 
Temporary agency work differs from the ‘temporary work’ described in the previous section on 
several characteristics. Most obvious is that the employer does not hire the employee directly on 
a fixed term contract, but through a private employment agency (PrEA). Typically the employee 
is hired directly by the employment agency, mostly on a temporary basis but sometimes even on a 
permanent contract. During the contract period the employee can be assigned to different user 
companies. Another important difference is what happens after that. If the contract expires, a 
renewed contract with the employment agency is one of the possibilities, but also a contract with 
one of the using companies.  
 
The labour relations are more complex in the case of temporary agency work: there is a triangular 
relationship between employee, agency and using company. Temporary work agencies often act 
as a kind of ‘impresario’ for the employee, because matching labour supply with demand is a 
common goal of employers, employees and agencies. As a consequence, temporary workers 
served by an agency have a lower risk of becoming unemployed than workers with a fixed-term 
contract. 
 
Temporary work agencies play a special role in promoting smooth labour transitions and 
increased participation. They are part of most flexicurity strategies, because they provide some 
favourable characteristics that are often not found in other flexible forms of labour. For example, 
temporary agency work is the most preferred form because of their function as ‘transition 
managers’, assisting people to move from job to job, or even from one sector of the economy to 
another. In this way, temporary work agencies actively improve matching, irrespective of the 
business cycle.  
 
Because of the negative effects of staying unemployed for longer periods of time, matching 
labour supply with demand is even more important in a recession than in prosperous economic 
times. In many countries, rising unemployment in some sectors goes together with vacancies in 
other sectors, especially in light of the current recession. This so-called ‘sectoral gap’ might be 
closed more easily by public-private partnerships with temporary work agencies, as many of them 
operate across many different sectors. In so far as a recession acts as a driving force for sectoral 
changes, this cross-sectoral matchmaking benefits the economy, also in the long term.  
 
For the (structural) unemployed, what matters is not the quantitative but the qualitative match. 
For many of them, temporary work agencies facilitate easier transitions from unemployment to 
work, thus bringing more people to the labour market. In some cases vocational training is 
provided, such as through the use of bipartite funds in Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Italy, 
Spain, Luxembourg and Austria. The use of RPL (‘Recognition of Prior Learning’) by the Dutch 
bipartite fund has recently been recognized as very helpful, for labour markets in general, but also 
for employees themselves.58  
 
                                                        
58  See http://www.kenniscentrumevc.nl/evc_nl/11cf2c21c134747892d544c26df1c55e.php.  
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Temporary agency work might act as a ‘stepping stone’ to more regular employment. Recently, 
SEO Economic Research has shown that, in the Netherlands, people with a temporary agency 
work job have almost the same perspectives on a more permanent job as people who directly 
obtain a regular job59 through the public employment service. The main difference is that the 
persons with a temporary agency work job change jobs more frequently and spend less time in 
unemployment. As such, they impose less of a burden on the welfare system. The effect of 
agency work here is that unemployment spells are significantly shorter. The so-called ‘stepping 
stone’ function of temporary work & temporary agency work is described in more detail in our 
literature study in Chapter 4. Temporary work (which also includes agency work) acts as a 
stepping stone for the unemployed in countries like the UK, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands.  
 
Measuring temporary agency work 
Unfortunately temporary agency work is seldom distinguished in official statistics yet, so we 
cannot use Eurostat or OECD databases to assess the impact of temporary agency work on the 
economy. We have collected as much internationally comparable statistics through CIETT (the 
International Confederation of Temporary Work Businesses) and through national employment 
agency federations. Reliability and comparability was a weak point, but has improved substantially  
since last year.60 We believe that they now present a fairly reliable overview of temporary agency 
work, and are the best source of information on this topic. Table 34 presents the temporary 
agency work ‘penetration rate’, defined as the average daily number of temporary agency workers 
FTE as a percentage of total employment. This gives an overview of the relative importance of 
temporary agency work in the national labour markets. It shows that in the UK temporary agency 
work is most common, followed by the Benelux countries & France. Already in 1998 temporary 
agency work was quite common in these countries; in Italy though it is a relatively new 
phenomenon, covering 0.9% of employment in 2007.  
 
                                                        
59 Arjan Heyma, Chris van Klaveren m.m.v. Marloes de Graaf-Zijl (2008), Uitzendbaan versus direct 
dienstverband: vergelijking loopbanen CWI-cliënten, SEO-rapport 2008-12, Amsterdam. 
60 In the preparation of Eurociett (2007) Eurociett and SEO Economic Research jointly improved the 
comparability and reliability of the reported statistics. They also recalculated time series for the UK; this was 
necessary because of definition changes. The tables in this section therefore replace all agency work tables in 
Berkhout et al (2007).  
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Table 34 Temporary agency work penetration rate, 1996-2008 
 1996 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 0.4% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.2% 1.5% 1.5% 1.7%
Belgium 1.2% 1.6% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.8% 1.9% 2.1% 2.2% 2.1%
Denmark 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.8% 0.7%
Finland 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 1.1% 1.2%
France 1.3% 2.3% 2.6% 2.4% 2.3% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.5% 2.3%
Germany 0.4% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.3% 1.6% 2.0%
Hungary 0.8% 1.0% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
Ireland 0.2% 0.6% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.5% 1.7%
Italy 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9%
Luxembourg 1.2% 1.7% 2.2% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.2% 2.6% 2.5% 1.9%
Netherlands 2.1% 2.5% 2.3% 2.1% 1.9% 1.9% 2.2% 2.5% 2.8% 2.8%
Norway 0.3% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0%
Poland 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6%
Portugal 0.6% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
Spain 0.5% 0.9% 0.9% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7%
Sweden 0.3% 0.6% 1.0% 0.9% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 1.3% 1.3%
Switzerland 0.6% 0.9% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 1.2% 1.5% 1.7% 1.6%
UK 2.6% 2.8% 3.8% 3.8% 4.0% 4.2% 4.3% 4.5% 4.8% 4.2%
 
Argentina 0.5% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
Brazil 0.9% 0.9%
Japan 0.5% 0.6% 0.8% 1.1% 1.2% 1.4% 1.7% 1.9% 2.1% 2.2%
Mexico 0.8% 0.8%
South Africa 2.4% 2.3% 2.3% .
South Korea 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
USA 1.7% 1.9% 2.0% 1.6% 1.7% 1.9% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 1.8%
Source: Own calculations SEO Economic Research, based on Ciett statistics & Eurostat. 
 
5.3.1 Statistics on temporary agency work 
Recently a report on the characteristics of temporary agency workers was published by Ciett.61 In 
this section we present some of the most interesting results. Table 35 shows that in most 
European countries, temporary agency workers are more often male than female. Exceptions are 
Poland, Greece, UK and Finland, plus important non-European countries like USA and Japan. 
 
                                                        
61 CIETT (2009), ‘The agency work industry around the world’, Brussels. See www.ciett.org . 
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Table 35 Temporary agency workers: sex composition, 2008 
 
Male  Male 
Austria 80% Norway 51% 
Switzerland 74% Sweden 50% 
Germany 73% Chile 49% 
France 71% Brazil 47% 
Japan 61% Poland 46% 
South Africa 60% Greece 46% 
Belgium 58% Portugal 45% 
Italy 58%* Czech Republic 44% 
Mexico 54% USA 44% 
Spain 56% South Korea 42%* 
Hungary 54% UK 42% 
Netherlands 53% Finland 34% 
Source: Ciett (2010), figures for Japan, Italy and South Korea regarding 2007. 
In most countries, the length of assignment is over 3 months for the majority of the temporary 
workers. But in Figure 47 we see that Spain (and, to a lesser extent, Italy) is a special case: 
assignments of temporary agency workers are very short, in fact rarely more than 3 months. But 
of course someone can have several assignments on a row, probably even on the same contract.  
 
Figure 47 Temporary agency workers: average length of assignment 
 
Source: Ciett (2009). 
On average, temporary agency workers are relatively young (see Figure 48). In most countries the 
majority has not reached the age of 30. The most important exception here is the US, where the 
age distribution of agency workers is more symmetric. One third is younger than 30, one third is 
between 30-45 years of age, and one third is older than 45. The Netherlands is not included in 
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the figure, because of conformability issues. Dutch temporary workers are on average quite 
young, half of them is younger than 25, while 12% is 45 years or older. This makes the age 
distribution in the Netherlands more or less comparable to the Belgian. 
Figure 48 Temporary agency workers: age distribution 
 
Source: Ciett (2009). 
The age distribution also correlates with the distribution of temporary agency workers by level of 
education.  
Figure 49 Temporary agency workers: educational level 
  
Source: Ciett (2009). 
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In some countries (especially the Netherlands) many temporary agency workers are students. 
Which means that in Figure 49 they show up as ‘medium’, because they have only completed 
secondary education. However, for most of them a tertiary education diploma is only a matter of 
time. In Eastern Europe and France the situation appears different, here temporary agency 
workers are predominantly lower educated, which means that they have not completed secondary 
education.  In Norway and South-Korea temporary agency work employs many higher educated 
employees.  
 
Although the trend is towards the service sectors of the economy, Figure 50 shows that 
manufacturing remains an important sector for temporary agency workers in the traditionally 
industrial economies like Germany, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, Italy, France and the Czech 
Republic. In the Scandinavian countries, UK and the Netherlands temporary agency work is 
common in the public sector and the health sector, whilst other countries have legal bans on the 
public sector (Belgium, Spain). France has lifted the public sector ban in 2009. Germany and 
Spain have bans on the use of temporary agency workers in the construction sector.  
 
Figure 50 Temporary agency workers: sectoral distribution 
 
Source: Ciett (2009). 
5.4 Self-employment 
Contrary to the other forms of modern labour relations discussed before, self-employment did 
not gain a lot of importance during the last decade, on average. According to official Eurostat 
statistics 10% of employment in the EU27 is in the form of self-employment, and that share has 
always been between 9.4% and 10.1% since the year 2000.  Self-employment is twice as common 
in Turkey and in Greece, while in Romania and Italy the share is around 16-17%. Differences 
between the other countries are not immense, between 5-10% of their employment is generated 
by registered self-employment (see Table 36). Self-employment is slightly more popular among 
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men than among women. The EU27 share of male self-employed is around 12%, whereas only 
7% of female employment is in the form of self-employment. Apart from these official statistics 
other forms of self-employment might also exist. Professor Schmid elaborates in this in Chapter 
6, with special attention for the role of self-employment in combination with part-time jobs. 
 
Table 36 Self-employment, as % of total number of employed persons 
Country 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria 5.7 5.4 5.1 6.8 7.0 6.8 6.7 6.4 6.3 
Belgium 13.4 9.2 9.3 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.5 8.2 
Germany 4.7 4.8 4.8 5.5 6.0 5.9 5.7 5.7 5.7 
Denmark 4.0 3.8 3.7 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.6 
Spain 14.5 12.2 11.9 11.1 11.2 11.0 10.9 10.6 10.1 
Finland 10.0 8.3 8.0 7.6 7.7 8.0 7.6 7.9 8.5 
France 6.1 5.7 5.4 5.3 5.3 6.0 5.9 5.2 5.8 
Greece 24.1 23.5 23.0 21.6 21.5 21.1 20.8 20.3 20.7 
Ireland 11.7 10.9 10.4 10.6 10.1 9.6 9.7 10.0 10.2 
Italy 11.7 11.1 10.9 17.6 17.2 16.9 16.7 16.4 16.1 
Netherlands 6.4 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.8 8.1 8.4 8.6 
Portugal 16.6 14.1 15.3 14.2 14.1 13.9 13.4 13.1 13.4 
Sweden 6.2 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.7 5.9 
United Kingdom 8.7 8.3 8.6 9.3 9.4 9.4 9.7 9.8 10.0 
Czech Republic 8.8 10.2 11.1 12.1 11.5 11.3 11.6 11.8 12.1 
Estonia 5.2 4.9 4.6 5.8 5.0 5.5 5.8 4.1 3.9 
Hungary 12.4 9.4 7.8 8.0 7.4 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.6 
Lithuania 11.7 14.0 14.6 13.8 12.4 11.6 10.0 8.0 8.2 
Latvia 7.8 6.1 5.9 6.1 5.9 7.3 5.9 5.3 6.5 
Poland 17.7 17.9 18.1 16.7 15.9 15.5 14.7 14.7 14.4 
Slovenia 8.1 6.7 7.3 6.1 5.9 6.8 6.8 6.3 7.0 
Slovakia 4.2 5.2 6.0 8.5 9.4 9.5 9.6 10.2 12.2 
Bulgaria 11.5 9.3 9.1 8.3 7.8 7.2 7.6 7.9 
Romania 16.7 19.1 18.6 16.0 17.2 16.8 17.2 17.2 17.1 
Switzerland 7.0 7.1 7.5 7.3 7.1 6.9 7.2 7.1 
Norway 5.6 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.9 5.5 5.2 5.3 
Turkey 22.1 21.1 20.1 19.7 
EU27 9.6 9.4 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.0 9.8 9.9 
Source: Eurostat LFS (lfsq_esgaed, 2010). 
5.5 Summary  
Modern labour relations have become more prominent in the last two decades, although the 
fulltime open-ended contract is still dominant. However, differences between countries (and 
sometimes between sex and age groups) are immense. For women in the Netherlands part-time 
work is now the dominant type of labour, in other Northwest-European countries part-time 
work is also common among women, while in the rest of Europe it is still a marginal 
phenomenon. So far part-time work is typically a phenomenon of women making a deliberate 
choice of balancing work and family in a modern way.  
Traditional fixed-term contracts between employer and employee have also gained importance in 
some countries (Spain, Poland) and among some groups (young people) and sectors 
(manufacturing, in some countries health care and construction). In Northwest-Europe flexibility 
is more often characterized by three-actor labour relations, involving temporary work agencies. 
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Compared to fixed-term contracts, temporary agency workers spend less time in unemployment, 
and in the countries with a mature ‘agency work market’ it often acts as a ‘stepping stone’ for the 
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6 Non-standard employment and labour 
force participation  
A comparative view of the recent development in Europe 
Günther Schmid,  
Free University of Berlin 62,63 
6.1 Introduction 
Despite the current crisis, which might again lead to mass unemployment in the short-term, the 
long-term perspective of most EU member states is still one of labour shortage for two reasons: 
one quantitative related to the ageing society, one qualitative related to the rapid change of 
technology and global competition. Whereas migration might fill this gap to some extent, raising 
labour force participation of the native population is generally seen as the more sustainable 
solution. Furthermore, changing work preferences, especially among women traditionally tied to 
unpaid work in the private households, hint to unexploited potentials of endogenous factors 
driving labour force participation. Preferences for labour market participation might still be 
blocked by institutional barriers of various sorts: employment protection, tax incentives, lack of 
child care or elderly care infrastructure, and wage discrimination. 
 
Other important factors slowing down the potential increase in labour force participation are all 
sorts of regulations that enforce outdated standards of the employment relationship. Such 
standards – traditionally defined as open-ended contracts in dependent full-time work, possibly 
further restricted to one employer and five days a week from nine o’clock in the morning to six 
o’clock in the evening – limit both the use of flexible labour for the employers as well as the 
opportunity of variable employment over the life course for the employees.  
 
The last decades, however, have seen an erosion of this – traditionally defined – “standard 
employment relationship” through part-time work, fixed-term contracts, temporary agency work 
and self-employment. Whereas many welcomed this development as a blessing for flexible labour 
markets, others were highly critical and hinted very early to disastrous intended or unintended 
side-effects such as low or volatile income, dead-end jobs instead of stepping stones, high job 
insecurity, and poverty in old-age. At the beginning of this century, the European Commission 
stepped in as a kind of broker by recommending to direct the European Employment Strategy 
towards a proper balance of flexibility and security (Kok et el. 2004), dubbed already early by 
ingenious Dutch researchers as ‘flexicurity’ (Wilthagen 1998). 
 
                                                        
62 Director of the Labour Market Policy and Employment Research Unit at the Social Science Research Centre 
Berlin (WZB) from October 1989 to March 2008, and Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at the Free 
University of Berlin; contact: www.guentherschmid.eu. 
63 I thank Paula Protsch for her invaluable gathering and handling of the statistics, Ernest Berkhout and Jules 
Theeuwes at SEO Amsterdam for their kind hospitality, complementary help and challenging suggestions, 
which I could not all fulfil. 
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Varying a well-known saying by Martin Luther with respect to his wife: ‘as we have got this term, 
we have to like it.’ All the more, since a further increase of labour force participation seems 
inevitably be connected with a greater variety of employment relationships. The aim of the 
following essay is to test this assumption in a preliminary way through systematic descriptive 
work and conceptual reflections:  
• first by comparing the development of non-standard employment in EU member states from 
1998 to 2008;  
• second by relating this development to the dynamics of economic welfare and labour force 
participation;  
• third by exploring some determinants to explain this development;  
• fourth by discussing the policy consequences aimed at ensuring a complementary relationship 
between flexibility and security rather than trading-off one against the other;  
• fifth by summarising the main results and concluding. 
6.2 The Change of the Employment Relationship in 
the European Union 
The following view on the dynamics of the employment relationship is based on the European 
Labour Force Survey using the following definitions for labour force participation and non-
standard employment: 
 
• (1) Activity rate / or labour force participation rate = (Employed + Unemployed) as per 
cent of working age population (age 15 to 64)64 
• (2) Part-time employment rate = employed in part-time work and in open-ended contracts 
or in own account work65 as per cent of working age population; or as a share of total 
employment 
• (3) Fixed-term employment rate = employed in fixed-term contracts (including temporary 
agency work with fixed-term contracts and part-timers in fixed-term contracts) as per cent 
of working age population; or as a share of total employment 
• (4) Self-employment rate = own account workers (self-employed without dependent 
employees) in full-time as per cent of working age population; or as share of total 
employment 
• (5) (Aggregate) Non-standard employment rate = sum of (2, 3 and 4) as per cent of 
working age population; or as share of total employment 
                                                        
64 Notice that we measure “labour force participation” by including the unemployed who belong – in functional 
terms – to the active labour force (i.e., being available to the labour market and willing to work). The 
downside of this measure is spoiling international comparability since the measurement of unemployment 
between countries varies more than the measurement of employment despite ILO or OECD standards 
especially at the margin of the ages and with respect to health related employability. Related to the latter, the 
standard for employability applied in Germany for instance is (since 2003) stricter than in Denmark or in the 
Netherlands. Konle-Seidl/ Eichhorst (2008) find that Dutch unemployment rates would almost double by 
applying the German standards. 
65 Notice that we use self-reported ‘part-time’ which includes both the possibility that some people are in an 
open-ended full-time contract but actually work part-time, or the possibility that people are in an open-ended 
part-time contract but actually work more than 35 hours. 
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The statistical analysis uses a special data set of EUROSTAT which allows, by using a filter, to 
put the three components of non-standard employment together to an aggregate figure of non-
standard employment. The figures usually published cannot be added since categories overlap: 
part-timers may be on a fixed-term contract, and temporary workers may work full-time. On the 
other hand, this data set leaves open the option to separate part-time from full-time fixed-term 
contracts or to distinguish between part-time and full-time own self-employment if the analytical 
perspective requires such a differentiation. 
 
Figure 51 shows the development of the (aggregate) non-standard employment rate for 24 EU 
member states66. The horizontal axis presents the share of non-standard employment as a 
percentage of total population aged 15-64 in 1998. The vertical axis presents the same indicator, 
but for 2008. Most countries are in the upper half of the graph, meaning that their ‘aggregate 
non-standard employment rate’ has increased during the last ten years. The other pattern we can 
see is the fact that countries belonging to the so-called social-democratic regime, here including 
Netherlands a ‘hybrid’, rank highest in terms of the combined indicator for non-standard 
employment.67 
 
Figure 51 Aggregate non-standard employment rates in Europe, 1998 and 2008 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS; own calculations; the “aggregate” non-standard employment rate includes part-time, 
fixed-term and own account work controlling for overlaps; the EU-average excludes Bulgaria, Malta and Cyprus; 
see footnote 5. 
                                                        
66 Excluded are – for reasons of data limitations or exceptionality – Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta. 
67 I refer to the classic ‘regime’-typology by Esping-Andersen (1990); Netherlands as a ‘hybrid’ contains 
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However, with around one quarter of the working-age population non-standard employment is 
also fairly well developed in the ‘liberal’ system of UK, and even in family centred or so-called 
conservative employment systems like Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal.68 On the other hand, it is remarkable that most of the new member states cluster 
together in the left corner of the figure, which means displaying low non-standard employment 
rates of around 10 percent, and some countries showing even declining rates. 
This leads to the second pattern that immediately can be observed from Figure 51. Most 
countries are situated above the diagonal line, which means above the implicit time axis. If all 
countries would lie on this diagonal, nothing would have changed from 1998 to 2008. This is true 
for some countries, e.g. for UK, Greece, and Hungary. Some countries, especially Lithuania and 
Latvia, experienced even a decline in the aggregate non-standard employment rate. In most other 
countries, however, especially in Italy, Poland, Spain, Germany and Netherlands, the non-
standard employment rate increased by about five to ten percentage points. 
 
By decomposing non-standard employment into its three components of part-time work, fixed-
term employment and self-employment, our expectation is confirmed: part-time work is the most 
prominent element in non-standard employment of most countries. As already hinted at the 
beginning by pondering about the definition of ‘standard’ employment from a life-course 
perspective, there are good reasons to argue that at least open-ended part-time work in the range 
of 20 to 35 hours deserves to be counted as standard, and not ‘atypical’ anymore. Part-time work 
is common especially in well developed knowledge and service economies. Part-time employment 
rates – including the non-trivial number of self-employed people working in part-time – however 
display great variation between the EU member states, ranging from one percent in Romania to 
27 percent for ‘champion’ Netherlands. The fixed-term employment rates (including part-timers 
with fixed-term contracts) vary ‘only’ between (roughly) one percent in Romania again and 16 
percent in Spain; whereas the self-employment rate (excluding part-time) displays a minimum of 
two percent (Luxembourg) and a maximum of 12 percent (Greece).69  
 
Behind any variation of figures there are possibly hidden patterns. Are these three components of 
‘flexible’ employment complementary or substitutive? A first answer to this question can be 
found by simply correlating the various forms of non-standard employment across the 24 
country observations in 2008. In order to avoid auto-correlations, we further subdivide self-
employment into part-time and full-time, and do the same with fixed-term contracts, which 
leaves – as fifth element – part-time work in form of open-ended contracts.  
Table 37 Correlates of non-standard employment in 2008 
Part-time1) Fixed-term employment Self-employment2) 
(Open-ended) (Full-time) (Part-time) (Full-time) (Part-time) 
Part-time (Open-ended) 1 
Fixed-term (Full-time) -0.07 1 
Fixed-term (Part-time) 0.68 0.34 1 
Self-employed (Full-time)   -0.46 0.14 -0.19 1 
Self-employed (Part-time) 0.49 0.28 0.62 0.15 1 
Source: Eurostat  LFS, own calculations; N = 24 Member States of the EU (without Bulgaria, Malta, Cyprus);  
Strong (‘significant’) coefficients (>= 0.30) are in bold. 1) Part-time according to self-assessment; without self-
employed. 2) Own account workers (without dependent employees) 
                                                        
68 May be catholic Poland can be counted to this regime-type as well. 
69 See the corresponding figures in Appendix 2. 
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The strong positive correlation between open-ended and fixed-term part-time employment 
(r=0.68) is intuitively clear since both contractual forms are complementary. One can plausibly 
assume that a majority of open-ended part-time employment is the continuation of fixed-term 
part-time work. The same explanation can be given for the positive correlation between fixed-
term part-time work and fixed-term full-time work (r=0.34), in other words: a substantial part of 
fixed-term part-time contracts might lead to fixed-term full-time contracts, although such 
interpretations cannot directly be derived from such correlations.  
 
A bit more difficult to explain is the strong correlation between fixed-term part-time employment 
and part-time self-employment (r=0.62). Common underlying causal factors of this correlation 
are probably supply constraints, in particular of single or married women (or of the few single 
men) having children who can devote only part of their time to gainful employment. This 
interpretation is corroborated by the significant correlation between open-ended part-time work 
and part-time self-employment (r=0.49).70 
 
The most interesting result of this exercise is the strong negative correlation between full-time 
self-employment and open-ended part-time work (r=-0.46), which indicates a substitutive 
relationship between these forms of non-standard employment. This would mean, as far as this 
interpretation is correct, that not all forms of non-standard employment are driving labour force 
participation – at least not for all target groups. This substitutive pattern forecasts the decline of 
full-time self-employment in favour of part-time employment especially for countries that need 
to catch up with the ‘developed’ countries in terms of non-standard employment and labour 
force participation. Furthermore, it can be assumed that formerly self-employed people in 
agriculture, retailing or sweat-shops transit into dependent part-time work and combine this small 
but regular income with volatile income from various kinds of informal work on the side 
(especially in small-sized agricultural production), moonlighting or even illegal work.  
 
The differentiation of these observations by gender provides further hints to the reasons of rising 
non-standard employment. Figure 52 and Figure 53 present the non-standard employment rates 
similar to Figure 51, but now separately for women and men. They clearly show that the variation 
of non-standard employment among women in the EU is much higher than among men. The 
minimum and maximum non-standard employment rates for men vary between 8 percent 
(Estonia) and 30 percent (Netherlands) in 2008; however, for women, they range from 6 percent 
(Slovak Republic) to 56 percent (Netherlands). Whereas non-standard employment of women 
increased (apart from Romania and the Baltic states) in almost all EU member states, especially in 
the Netherlands and Germany, the pattern of dynamics is mixed for men: The small Baltic States, 
and also Greece, experienced a decline, and only a few of the countries (Italy, Poland, and 
Netherlands) show a substantial increase in male non-standard employment. 
                                                        
70 One is also tempted to explain this correlation by the possible combination of gainful part-time work (as the 
main and reliable income source) and part-time self-employment (as experimental area of additional income 
or ‘self-realisation’). However, the nature of the data does not allow this conclusion since individuals are 
counted by the main occupation they are reporting. Nevertheless, as we will see later, this combination may 
indeed play an important role. 
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Figure 52 Aggregate non-standard employment rates in Europe, 1998-2008, Women 
 
Figure 53 Aggregate non-standard employment rates in Europe, 1998-2008, Men 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS; own calculations; the “aggregate” non-standard employment rate includes part-time, 
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The differentiation according to education71, surprisingly, does not provide a clear pattern. One 
would expect a concentration of non-standard employment among low-skilled people which is, 
as we find at first glance, only partly true (see the table in Appendix 5.3). Whereas non-standard 
employment among low-skilled people is common in Mediterranean countries like Portugal, 
Spain and Greece many highly skilled people in non-standard employment can also be found in 
the ‘social-democratic’ regimes like Denmark, Sweden and Netherlands. Confronting the shares 
of non-standard employment by qualification with corresponding shares of these skill levels in 
total employment, the pattern becomes clearer (Figure 54). 
 
Figure 54 Share of skill-groups in nonstandard employment compared to their shares in total 
employment in Europe 2008 (differences in percentage points) 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS; own calculations 
Without any exception, low skilled people are overrepresented in non-standard employment, 
however, with great variation across EU member states. We find, for instance, about 12 
percentage point overrepresentation in Denmark, 8 in Germany, and only 3 in the Netherlands 
(six percentage points being the EU-average). At medium skill level, the pattern is mixed, whereas 
at high-skill level, high skilled people are underrepresented in most countries (especially in 
Eastern European new member states), with the exception of Italy and Czech Republic. 
6.3 Explaining the Dynamics of Non-standard 
Employment 
                                                        
71 According to ISCED (1997): Low=ISCED 0-2 (pre-primary education; primary or first stage of education of 
basic education; lower secondary education or second stage of basic education); Middle=ISCED 3-4 ([upper] 
secondary education; post-secondary non tertiary education; High= 5-6 (first stage of tertiary education [not 
leading directly to an advanced research qualification]; second stage of tertiary education [leading to an 
advanced research qualification]). The reader, however, should be aware of the dubious validity of these levels 
for comparative aims (Müller 2007).  
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Many possible factors would have to be taken into account to explain the dynamics of non-
standard employment. One would have to start with structural changes on the supply and 
demand side including their interaction, and then scrutinize institutional as well as policy 
determinants as reactions to these changes, for instance taxation, social security reforms and 
labour market policies targeted towards specific groups like elderly and women. Last but not 
least, changes in labour market regulation, especially those targeted to non-standard work, would 
have to be considered.  
 
In the following, a pragmatic approach – instead of following a systematic analytical framework – 
shall be applied to bring some insights at home.72 Leaving aside text book wisdoms like wage 
elasticity at the supply side or marginal productivity at the demand side, such a perspective is 
both guided by interesting patterns observed as well as by considerations of policy relevance.  
 
The basic assumption guiding these considerations is the expectation that non-standard 
employment is not only a risky and often unpleasant side effect of the new employment 
dynamics. It is, first of all, a central requisite for high labour force participation in a 
modern economy in which both men and women want to combine family, life and labour 
market work. It can also be anticipated that in a knowledge economy people of all ages want to 
combine life-long-learning and work; and it seems also plausible that in an ageing society – in 
which the proportion of young and old fundamentally change – age is becoming an asset and not 
(only) a burden. Furthermore, non-standard employment in the form of part-time, temporary or 
own account work may also replace, to some extent, flexible adjustment forms within the 
standard employment relationship (e.g. short-time work, overtime, job rotation) which have 
evolved in large-scale internal labour markets related to mass production in manufacturing. It 
seems that in knowledge based service economies, dominated by project-oriented work 
organization and horizontal labour division, employers probably have to rely more on external 
flexibility with respective higher labour turnover. The resulting increase in non-standard 
employment forms with corresponding higher risks for workers, then, would imply the necessity 
of developing new securities to avoid new forms of labour market segmentation. 
6.3.1 Is non-standard employment driving labour force participation? 
Before starting to test the relationship between non-standard employment and labour force 
participation in a preliminary and descriptive way, the two main reasons for expecting a positive 
relationship shall be made explicit.  
 
First, from the demand side perspective, deepening labour division due to globalisation or 
internationalisation and information technologies requires a flexible work organisation in which 
individual job security may become a barrier rather than a requisite of high productivity. This 
does not mean that job tenure becomes obsolete as a requirement for cumulating experience and 
cooperation among complementary skilled workers. But it is safe to assume that either job 
security has to be combined with multiple skills, or individual job security has to be replaced by 
individual employment security in order to enable employers to mix the skills according to the 
                                                        
72 For economic text-book versions see, among others, Ehrenberg/ Smith (2003); in the framework of comparing 
employment systems Schmid (2008, chapters 2 and 3); from a sociological point of view and related to the 
perspective of ‘precarious work’ see Kalleberg (2009). 
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changing tasks related to high-skill diversity production often based on projects or network types 
of work organisation (Marsden 2004).  
 
Second, from a supply side perspective, rising labour force participation of women, especially of 
those with high skills, increases coordination problems – for both men and women – between 
gainful labour market work and work related to care or education which money can’t (or should 
not) buy. Furthermore, higher living standards may induce to value free time for leisure or self-
productive activities higher than additional market income, leading to claims of opportunities to 
transit between various employment relationships over the life-course. 
Both kinds of reasoning lead to the expectation that labour force participation and non-standard 
employment are developing in a parallel way. This expectation would be (at least provisionally) 
falsified by significant negative correlations between non-standard employment shares and labour 
force participation rates. 
 
Aggregate non-standard employment 
Figure 55, however, shows a – albeit not very strong – positive relationship between the 
aggregate share of non-standard employment73 and activity rate in 2008 for 24 member states of 
the EU (excluded are Cyprus, Malta and Bulgaria). As the scatter plot makes clear, the 
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands rank highest both in terms of non-standard 
employment shares and labour force participation; the new member states, but surprisingly also 
Italy, rank lowest. 
Figure 55 Aggregate non-standard employment in percent of total employment and activity rate 
(2008) 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS; own calculations 
                                                        
73 Notice that we use here the shares of aggregate (part-time, fixed-term, self-employment) non-standard 
employment in total employment to avoid multi-collinearity, since non-standard employment rates are parts 











































Non-standard Employment in % of Total Employment (15-64 y)
r = 0.41
132   CHAPTER 6 
SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
The ‘causal’ interpretation of this figure would be substantiated if the change of both variables 
(the activity rate and the share of non-standard employment) would go in the same direction. 
Checking this for the change from 1998 and 2008 (not shown here), we find a positive but not 
significant sign (r = 0.16). The scatter plot, however, hints to – especially for the new member 
states – erratic movements that destroy the expected stronger correlation. It is very likely, that the 
overall relationship between non-standard employment and activity rates is “spoiled” by possibly 
opposite links between the components of “non-standard” jobs. So, a look on the differentiated 
correlations might give a clue. 
 
Part-time employment 
Figure 56 shows the relationship between the share of part-time work (as a percentage of total 
employment, on the horizontal axis) and the overall activity rate (on the vertical axis). This 
relationship turns out – not unexpectedly – to be positive again and much stronger than the 
relationship discussed in the previous section (between overall non-standard employment and the 
activity rate).  
 
Figure 56 Part-time employment in percent of total employment and activity rate (2008) 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS; own calculations 
 
However, such figures only describe a ‘static’ relationship, valid for the year 2008. It is also 
interesting to see whether a ‘dynamic’ relationship exists. Is the growth of part-time employment 
also related to the growth of economic activity? This question can be answered with the help of 
Figure 57. It compares the increase of the part-time employment shares between 1998-2008 (in 
percentage points) on the horizontal axis and the increase of the overall activity rates between 
1998-2008 (in percentage points) on the vertical axis. Figure 57 thus tells us that since 1998 the 
share of part-time workers in the Netherlands has increased by 6 percentage points while the 
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Figure 57 Change of part-time employment share and change of activity rate (differences 2008-
1998, in percentage points) 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS; own calculations 
Similarly, the share of part-time workers in Spain has increased by roughly 2.5 percentage points 
while the overall activity rate has increased by 10 percentage points. Overall it appears that the 
higher the increase in part-time employment between 1998-2008, the higher the increase in 
overall activity. Clearly, the assumption that part-time work drives labour force participation is 
thereby strongly supported by this ‘dynamic’ scatter plot. As to be expected, the correlation in the 
corresponding ‘dynamic’ scatter plot for women (not shown here) is particularly strong (r=0.64), 
but the nexus is also strong for men (r=0.43). 
 
Temporary employment 
The positive correlation between the share of temporary (or fixed-term) work and the activity 
rate, however, is rather small (Figure 58). This weak relationship indicates already that fixed-term 
work contracts play a quite different role within the various employment systems represented in 
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Figure 58 Temporary employment in percent of total employment and activity rate (2008) 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS; own calculations 
Although Poland’s overall labour force participation is low, its share of temporary work is high. 
In this country, fixed-term employment rocketed from 514 thousand (1998) to 3,207 thousand 
(2008), whereas total employment stagnated. The reason probably is the lax regulation of 
temporary work which allowed until 2003 fixed-term chain contracts without any limit. Only in 
2004, Poland introduced stricter regulation, except in the seasonal and temporary agency work 
sector. In fact, the height of fixed-term contracts was in 2007 and the number of temporary 
workers declined slightly in 2008.  
On the other hand, Denmark’s high labour force participation combined with exceptionally low 
shares of temporary work hints to an alternative to fixed-term contracts: low employment 
protection combined with high income security (through generous unemployment benefits) and 
high employment security (through active labour market policy). Thus, flexibility within the 
“standard” employment relationship might serve as a functional equivalent to external flexibility 
through fixed-term contracts, a point to which we will come later. 
 
Temporary agency work  
As fixed-term contracts obviously play a different role within the context of different 
employment regimes, it would also be interesting to look at various organisational forms of 
temporary work, especially at the role of temporary work agencies as possible mediators between 
employers’ predominant interest in flexibility and employees’ predominant interest in security. 
Professional temporary work agency firms might be able to pool the risks in a way to make both 
interests compatible or even complementary by establishing a virtuous cycle between flexibility 
and security.74 A first hint for such a potential positive role has already been provided in this 
                                                        
74 For an extensive discussion of the complex flexibility-security nexus, in which – apart from trade-offs – also 
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report, indicating a positive correlation between employment participation and voluntary 
temporary work (see Figure 45 in Chapter 5).  
 
Unfortunately, as explained at the beginning, our Eurostat database is unable to separate different 
organisational forms of temporary work. However, combining the CIETT Statistics (see Table 34 
in Chapter 5) with OECD statistics, we can look at the relationship between temporary work 
agency penetration and labour force participation rates in the Figure below.75 
 
Figure 59 Temporary agency work penetration and labour force participation for selected 
countries (2008) 
 
Source: Labour force participation (OECD Employment Outlook 2009); temporary agency work (CIETT, see 
Table 34 in Chapter 5). Labour force participation rates refer to persons aged 16-64 in UK, US, ES, SE; 
temporary work agency penetration rates refer to 2007 in DK, HU, IE, IT, PT. 
Utilizing all statistical information, it turns out – not shown here – that the correlation is positive 
but weak (r=0.13).76 However, if we skip the Nordic employment systems (DK, FI, NO, SE), in 
which temporary agency work is rather differently regulated than in continental or ‘liberal’ 
European employment systems,77 we find a stronger positive relationship between temporary 
agency work and labour force participation (r=0.41). Again with proper caution, this evidence 
                                                        
75 Temporary work agency penetration rate=average daily number of temporary agency workers full-time-
equivalent as a percentage of total employment. 
76 However, due to data restrictions, the country set differs from that used in the other tables and figures. On the 
one hand, it excludes some EU-member states; on the other hand it includes Switzerland (CH), the United 
States (US), Japan (J), and Norway (NO). 
77 Most important is, first, the late liberalization of temporary agency work; second, the dominant modus of 
collective agreements, especially in Denmark and Sweden; the upward dynamic in both countries (from a very 
low level), however, is remarkable. For more information see chapter 5.3 of this report, and Ahlberg/Bruun 
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allows the conclusion that at least some part of the higher labour force participation might be 
related to the ‘driving force’ of temporary agency work.78 
 
Self-employment 
The factor really ‘disturbing’ the expected parallel development of non-standard employment and 
labour force participation comes with the third component of ‘non-standard’ jobs, the category 
of (full-time working) self-employed. Here, the scatter plot shows a surprisingly strong negative 
correlation (Figure 60). 
 
Figure 60 Self-employment (own account workers without employees) in percent of total 
employment and activity rate (2008) 
 
Source: Eurostat LFS; own calculations 
If we distinguish between men and women (not shown here), this negative correlation is 
especially strong among women (r=-0.66). It is very likely that the share of self-employed (own 
account work without employees) is still strongly related to the importance of agriculture which is 
corroborated by the fact that this share declines in the respective countries (such as Greece, Spain 
and most of the new member states). It is probably safe to say that a ‘causal’ point for a positive 
correlation between self-employment and activity rate can only be made related to the modern 
type of own account work which is completely unrelated to agriculture and rather connected with 
the so-called creative sector. The latter informed speculation might also be the reason that own 
account work even increased in some rather ‘developed’ countries like Netherlands, Germany, 
Austria, UK and Denmark. 
 
                                                        
78 Note, that this observation does not allow a statement on the quality of related jobs. This requires looking at 
the individual level and long-term job sequences (‘careers’) related to the (potentially positive) intermediate 
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Concluding 
The speculation gets a bit more save by exploiting our possibility to differentiate between full-
time and part-time self-employment under the assumption that part-time represents more the 
modern type and full-time more the traditional type (especially related to agriculture) of own 
account work. Table 38 shows the correlations between changes in the share of non-standard 
employment components and changes in labour force participation, and provides some 
interesting insights. For example the growth of part-time open-ended employment in 1998-2008 
is closely linked to the growth of overall labour force participation, resulting in a relatively high 
correlation coefficient (0.60). This suggests that open-ended part-time employment could be an 
important driver of overall participation.79  
 
Our expectation is at least partly corroborated by the different signs between part-time and full-
time self-employment in the expected direction. There seems to be a positive relation between 
the growth of part-time self-employment and overall participation (0.27), while growth of full-
time self-employment is negatively related to participation growth (-0.25). Furthermore, the 
strong correlation between the change of the share in part-time self-employment and change of 
labour force participation for women (0.39) indicates that own account work may indeed serve as 
driver of labour force participation at least for women. 
Table 38 Correlates of the changes in the share of non-standard employment components and 
the change in labour force participation (1998-2008) 
 Total Men Women 
Part-time open-ended 0.60 0.48 0.65 
Part-time fixed-term 0.27 0.40 0.08 
Part-time self-employed 0.27 0.21 0.39 
Full-time fixed-term -0.10 -0.02 -0.15 
Full-time self-employed -0.25 -0.26 -0.03 
Source: Eurostat LFS, own calculations 
The correlation matrix reveals three further insights. First, the change in open-ended part-time 
work strongly correlates with the change in labour force participation, for the total and both for 
women and (a bit less) for men, which confirms our previous results. Second, it is interesting to 
see, that part-time work in fixed-term contracts correlates with labour force participation only for 
men in a ‘significant’ way, not for women. This pattern (tentatively) may reflect the fact that 
temporary part-time serves only for men as effective stepping stone for participating in the 
labour market. The dynamics of temporary full-time employment is not at all related to the 
dynamics of labour force participation. 
 
To summarize this part, it is evident that only the availability of part-time work can be considered 
as a strong driving force of labour force participation. This conclusion is corroborated by the 
quite strong correlation (r=0.58) between the changes of the activity rates and changes of the 
shares in part-time work from 1998 to 2008. The correlation becomes even stronger considering 
only open-ended part-time work without self-employment. Temporary work, however, and 
especially own account work play an ambiguous role that would have to be specified for the 
target groups of increasing labour force participation, especially related to women, the young and 
                                                        
79 We can only speak of a suggestion here, because obviously a correlation is by no means the same as a direct 
causal relation.  
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the elderly. There is some reason to believe that temporary agency work can support higher 
labour market activity of people who otherwise would become ‘outsiders’ (the young, long-term 
unemployed and returning women) if properly regulated and professionally organized. There is 
also some evidence that part-time self-employment drives female labour force participation. 
6.3.2 Is non-standard employment related to structural change? 
Finding a positive relationship between structural change in the economy and non-standard 
employment would further corroborate the expected parallel development of non-standard 
employment and labour force participation. The expectation would be disconfirmed if we would 
find a significant negative relationship between growing industries and non-standard 
employment.  
 
A direct preliminary test would be, again, a simple correlation with non-standard employment 
and the most dynamic growth sectors of the economy in terms of employment. As the proper 
statistical data basis for this exercise is not available, we present only scattered evidence from 
other sources. 
 
First, a special study in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008) about the sectoral composition of 
non-standard employment shows that wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, business 
services and social (especially health) services are most prone to non-standard employment; the 
least prone to non-standard employment are the declining sectors of manufacturing (apart from 
temporary agency work being heavily concentrated in this sector) and construction (in which 
temporary work agency was completely prohibited until 2003, since then only partly deregulated).  
 
Second, two shift-share analyses, again in Germany, come to the result that structural changes in 
sectoral and in gender composition of employment explain some part of the decline in standard 
employment (and, vice versa, of increasing non-standard employment). A study (covering the 
period of 1991 to 2007) finds that structural change of gender composition explains eight percent 
of the decline in standard employment; and structural change in the sectoral composition 
explains 16 percent (Sachverständigenrat 2008, p. 438). Another study, only concentrating on 
West-Germany and the period of 1985 to 2005, allocates even 27 percent of the decline in 
standard employment to structural change in the gender composition and 22 percent to structural 
change in the sectoral composition (Schäfer and Seyda, 2008). 
 
Chapter 5 of this publication provides a very informative sectoral breakdown of temporary and 
part-time employment for all EU member states and for 2007/ 2008. If we look at countries with 
both high shares of part-time work and labour force participation, a clear pattern emerges: There 
are two sectoral clusters contributing most to part-time work: first wholesale, retail & repair plus 
hotels & restaurants; second, education, health & social work plus other community, social and 
personal services.  
 
The picture related to temporary work is not as clear-cut. In most countries, temporary work is 
overrepresented (relative to the average) in ‘other community, social and personal services’; the 
same holds true – with a few exceptions (for instance the Netherlands and Poland) – in 
education, health & social work and in hotels & restaurants (exception Denmark). In countries 
with exceptional high shares in fixed-term contracts but low participation rates, temporary work 
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is typically concentrated in sectors with seasonal characteristics or other peculiar conditions. 
Spain, for instance, employs in construction 45% of the work force in temporary work, and 32% 
in agriculture. Agriculture also attracts high shares of temporary work in Germany (13%), Italy 
(35%), Slovakia (9%) and Hungary (8%). Poland’s temporary workers are also highly 
concentrated in construction (35%) and to an unusual extent in hotels & restaurants (41%); 
Poland is also exceptional in having a high share of temporary work in manufacturing (30% as 
compared to 11% for the EU-27 average).80 Temporary work (not necessarily restricted to fix-
term employment, but usually related to this contract type) does not show a clear sectoral or 
occupational pattern. It seems that this form of temporary work plays – according to the 
respective employment regime – different roles: from replacing people on (growing) leave 
schemes, thus contributing to the stability of the core work-force, to simple cost-cutting 
strategies, thus contributing to shifting employment risks to the most vulnerable workers. 
 
For an intermediate summary, it seems worthwhile to briefly reflect on the sectoral pattern of 
part-time work which we have identified as the main driver for labour force participation. Both 
sectoral clusters in which part-time work is concentrated share a low level of labour division in 
producing or providing the services and a high share of self-servicing. Most of these services – 
especially the expanding education, health and social services – are directly oriented towards 
persons, often in interactive form. Many of these services have been provided in former times by 
unpaid household work or barter exchanges in neighbourhoods. All in all, the driving force of 
part-time work seems to be grounded in the interaction of changing work preferences (especially 
among women) and transforming formerly unpaid services into market transaction 
(‘marketisation’). 
6.3.3 Institutional determinants of non-standard employment 
As elaborated in the preceding section, structural change explains – both on the supply and the 
demand side – some but even not the major part of the dynamics in non-standard employment. 
Other determinants have to be considered, especially related to target groups with low labour 
force participation like women, the elderly and low skilled people (or even more generally the 
“inactive”) .81 Obviously, institutional change – which means changes in the rules of the labour 
market game – has to be taken into consideration for further explanations. 
First of all, economic incentives through changing institutions of wage formation or tax 
treatment would have to be considered. Unjustified gender wage gap through open or statistical 
discrimination are one possible factor blocking or slowing down the rise in female labour force 
participation (Mandel/ Semyonov 2005). The same holds true if non-standard employment is 
systematically punished by lower wages per hour, which is an established fact especially related to 
fixed-term employment (Schoeman et al. 1998).  
 
Well established is the fact that equal tax treatment for married women has a strong positive effect 
on female labour force participation. Married women, especially if they work part-time, are taxed 
more heavily than men or single women in many OECD countries. Sweden is a good example 
where the transfer from joint to separate taxation in combination with other family friendly 
policies has led to higher labour force participation among women. A study for 17 OECD 
                                                        
80 An analysis of self-employment according to industries or occupations was not possible here. 
81 Fighting effectively unemployment, especially long-term unemployment, would increase employment, but not 
necessarily labour force participation since the unemployed are counted to the active labour force. 
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countries shows that women will participate more when they are being taxed separately and 
equally compared to men (Jaumotte 2003), and another study attributed to the change from tax 
allowances to non transferable tax credits of a recent Dutch tax reform a positive impact on 
female labour force participation (Bosch/ van der Klaauw 2009). 
 
Parental leave arrangements, both in terms of costs and duration, are important drivers of labour 
force participation, too. They are relatively well researched in the meantime, although the links 
between institutional arrangements and labour supply reactions can be quite complicated. Two 
main results, however, are well established. First, the availability of affordable care services is a strong 
positive driver, whereas long parental leaves combined with entitlements to return to the job 
produce ambivalent results, improving participation on the one hand but leading to wage and 
income penalties on the other hand (Esping-Andersen 2002). 
Drivers of labour force participation for elderly are also well studied (OECD 2006). Most 
important for early retirement were strong incentives by generous pension entitlements not calculated 
on an actuarial basis, a policy that most of the EU member states withdrew in the meantime. 
Some countries (for instance Germany) still have strong seniority based wages which reduce the 
transition probability into early retirement at least of the healthiest people. On the other hand, 
however, seniority wages hamper transitions of elderly unemployed back into employment, 
leading them often to escape into inactivity and on alternative transfer schemes like disability 
pensions. Comparative research also indicates that non-standard forms of employment, especially 
part-time and new self-employment in service related local jobs can help keeping the elderly 
active on the labour market (Hartlapp/ Schmid 2008). 
 
Much neglected is the low labour force participation among low-skilled people, hinting to the 
possibility that an egalitarian education policy might be one of the most effective policies to increase 
labour force participation. Taking the European Employment Strategy’s main goal of full 
employment, namely, to reach an overall employment rate of 70 percent by 2010 and an 
employment rate of at least 60 percent for women, then the breakdown by qualification 
immediately shows where the main problem lies.82 
 
Taking women as the main target group for raising labour force participation at the EU-level, 
highly skilled women already surpass the benchmark of 60 percent by 15 to 25 percentage points, 
almost regardless of the kind of welfare regime involved. It is the low-skilled women whose 
opportunities for (employment) participation in the labour market are seriously compromised.83 
Portugal, Norway and Switzerland are the exception, with employment rates of women already 
over 60 percent. At the overall EU-27 level, low-skilled women are – with an average 
employment rate of about 45 percent – 37 percentage points below the average employment rate 
for highly skilled women. The employment rate of highly skilled Dutch women, to take an example 
of a ‘progressive’ country, is relatively high and matches almost that of the Scandinavian 
countries. However the Dutch figure for low-skilled women is still far away from the Lisbon target, 
                                                        
82 I refer here to ‚employment participation’ because the skill level of the total active labour force is not as easily 
available; both figures, however, strongly correlate. 
83 The difference in employment rates between highly skilled and low-skilled people is also present among men 
but slightly less marked. I also abstract from critical qualifications with respect to the employment rate as 
proper benchmark for employment policy. Apart from the quality of jobs, working time would have to be 
taken into account, especially for women who overwhelmingly work part-time, many even in marginal jobs. 
Information on full-time equivalents would be necessary if increasing working volume (important for 
economic prosperity) is the goal. 
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although it is above the EU-27 average. Figure 61 proves this graphically; on the vertical axis is 
the employment rate for high-skilled women, while on the horizontal axis is the employment rate 
for low-skilled women. The latter shows that in nearly all the countries the participation of low-
skilled women is below 60%.  
 
Figure 61 Employment rates of women (25-64 years old) by skill level, 2008 (2006) 
 
The figure includes some Non-EU countries for the sake of comparison: (AUS = Australia, NO=Norway, 
USA=United States of America, CH=Switzerland); “low skill” (ISCED 0-2), “high skill” (ISCED 5-6). Source: 
Eurostat; AUS and USA (OECD Employment Outlook 2008, Table D, year 2006). For abbreviations of EU-
countries see Appendix 1. 
Finally, a prominent candidate for being a barrier instead of a driver for labour force participation 
is employment protection regulation. Although its influence on employment dynamics is well 
researched in the meantime, its impact is still much contested.84 As such, high employment 
protection shields the ‘insiders’ against the risk to become unemployed. The other side of the 
coin, however, is the higher risk of unemployed or inactive people (the ‘outsiders’) to remain 
unemployed or inactive. Among the ‘outsiders’, employment protection might reduce the 
employment chances especially for young people looking for their first job and for women trying 
to re-enter the labour market. Because other institutions or labour market policies might 
intervene, the available empirical evidence for the theoretical expectation of segmentation is not 
clear-cut. Employment protection can foster, for instance, cooperation among employees in the 
firm, thereby increasing productivity and competitiveness, which eventually can result in higher 
labour demand, thereby reducing or at least mitigating segmentation. Forms of non-standard 
employment, thereby, might play the role as mediators or stepping-stones to transform 
employment potentials into real and sustainable employment. 
 
However, employment protection might drive non-standard employment also for other reasons. 
Fixed-term contracts allow employers to circumvent employment protection or to combine 
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external flexibility (hire and fire) with job security for the core work force. Both possibilities lead 
to the same consequence: segmentation between ‘insiders’ (with standard contracts) and 
‘outsiders’ (with non-standard, fixed-term contracts). 
 
The theoretical relationship between employment protection and part-time work or self-
employment is more difficult to establish. Open-ended part-time work is not more flexible than 
standard employment, and it is, as we have already seen, very much supply driven and dominated 
by women. New self-employment (especially in the form of ‘dependent’ or fake self-employment) 
on the other hand, could be used for outsourcing certain functions, so that a slight positive link 
between employment protection and self-employment might be expected, especially if 
employment protection is combined with high non-wage costs related to social security financing. 
To test these expectations, we restrict ourselves again to a descriptive test by simple correlations, 
which should be complemented in further research by multivariate analyses. Table 39 present 
these correlations, between several forms of employment protection (vertically) several forms of 
non-standard employment (horizontally). 
 










Men1) Women2 Total3) Total4) Total5) 
Individual employment protection6) 0.33 0.12 -0.12 0.53 0.10 
Collective employment protection7)  0.22 0.14   0.08 0.13 0.08 
Temporary employment protection8)  0.25 0.05 - 0.16 0.46 0.17 
Combined employment protection9)  0.39 0.13 - 0.16 0.62 0.19 
Source: Eurostat; OECD 2004; own calculations 
Figures in bold ‘significant’ (N=24 member states of the EU; Bulgaria, Malta and Cyprus excluded) 
1) Men in part-time, fixed-term or own self-employment in percent of working-age men (15 to 64) (2008) 
2) Women in part-time, fixed-term or own self-employment in percent of working-age women (15 to 64) (2008) 
3) Employees in open-ended part-time (without self-employed) in percent of working-age population (15 to 64) 
(2008) 
4) Employees in fixed-term contracts in percent of working-age population (15 to 64) (2008) 
5) Employees in own self-employment (without part-timers) in percent of working-age population (15 to 64) 
(2008) 
6) Indicator composed of eight characteristics of employment protection against individual dismissals (OECD 
2004) 
7) Indicator composed of four characteristics of employment protection against mass dismissals (OECD 2004) 
8) Indicator composed of six characteristics of employment protection in case of temporary work (OECD 2004) 
9) Indicator composed of 6), 7) and 8); all four indicators represent employment protection regulation around the 
year 2003; according to OECD-Employment Outlook 2008 (p. 132) no significant changes can be reported since 
then; most changes were related to temporary work in the direction of stricter regulation. 
 
The results largely meet the expectations. Generally, high employment protection seems to 
induce high non-standard employment among men, the correlations however are not strong  
(r=0.39). The signs related to non-standard employment of women go in the right direction but 
the correlations are quite weak. Decomposing non-standard employment into the three elements 
of part-time work, fixed-term employment and self-employment confirms quite clearly that 
individual employment protection drives up fixed-term employment (r=0.53) but not part-time 
work  (r=-0.12). 
The coefficients for self-employment have the right sign, but are rather weak. Employment 
protection especially directed towards temporary work also correlates positively with the fixed-
term employment rate (r=0.46), although the causal link might be the other way round (growing 
temporary work might induce tightening regulation). Collective employment protection seems to 
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play no role in determining non-standard employment. Finally, the combined indicator of 
employment protection hints to a quite strong correlation (r=0.62) with the employment rate in 
fixed-term contracts. 
6.3.4 Preferences for non-standard employment 
It is evident that asking people themselves about their preferences should provide insights into 
the reasons for non-standard employment. This raises, however, a measurement problem. 
Preferences cannot be directly measured, since preferences are not fixed or even not inherited. 
Preferences are also expression of economic constraints and cultural influences. It remains 
therefore unclear whether responses to corresponding questions reflect genuine choices (as 
expression of autonomy or free will) or the results of external constraints and influences. 
Despite these caveats, it makes sense to take notice of such surveys since they represent the 
results of individual decisions interacting with external constraints. Thus, being aware of 
contextual conditions, changes of such preferences in time and across countries might tell a story. 
The European Labour Force Survey (ELFS) contains information about the reasons people are 
giving for being in part-time or temporary (fixed-term) work.85 In the following, however, we 
cannot exploit the whole potential of this information available and have to restrict ourselves to 
some impressions.86 
 
For part-time work (and year 2005) the following peculiarities are worth to be emphasised: A 
majority of women in Germany (57%) and UK (45%) mentioned ‘looking after children or 
incapacitated adults’ as reason for working part-time; both countries are known as having 
relatively conservative attitudes related to gender role models. This reason has little or no 
importance in countries having a reputation for progressive family and gender policy, for instance 
the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and France. Here, many women just do not want to 
work full-time (Netherlands 74%, France 57%, and Denmark 41%).87  
With the exception of Netherlands, the reason of not having found a full-time job is also 
common in these countries (France 29%, Sweden 25% and Denmark 18%). Employment in part-
time due to education or training is only substantive in Denmark (31%), although many students 
work part-time as well in the Netherlands. Finally, a remarkable share of women in Sweden 
(11%) works part-time for reasons of illness or disability. Especially for the latter two reasons, it 
would be desirable having this information broken down both by age and gender.  
For temporary work or fixed-term contracts (here referring to 2007), ‘person could not find a 
permanent job’ is the most important reason given in almost all countries. In Greece, Portugal 
and Spain, over 80 percent of temporary workers prefer a permanent job (or an open-ended 
contract). The average in the 27 EU member states is 60 percent. Countries with a vocational 
                                                        
85 Related to part-time, the possible reasons are: (1) undergoing school education or training; (2) own illness or 
disability; (3) looking after children or incapacitated adults; (4) other family or personal reason; (5) could not 
find a full-time job; (6) other reason; (7) none of these reasons applies. Related to temporary work (fixed-term), 
the possible reasons are: (1) contract covering a period of training (apprentices, trainees, research assistance, 
etc.); (2) could not find a permanent job; (3) did not want a permanent job; (4) probationary period; (5) none 
of these reasons applies. 
86 The following figures are taken from SEO (2008). 
87 The interpretation of these results is corroborated by Gash (2008). The methodological subtlety of this study 
consists in the indirect measurement of preferences by comparing transition rates (into full-time, inactivity, 
other employment) of part-time workers with corresponding transition rates of full-time workers.  By 
statistically controlling transition probabilities for socio-demographic and other factors, part-time working 
women in the UK remain longer in this status and in the same job than in Denmark or France. 
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training system in form of apprenticeship (combining ‘on’ and ‘off’ the job training) deviate from 
this pattern since apprentices per definition have a temporary contract, e.g. Germany (25%) and 
Austria (20%); combining education and temporary work is also common in Denmark and the 
Netherlands (about 35%). 
 
The pattern becomes even more pronounced if we concentrate on the age group of 15 to 24 for 
which we found already a concentration of temporary work. In Austria and Germany, over 80 
percent of young people give ‘education or training’ as the primary reason for being involved in a 
temporary contract, in Denmark 50 percent. 
Finally, in some countries, for example in Scandinavia, and especially in the UK, a substantive 
minority (about one third) doesn’t want a permanent job. One reason could be the difference in 
wages and working conditions. In Denmark, for instance, it is reported that working conditions 
and wages for professionals and specialists, e.g. in the health sector, are often better in temporary 
work agency contracts than in ‘regular’ contracts since higher employment insecurity related to 
these temporary contracts is compensated by higher wages (Ahlberg/ Bruun 2008, 41). Wages 
and working conditions in ‘everyday-labour-markets’, however, seem to be universally connected 
with less attractive wages and working conditions, independent of the employment regimes. 
6.3.5 Reasons for self-employment 
The analysis would need further differentiation according to the different components of non-
standard employment to get a full understanding of their dynamics and various functions they 
play in the modern labour market. Since the state of the art is already quite developed for part-
time work and for temporary work (including temporary agency work), we just refer here to some 
literature and turn to some additional reflections related to self-employment, especially in the 
form of own account work.88 
 
A study on the development of female self-employment on the basis of the ELFS (Strohmeyer/ 
Tonoyan 2007) reports that most of the increase in own account work from 1995 to 2005 took 
part in form of part-time work (54% compared to 15% in full-time self-employment); the same 
pattern can be seen among men. The share of part-time working women in own account work 
ranges from 11% in Greece, over 18% in France, 32% in Sweden, 38% in West-Germany to 68% 
in the Netherlands. On the basis of a Heckman-Probit estimation, the authors also found that 
“having a family with children” turned out as the most important driver for the choice of part-
time work in self-employment. This pattern is especially strong in so-called “conservative welfare 
regimes” where public care facilities are still underdeveloped, and where traditional values 
concerning labour division in the family still prevail. Unfortunately, the study is silent about the 
combination of part-time self-employment and dependent part-time work. However, the great 
share of marginal part-time in self-employment seems to imply that – as we already speculated 
looking at the corresponding correlations – such combinations are quite common. 
 
                                                        
88 For non-standard employment see Mangan (2000) and Houseman/ Osawa (2003); on part-time work Leschke 
(2008) and Sciarra et al. (2005); related to temporary work the ‘classic’ Schoeman et al. (1998); for temporary 
agency work Storrie (2002); for self-employed Arum/ Mueller (2004).  
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This informed speculation is corroborated by a recent study in Sweden (Delmar et al. 2008)89, 
which hints to a stepping-stone function of part-time self-employment. The authors find persons 
who combine own account work with wage work constitute a majority of the total number of 
self-employed. Most people enter own self-employment by engaging first in combinatory work, 
indicating that the decision to transit into self-employment is more complex than characterized in 
earlier research.  
 
Three “transitional motivations” might explain this astonishing pattern: First supplemented utility 
maximization, which means attaining psychological utility from self-employment by retaining at 
the same time economic security from dependent wage work (so to speak balancing flexibility 
and security on an individual level); second providing a hedge against the potential risk of 
unemployment; third reducing uncertainty associated with entry into self-employment or exit 
from self-employment. 91 percent of dependent employees enter self-employment as combiners, 
and only 9 percent of them start with full self-employment. Of all combiners, 68 percent go back 
into dependent wage work, and 32 end up as pure self-employed. Finally, 61 percent of the pure 
self-employed transit at one stage or the other in their life course to dependent employment, and 
39 percent transit to a combinatory status. 
6.4 Policy Debate 
Before discussing the main results, a big caveat is at place. Although a remarkable body of 
research on the consequences of non-standard employment for income, employment stability or 
social security is already available, important pieces of information are still missing.90 Proper risk 
assessment of non-standard employment would require the analysis of individuals’ long-term 
transitions sequences over the life course (careers) to uncover whether risky events end up in 
status maintaining, integrative or exclusionary transitions.91 Equally important are deeper studies 
on the functions of non-standard employment at the level of firms, especially whether they are 
mainly used as instruments of short-term cost reductions and shifting the burdens of risks to the 
non-standard employees or as instruments to improve long-term competiveness through 
diversified high quality production and enabling especially school leavers and young adults to 
accumulate work experiences and to improve their work-life balance in the ‘rush hour of live’. 
 
The first question to be raised is the consequence of non-standard employment for social 
security, especially in old age. In as far as pension entitlements are related to wage income, the 
corresponding first conclusion is to attack any wage discrimination that might be connected with 
non-standard employment contracts. As this might be self-evident for some countries, e.g. for 
Netherlands, for many EU member states it is not. Any gender wage gap obviously hurts above 
all women who are overrepresented in part-time work. Related to fixed-term employment, 
countries with no legal minimum wage are especially prone to wage discrimination. The main risk 
                                                        
89 The empirical basis of this study is unique and representative for all cases of self-employment in Sweden from 
1990 to 2002. 
90 For the most recent state of the art in the spirit of ‘transitional labour markets’ (TLM) and ‘flexicurity’ see the 
excellent volume edited by Muffels (2008). 
91 For criteria and examples of proper risk assessment (including the important element of communicating risks 
and from a TLM point of view), see Schmid (2006).  
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of (new) self-employment is the extreme volatility of the income stream over the life course, and 
many own account workers even remain at the lowest income level for a long, if not all the time. 
 
The flip side of this coin is positive wage discrimination. One example is continued salary pay in 
the critical event of illness often linked to the employment status.92 Small or medium sized 
employers are less able than large employers to reinsure this risk with the likely consequence that 
they tend to escape into fixed-term contracts in order to reduce this risk. Another and more 
important example are seniority wages, which originally served as an insurance device smoothing 
individual productivity changes over the life course. The rationale of this internal labour market 
institution diminishes with the need of higher external flexibility. As the corresponding coupling 
of pension entitlements to the last wage before retirement became unjustified, most countries 
have abolished this rule in the meantime. Nevertheless, even if pension entitlements now are 
consequently linked to average life course income, the transition to an intermediate spell of non-
standard employment (especially part-time) or to substantially lower paid jobs does not yet pay. 
Under the assumption, however, that such mobility is necessary due to better adapting to 
structural change or reduced individual earnings capacities, or even desired due to changes in 
preference over the life course, better insurance is required to offset the related risks of 
unemployment and income volatility (Kalleberg 2009, p. 16). One possibility would be to extend 
unemployment insurance towards an employment insurance that makes valuable transitions pay, 
among other through continuous vocational training accounts, life course saving systems or wage 
insurance (Schmid 2008, chapter 8). 
 
The second question relates to the financing source of social security. The rise in non-standard 
employment logically implies not to link fund raising for social security too closely to the 
standard-employment relationship. Otherwise, the employment contract becomes, indeed, more 
and more an ‘exclusionary device’ (Knegt 2007). Strategies to reconstruct the employment 
contract to an inclusionary device – which means to develop a new standard-employment 
relationship – are manifold. The respective varieties in the EU member states still require more 
systematic screening before one could start to recommend simple alternatives. Nevertheless, the 
principle alternatives are clear: extension of individual or collective private insurances, linking 
social security to citizenship status (‘basic securities’) or making public social security institutions 
– especially the employment contract – more inclusive. Many countries, for instance, have started 
to make additional private or collective insurance mandatory for employers and workers 
independent of their employment status. France, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark and 
Sweden, for instance, have reached an almost universal coverage of the employees by firm or 
branch level additional insurances. In contrast, for instance to Germany, these countries arranged 
such an extension either by law or by legally extending corresponding collective agreements. At 
the EU level, such national activities could be induced by directives, especially for own account 
workers for whom – in contrast to part-time and temporary workers – no such binding 
regulatory framework exists. 
 
Schulze Buschoff and Protsch (2008) argue on the basis of comparative studies that contributory 
financing systems with bottom down income thresholds are not suitable to cover the specific 
                                                        
92 With respect to the obligation of the employer to continue paying an ill employee’s wage in international 
comparison see Knegt/ Westerveld (2007); in the duration of this obligation (up to two years), the 
Netherlands is unprecedented in the rest of Europe.  
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risks related to non-standard employment, especially not for new self-employed. They argue for 
an extension of tax financed basic income guarantees to cover the risk of extreme income 
volatility related to self-employment and – to some extent – to fixed-term contracts. Tax financed 
basic income guarantees (‘folks’ pensions, national health insurance, earnings related benefits) 
seem better able to balance flexibility and security than contributory insurance schemes often 
based on corporate arrangements. 
Basic income guarantees, however, usually offer only limited income protection in old age, and 
they are not designed to compensate for the higher income risks related to non-standard work. 
Some countries, therefore, introduced risk contingent schemes in various forms, either through 
risk related contributions (higher premiums for higher risks, as it is common in work accident 
insurance) or through mandatory contributions to training or employability funds. France (higher 
social security contributions for temporary agency workers), Denmark and Sweden (better wages 
and working conditions for skilled temporary agency workers) and the Netherlands 
(contributions targeted to training and employability for temporary agency workers) provide here 
‘best practice’. The existence of such ‘active securities’ probably makes workers more inclined to 
take over the risks related to non-standard employment. And to the extent that such schemes 
induce an ‘entitlement effect’, they might even promote higher employment in the formal sector 
and thereby labour force participation. 
 
The third question is to what extent in-built flexibilities into open-ended employment contracts 
should be considered as functional equivalent to non-standard employment. It seems that to a 
certain degree, internal flexibility can substitute external flexibility through in-built flexibility of 
the open-ended “standard” contract, for example, working time variability over the life course or 
job rotation. Contracts that include the possibility of long-term working-time accounts are 
already one observable trend as an instrument to build in flexibility over the life course into the 
employment contract without affecting seriously income and employment security. Research, 
however shows, that the risks related to a fair implementation should not be underestimated. 
Employers, on the one hand, tend to use such accounts to overcome economic slumps like in the 
present times (2009/10), and small as well as medium sized enterprises seem to have difficulties 
to use this instrument. Furthermore, the state has to enter the game by ensuring claims to time 
accounts both in the event of insolvency of firms and workers’ transition between firms. On the 
other hand, employees often prefer cash (e.g. for working overtime) to time as an investment in 
an uncertain future. Especially tempting for them is the use of such accounts for early retirement 
instead of investing the accumulated accounts into employability measures, a behavioural feature 
that doesn’t fit with the objective of raising labour force participation.93  
 
Sweden delivers a good example for the consequences of increasing in-built flexibilities in terms 
of employment or labour force participation. The Swedes can be proud of having one of the 
highest employment rates of about 74 percent and well above the Lisbon goal. However, their 
effective employment rate – the rate of people in working age population actually working during 
the week – is only in the size of about 64 percent. Though precise statistics explaining this 
difference between ‘nominal’ and ‘effective’ employment rate does not exist, the potential factors 
explaining this discrepancy are clear. The ‘good’ reasons are: despite an open-ended contract in 
dependent fulltime work (or a standard employment relationship), many people do not work 
because they are on educational, parental or care leave. The ‘bad’ reasons are: despite an open-
                                                        
93 See, for instance, Delsen/ Smits (2009), Roman (2006), Wotschack/ Hildebrandt (2008). 
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ended contract in dependent fulltime work, many people are not working because they are ill, in 
psychological trouble or absent for undeclared reasons.94 
In as far as the discrepancy between ‘nominal’ and ‘effective’ employment rate is not only a 
universal trend but also to be recommended for enhancing flexibility and security, then the full-
employment goal of the Lisbon strategy set at 70 percent for 2010 is far too modest. In the long-
term, this benchmark probably has to be set at 80 percent, a benchmark that the Dutch and 
Swedes already established in their national employment programmes. 
 
The trend towards non-standard forms of employment, finally, raises the question whether all 
this leads to – or even whether we need – a new ‘standard employment relationship’. Expanding 
the institutional status of the employment contract to all forms of employment, including even 
unpaid but socially highly valued work as proposed for instance by Supiot (2001), seems to be the 
most radical and most promising route towards a new standard-employment relationship. The 
main aim is the move from protecting jobs to protecting people or from job security to labour 
market security (Auer 2007). The old standard employment contract would be transformed into a 
new labour contract which includes income and employment risks related to transitions between 
various employment-statuses. The core is the establishment of new social rights and (neglected in 
the much quoted Supiot-Report) new social obligations to both sides of the labour market.  
 
The new social rights would be new in that they cover subjects unfamiliar to industrial wage-earners 
on which the traditional standard employment relationship builds: rights to education and 
training, to appropriate working hours, to a family life and to occupational redeployment, 
retraining or vocational rehabilitation. Their scope would also be new since they would cover not 
only “regular” wage-earners but also the self-employed, the semi-self-employed, temporary work 
agency and marginal workers. They are new in nature because they often take the form of 
vouchers or social drawing rights, which allow workers to rely on solidarity within defined and 
perhaps collectively bargained limits when exercising their new freedom to act. 
 
The new social obligations would be new in that they cover subjects unfamiliar in the traditional 
employment relationship: obligations to training and retraining both for employees as well as for 
employers, to actively searching a new job or accepting a less well paid job, to healthy life styles 
and occupational rehabilitation, to work-place adjustments according to the capabilities of 
workers, and to changing working times according to the needs either related to the individual 
life course or to volatile market demands of goods and services. The scope of new social 
obligations would also be new since they would cover not only certain categories of workers or 
employers but also the core workers in open-ended contracts and all firms independent of size 
and function. They would be new in nature since they often take the form of ‘voice’, i.e. being 
ready to negotiate at individual, firm, regional and branch level in order to reach mutual 
agreements and to accept compromises in case of different interests. 
 
                                                        
94 Another reason for the discrepancy between ‘nominal’ and ‘effective’ employment rate could be institutional. 
Germany’s part-time scheme for ‘gradual’ retirement (now abolished) provides an extreme example. The 
scheme subsidised five years part-time, of which the first half (2 and 1/2 year) could be taken as full-time, the 
second half as zero-time. Notice again that we used self-reported part-time figures. Thus, in the German 
‘block-model’ of part-time work for elderly it might well be that the elderly ‘part-timers’ report that they work 
full-time in the first half of the scheme, but report being inactive or even not employed anymore in the 
second half of the scheme. 
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In brief: The establishment of social rights and new social obligations into an inclusive 
employment contract would ensure the development of capabilities that not only ‘make workers 
fit for the market’, but that also ‘make the market fit for the workers’ (Gazier 2007). The 
management of working time flexibility over the life course thereby is, as we have seen, probably 
the most important driver of labour force participation that meets the otherwise empty 
‘flexicurity’ ideal. 
6.5 Summary and Conclusions 
(1) The main result regarding the nexus of non-standard employment and labour force 
participation is quickly told: it is part-time work – especially in its open-ended form of dependent 
work – which drives labour force participation. This holds especially (and obviously) true for 
women but also (and less obviously) for men. The overall driving capacity of temporary work, i.e. 
the employment relationship in fixed-term contracts, so far was weak. However, it might become 
a forceful and welcome driver if good quality of jobs or stepping-stone-functions are provided, 
but it may also remain driven itself mainly by cost-cutting considerations of employers. Self-
employment is ambiguously related to labour force participation since– in the long-term – 
countervailing tendencies let expect rather stagnation than an extension of this employment 
form. 
 
(2) The second important result is a deeper understanding of the dynamics of non-standard 
employment. The standard employment relationship defined in its traditional and narrow way (as 
an open-ended and dependent full-time employment relationship) declines and ‘non-standard’ 
forms increase. For the 24 EU member states represented here, the employment rate in part-
time, fixed-term and self-employment (overlaps controlled) rose from 17.5 percent (1998) to 22.3 
percent (2008). The huge differences between the EU member states show a clear pattern: The 
‘social-democratic’ employment regimes (Netherlands included) are at the top, but non-standard 
employment rates are also high in family centred ‘conservative’ and in ‘liberal’ regimes. Apart 
from Poland (which deregulated – until recently – temporary work in an exceptional radical way), 
all East-European new member states are ‘underdeveloped’ in terms of non-standard 
employment.  
Whereas temporary work is mainly driven by cost competition and new forms of work 
organisation, the main underlying causal factors for part-time work are women’s strive for 
economic independence and the transformation of formerly unpaid family work into market 
work. Thus, globalisation, information technologies and ‘feminisation’ of the labour markets are 
the megatrends standing behind the increase of non-standard employment. Furthermore, the 
positive relationships of non-standard employment with labour force participation and GDP 
growth indicates that an increasing variety of employment relationship may well be one of the 
preconditions for a sustainable economic dynamics and prosperity.  
 
(3) The third important result relates to the differentiated role of the three components of non-
standard employment. Part-time work has clearly the strongest weight in this ‘partnership’. As it 
is (still) taken up mainly by women, this form of non-standard employment reflects above all 
restrictions in labour supply due to family obligations. And as many tasks, especially caring tasks, 
cannot or should not be transformed into market transactions, flexibility of working time will 
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further be required if gender equality and work-life balance are highly estimated. Thus, non-
marginal part-time employment in the form of open-ended part-time contracts say in the range of 
20 to 35 hours a week deserves to be counted as part of a new standard employment relationship. 
For temporary work, we observed a relatively slow upward movement, if not a stagnating trend. 
Poland is the great exception, but there are signs that the new regulation here might stop the 
rocketing upward movement in the last ten years. The study also made quite clear that temporary 
and open-ended part-time work are complementary due to their double function as recruitment 
channel for employers and as career-bridge for school leavers and young adults. Although the 
Eurostat database did not allow a distinction of different forms of temporary work, other sources 
make clear that temporary agency work (although not necessarily restricted to temporary work) 
may play an increasing role as intermediate employment form and drive labour force participation 
by mobilising long-term unemployed and inactive members of the workforce. 
 
Regarding self-employment, first attention should be drawn to the overall stagnating or even 
declining trend of this non-standard form of employment. Only a minority of the EU member 
states experienced (mostly from a low level) an increase in self-employment in the last ten years. 
This result sharply contrasts optimistic expectations of many policy makers and some researchers 
who sometimes see in self-employment a panacea for job creation or increasing labour force 
participation. However, it became also clear that this component of non-standard employment 
deserves much deeper research, all the more because the phenomenon of fake self-employment 
erodes the strict borderlines between dependent work and genuine self-employment. 
Since we were not able – at this stage of research – to skip self-employment related to agriculture, 
our data set contains probably two different kinds of own account work: a traditional type related 
especially to agriculture and partly to conventional petty bourgeois self-employment, and a 
modern type related to the ‘creative sector’ and to the new professionals in information and 
communication technologies. Whereas the traditional type is declining, thereby contributing to a 
negative relationship between self-employment and labour force participation, the modern type 
of own account work might contribute in two ways to increased labour force participation: first 
by new professional (full-time) jobs for new markets, second by offering a combination of 
‘inactivity’ (mostly activities in unpaid care work) and gainful work or by providing a stepping 
stone for inactive people, for instance for women after parental leave, or for elderly after (early) 
retirement. This assumption is partly confirmed by the weak but positive relationship of part-time 
self-employment with labour force participation especially for women. 
 
(4) The fourth grave result is the unequal distribution of non-standard employment among socio-
economic groups. This observation, although not new, is all the more relevant since the usual 
higher risks related to non-standard employment in terms of income, unemployment, social 
security in old age and partly even in terms of health are sources of new inequalities if welfare 
states are not able to adjust their institutions to this new dynamics. Low-skilled people are 
overrepresented, whereas highly skilled people are underrepresented in non-standard 
employment. The overrepresentation of low-skilled concerns especially people in fixed-term 
contracts, whereas highly skilled people are substantially represented in part-time employment 
only in a few (‘modern’) countries. Temporary work concentrates especially on school leavers and 
young adults, whereas women are strongly represented in own account work, especially in its 
growing part-time form. The other side of the coin is the extremely poor level of labour market 
participation among the low-skilled which hints to the need of substantive efforts especially in 
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education policy to overcome this deficit. As far as education is (or even should be) related to 
‘on-the-job’ training, temporary work (including temporary agency work) might provide 
important ‘midwife services’. 
 
(5) These observations were reason to ponder a bit more about the underlying causes that erode 
the traditional standard employment relationship. Looking at the distribution of non-standard 
employment by industrial branches, the assumption of a continuous transformation of unpaid 
household work into market transaction driving especially part-time work and increasing female 
labour force participation was confirmed. This process encompasses the whole economy but 
concentrates on a few and in part strongly growing sectors (business and health services). In 
addition, one can observe some common features in this process contributing to explain or 
understand the changes in the employment relationship. We find non-standard employment 
often in sectors with low depth or breath of labour division (retail trade or reparation), or in 
sectors with strong seasonal characteristics (agriculture, construction, hotel and restaurants, 
tourism), or in sectors related to personal services (education, health, care) which often require 
interaction and availability all around the clock (24 hours economy). This pattern underlies the 
likelihood that non-standard employment will further increase, but it also reminds that the 
rationale for open-ended (long-term) full-time employment contracts is still resilient. 
 
(6) Labour market institutions also play a role. Taxes and social security contributions provide 
economic incentives both for the labour demand and supply side to search for employment 
forms with the highest returns or the lowest costs. High income taxes or social security 
contributions certainly do not encourage own account work except the respective people 
circumvent those rules by choosing informal (‘black work”) or even illegal forms of employment. 
On the slip side of ‘going informal’, however, we find lack of social security in case of illness or 
old age as well as hidden forms of exploitation or even Mafia-kind employment relationships.95 
We also found a surprisingly strong negative correlation between (formal) labour force 
participation and full-time self-employment, which hints to the necessity of constructing – in 
terms of social security – a more inclusive employment relationship if one intends to stimulate 
this ‘non-standard’ form of employment for the sake of its supposedly creative and innovative 
functions. One possibility would be to subsidise social security contributions in times of low and 
volatile income, and progressive social security contributions in times of high earnings. An 
alternative would be to radically change the framework conditions for multiple forms of 
employment and frequent transitions between these forms through a more inclusive labour law 
and social security legislation. 
 
(7) Unequal taxation of male and female income favours marginal forms of part-time with high 
risks related to sustainable labour market careers and social security in old age. It also favours the 
traditional role division between men and women. The same holds true for non-targeted forms 
of wage subsidies in form of in-work-benefits, that allow combining wage and transfer income ad 
ultimo but keeping people, especially women, in low wage jobs without promotion opportunities. 
One has also to be aware that albeit "mother-friendly" policies might enable more women to 
become economically active, they also might exacerbate gender occupational inequality. 
Comparative research shows that lower earnings differentials between men and women in 
                                                        
95 The Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen (2001, chapter 11) saw in the Mafia even a functional 
equivalent to formalized structures and entitlements to social security. 
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developed welfare states with high labour force participation are probably to be attributed to 
their more egalitarian wage structures rather than to their family policies. Cross-national research 
also indicates that in contrast to extended maternal leaves, expansion of public sector 
employment and the provision of services such as subsidized day care are suitable instruments to 
increase labour force participation without doing harm to economic outcomes for women 
(Jaumotte 2003, Mandel/ Semyonov 2005). 
 
(8) High employment protection drives – as expected – fixed-term employment, especially for 
men. Fixed-term contracts allow employers to circumvent dismissal protection or to combine 
external flexibility (hire and fire) with internal security for the core labour force (employment 
protection) with respective loyalty and – may be – higher productivity. Both options lead to a 
segmentation of the labour market in so called ‘insiders’ with open-ended contracts and 
‘outsiders’ with fixed-term contracts. Employment protection regulation, therefore, would have 
to be developed in a way that both flexibility and security complement each other in a functional 
way without enhancing the inbuilt tendencies of labour market segmentation. A ‘best practice’ 
case of such a regulation is the Austrian new severance pay act (2003) based on ‘inclusive’ 
mandatory employers’ contributions according to which each dismissed worker receives a 
payment, an entitlement that can be put into a savings account even if the person has only a brief 
employment record or quits the job on his or her own. The former system required a minimum 
contribution period of three years, a rule that excluded most flexibility-enhancing workers who 
had low average employment spells. It trapped employers as well (especially small-scale ones), 
who accumulated substantial liabilities in the form of severance entitlements held by their 
employees with long periods of service (Schmid 2008, p. 293). Scattered anecdotal evidence hints 
to the potential positive role of temporary agency work in balancing flexibility and security 
through risk pooling and risk sharing (see also chapter 5 in this report). 
 
(9) Cultural factors also play a role in choosing – in as far as this choice is free at all – non-
standard employment relationship. Unfiltered responses to preference questions, but also a few 
sophisticated studies provide evidence that women of ‘conservative’ welfare regimes are still not 
very supportive to the transformation of care work into market transactions. They choose part-
time work mainly for the reason to combine unpaid family work with some additional market 
income. With respect to temporary work, the most important – and probably increasing – 
preferential reason is to combine education or continuous training and education with gainful 
work or to accumulate vocational experiences of various kinds in order to maintain or to improve 
employability. Due to their risk-pooling capacity, temporary work agencies might play an 
important role for optimal job matching and recruitment, especially for school leavers and young 
adults. In countries with high levels of fixed term contracts also for mature adults (like Spain or 
recently Poland), however, having no other choice is the main reason for temporary jobs, which 
means lack of jobs with open ended contracts. Such countries, probably, have to come to a more 
balanced regulation of ‘flexicurity’, not least for the sake of higher productivity enhanced through 
the ‘psychological contract’ fostered by open-ended contracts. 
Good studies on preferences and on the dynamics over the life course are especially missing 
related to (new) self-employment. However, we found a ‘best practice case’ of research in 
Sweden which produced in part thrilling results that probably can be transposed to other 
comparable countries. Apart from unemployment as an important driver to choose self-
employment, most people in dependent work who decide to become self-employed choose a 
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combination of dependent (part-time) employment and (part-time) self-employment to test under 
the ‘safety umbrella’ of dependent work whether own account work might become an alternative 
income source at the end. Many become fully self-employed at the end, the majority, however, 
returns to dependent work or keeps the combinatory status. Unfortunately, a conscious 
employment policy that systematically supports or encourages such trial and error processes is 
not yet in sight. Labour market policy, so far, reacted in some countries only with respect to the 
target group of unemployed for whom own account work, however, often is only an escape route 
rather than a sustainable solution. Nevertheless, as evaluation studies in the meantime show, 
employment or labour force participation can effectively be promoted by this way.96 
 
(10) Last, but not least, our results hint to a great and in many countries unexploited potential as 
functional equivalent to non-standard employment: the flexibilisation of the standard 
employment relationship. The implantation of flexible elements into the open-ended full-time 
contract can take various forms: agreements on regulated time-offs (sabbaticals) for various 
reasons such as child care, care for the frail elderly or the ills or disabled among the members of 
the family, training or educational leaves, physiological or psychological recreation. Such 
agreements provide at the same time the relative security of a formal employment relationship as 
well as the flexibility of working time according to the needs of the life course. They would also 
foster flexibility without destroying the potential of open-ended contracts for sustainable 
‘psychological contracts’ between employers and employees. 
For the other side of the employment contract, the employers or managers responsible for 
competitive production or high quality services, corresponding framework conditions have to be 
created enabling them to cope with the increasing costs and with the adjustment of the work 
organisation. However, since such a new standard employment relationship extends the 
expectation horizon for both sides, the higher costs in the first round probably will be more than 
compensated in the second round due to higher motivation, job satisfaction, loyalty, productivity 
and competitiveness. 
  
                                                        
96 For Germany, e.g., see Baumgartner/ Caliendo (2007). 
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Appendix 5.2: Differentiated non-standard employment 
rates, 2008 
 
A2.1:Non-standard employment rates in Europe according to three non-standard components, 
2008 
 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey; own calculations; yellow=part-time (including self-employed), red=fixed-
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A2.2: Part-time employed persons (including self-employed) in percent of working-age 
population (age 15 to 64) 
 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey; own calculations  
 
A2.3: Fixed-term employed persons (including part-time) in percent of working-age 
population (age 15 to 64) 
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A2.4: Self-employed persons (only full-time) in percent of working-age population (age 15 
to 64) 
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 Low Middle High 
FR 5.3 8.6 5.4 
AT 6.1 13.2 3.8 
BE 4.9 8.7 7.3 
CZ 0.9 10.3 2.2 
DE 6.2 15.4 5.6 
DK 8.7 9.2 6.6 
EE 0.9 4.2 2.0 
ES 12.7 6.3 7.3 
FI 5.2 11.2 5.4 
GR 8.5 6.3 3.6 
HU 1.7 6.0 1.5 
IE 6.1 7.7 5.6 
IT 8.1 9.2 3.8 
LT 0.9 6.5 1.7 
LU 5.3 6.3 4.9 
LV 1.7 5.0 1.4 
NL 12.3 18.0 11.9 
PL 2.8 15.8 3.4 
PT 16.5 3.5 3.4 
RO 5.2 5.5 0.2 
SE 4.8 15.0 7.8 
SL 2.8 10.4 2.6 
SK 0.5 7.4 1.3 
UK 5.8 11.3 5.3 
EU (24) 6.6 10.7 4.9 
Non-standard employed by skill level in percent of working age population (15-64 years). According to ISCED 
(1997): Low=ISCED 0-2 (pre-primary education; primary or first stage of education of basic education; lower 
secondary education or second stage of basic education); Middle=ISCED 3-4 ([upper] secondary education; 
post-secondary non tertiary education; High= 5-6 (first stage of tertiary education [not leading directly to an 
advanced research qualification]; second stage of tertiary education [leading to an advanced research 
qualification]). 





SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
Appendix A Index of figures & tables 
Tables 
Table 1  Total population in EU & OECD countries, 2008 (x1000) .............................................. 2 
Table 2  Total population non-OECD countries, 2008 (x1000) ...................................................... 3 
Table 3   Employment-population ratio’s for persons aged 15-64 ................................................... 4 
Table 4  Harmonized unemployment rates ....................................................................................... 12 
Table 5  Methods used for seeking work, (EU-27, 2009) ............................................................... 17 
Table 6   Long-term unemployment rates (% of unemployed for >12 months) ......................... 19 
Table 7  EU Autumn Forecasts 2009-2011 ....................................................................................... 22 
Table 8  Assumptions in calculations, step-by-step.......................................................................... 30 
Table 9   Calculation of the potential employment gap, EU-27 (method 1). ................................ 31 
Table 10   Calculation of the potential employment gap, EU-27 (method 2). ................................ 32 
Table 11   Calculation of the potential employment gap, EU-27 (method 3). ................................ 32 
Table 12  Impact of migration in the baseline scenario population (mln. persons) ..................... 34 
Table 13  Impact of migration in the baseline employment (mln. persons) .................................. 35 
Table 14   Calculation of the potential employment gap, EU-27 (‘no migration’ scenario, 
new). .......................................................................................................................................... 36 
Table 15  Potential employment gap 2050 in absolute and relative terms, EU27......................... 37 
Table 16  Potential employment gap 2025 in absolute and relative terms, EU27......................... 38 
Table 17  Potential employment gap 2050 with different demand & productivity 
parameters, EU27 baseline projection ................................................................................ 39 
Table 18  How far can each country get if it reaches 80% employment?....................................... 41 
Table 19  Possible solutions per country: how far beneath reference values? ............................... 46 
Table 20  Key messages from international organisations on labour market participation 
and its dimensions .................................................................................................................. 65 
Table 21  Answer to the statement “A household will suffer if the woman has a full-
time job”, percentage that (strongly) agrees ....................................................................... 76 
Table 22  Differences between defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans ........... 79 
Table 23  Selection of countries that have scored high on participation rates .............................. 87 
Table 24  Selection of drivers in practice ............................................................................................. 88 
Table 25  Increasing participation of women ...................................................................................... 90 
Table 26  Increasing participation of older workers ........................................................................... 92 
Table 27  Increasing participation of the (long term) unemployed ................................................. 93 
Table 28   Part-time employment according to OECD definition (less than 30 
hours/week) ............................................................................................................................ 96 
Table 29   Part-time employment according to Eurostat definition ................................................. 97 
Table 30  Part-time work by skill level, (% of total employment) ................................................. 102 
Table 31   Percentage of employees with a temporary contract ...................................................... 105 
Table 32  Distribution of temporary workforce, economic sector 2008 (NACE, column-
%) ............................................................................................................................................ 112 
Table 33  Distribution of temporary workforce, occupation 2008 (ISCO, column-%) ............. 112 
Table 34  Temporary agency work penetration rate, 1996-2008 .................................................... 116 
Table 35  Temporary agency workers: sex composition, 2008 ....................................................... 117 
164 APPENDIX A 
SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
Table 36  Self-employment, as % of total number of employed persons .................................... 120 
Table 37  Correlates of non-standard employment in 2008 ........................................................... 126 
Table 38  Correlates of the changes in the share of non-standard employment 
components and the change in labour force participation (1998-2008) ..................... 137 




Figure 1  Employment rates in 2009 ...................................................................................................... 5 
Figure 2   Development of employment rates, 1990-2000-2009 ........................................................ 5 
Figure 3   The gender gap in employment rates, 2009 ......................................................................... 7 
Figure 4   Development of the female employment rate, 1990-2000 and 2000-2009 .................... 7 
Figure 5   Employment rates of the elderly (age 55-64), 2009 ............................................................ 8 
Figure 6   Development of the employment rate of the elderly (age 55-64), 1990-2000-
2009 ............................................................................................................................................. 9 
Figure 7   Development of the youth employment rate (age 15-24), 1990-2000 and 2000-
2009 ........................................................................................................................................... 10 
Figure 8  Development of the youth unemployment rate (age 15-24), 1990-2000 and 
2000-2008................................................................................................................................. 10 
Figure 9   High unemployment in the nineties .................................................................................... 13 
Figure 10  Most larger EU-countries kept the average up till 2005, but not anymore .................. 14 
Figure 11  Smaller EU-countries have lower, but rapidly rising unemployment ............................ 15 
Figure 12  EU unemployment was falling since 2005 but target was never within sight .............. 15 
Figure 13  Unemployment in Eastern European countries................................................................ 16 
Figure 14  Unemployed searching through private employment agencies, 2009 (%) .................... 17 
Figure 15  Use of private employment agencies by unemployed, 1998-2008 ................................. 18 
Figure 16  Use of private employment agencies by unemployed, 1998-2008 ................................. 18 
Figure 17  Road to Lisbon employment target blocked by crisis ...................................................... 20 
Figure 18  Road to female employment target bent backwards ........................................................ 21 
Figure 19  EU27 forecasts, GDP and employment growth rates, .................................................... 21 
Figure 20  Unemployment target EU27 has never been in sight ...................................................... 23 
Figure 21  Youth, working age and elderly population, EU-27, projection 2008-2060 ................. 26 
Figure 22  Working age as % of total population, EU-27, projection 2008-2060 .......................... 26 
Figure 23  Grey rate per country in 2007 (population 65+ as % of population 15-64) ................ 27 
Figure 24  Age distribution of the EU-27 population, 2008 vs. projection 2050 ........................... 28 
Figure 25  Potential employment gap widens between 2025 and 2050 ............................................ 40 
Figure 26  Relative employment gap, by country, baseline & no migration, 2050 ......................... 42 
Figure 27  An analytical framework of employment dynamics ......................................................... 43 
Figure 28  Usual weekly working hours, for full-timers and part-timers. ........................................ 47 
Figure 29  Correlation between part-time jobs and employment participation .............................. 48 
Figure 30  Productivity, level versus growth ......................................................................................... 49 
Figure 31  Reasons for working in part-time job, women age 15-64, 2005 (in percentages) ........ 74 
Figure 32   Part-time work is a female phenomenon, 2009 ................................................................. 98 
Figure 33   Development of female part-time work, 1990-2000-2009 .............................................. 99 
Figure 34   Part-time growth strongest amongst youth (NL as clearest example) ........................... 99 
Figure 35   Part-time growth in other countries .................................................................................. 100 
 165 
SEO ECONOMISCH ONDERZOEK 
Figure 36   Working part-time is a deliberate choice .......................................................................... 101 
Figure 37  Part-time work is more prominent among low-skill workers ....................................... 103 
Figure 38  ‘Temporary work’ is not the same as ‘temporary agency work’ ................................... 104 
Figure 39   Recent growth in temporary work impressive in Poland .............................................. 106 
Figure 40  Temporary work does differ between age classes… ...................................................... 107 
Figure 41  …but less between the sexes, 2009 ................................................................................... 107 
Figure 42  Temporary work in Poland also: age matters, not sex ................................................... 108 
Figure 43  Average duration of temporary contracts, 2009 .............................................................. 109 
Figure 44  Reasons for working in a temporary job, 2008 ............................................................... 110 
Figure 45  Voluntary tempwork is correlated with higher participation, 2008 ............................. 110 
Figure 46  Temporary work, by educational level (% of total employment in category), 
2009 ......................................................................................................................................... 111 
Figure 47  Temporary agency workers: average length of assignment ........................................... 117 
Figure 48  Temporary agency workers: age distribution ................................................................... 118 
Figure 49  Temporary agency workers: educational level ................................................................. 118 
Figure 50  Temporary agency workers: sectoral distribution ........................................................... 119 
Figure 51  Aggregate non-standard employment rates in Europe, 1998 and 2008 ...................... 125 
Figure 52  Aggregate non-standard employment rates in Europe, 1998-2008, Women ............. 128 
Figure 53  Aggregate non-standard employment rates in Europe, 1998-2008, Men ................... 128 
Figure 54  Share of skill-groups in nonstandard employment compared to their shares in 
total employment in Europe 2008 (differences in percentage points) ........................ 129 
Figure 55  Aggregate non-standard employment in percent of total employment and 
activity rate (2008) ................................................................................................................ 131 
Figure 56  Part-time employment in percent of total employment and activity rate (2008) ....... 132 
Figure 57  Change of part-time employment share and change of activity rate 
(differences 2008-1998, in percentage points) ................................................................. 133 
Figure 58  Temporary employment in percent of total employment and activity rate 
(2008) ...................................................................................................................................... 134 
Figure 59  Temporary agency work penetration and labour force participation for 
selected countries (2008) ..................................................................................................... 135 
Figure 60  Self-employment (own account workers without employees) in percent of 
total employment and activity rate (2008) ........................................................................ 136 





SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
Appendix B Literature 
Anxo, Hussain & Shukur (2009), The Demand of Part-time in European Companies: A 
Multilevel Modeling Approach, Centre for Labour Market Policy Research Working 
Paper Nr 8, 2009, Växjö. 
Arrowsmith, J. (2006). Temporary agency work in an enlarged European Union. Dublin: 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
Berkhout, E.E. & M.J. van Leeuwen (2004). International Database on Employment and 
Adaptable Labour (IDEAL); Randstad Jobs Report. Amsterdam: SEO Economic 
Research. 
Berkhout, E.E. C. Dustman & P. Emmer (2007). Mind the gap! International Database on 
Employment and Adaptable Labour (IDEAL). Amsterdam: SEO Economic Research. 
Berkhout, E.E. (2008). Effects of Ageing: Potential Employment Gaps and the Possible Role of 
Migration. European Review, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 517-527. 
Berkhout, E.E., C. van Klaveren, K. Tijdens & W. Salverda (2008). Verdiepende analyse van 
loonverschillen; de loonachterstand van vrouwen verder uitgediept. SEO Economisch 
Onderzoek, SEO-rapport nr. 2008-7, Amsterdam. 
Card, Kluve & Weber (2009), Active Labour Market Policy Evaluations: A Meta-Analysis, 
Austrian Center for Labour Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State Working 
Paper No. 0902, Linz. 
Cazes, S. (2008). Flexicurity in Europe: A short note on moving forward. ILO. 
Cedefop (2008), Future Skill Needs in Europe. Medium-term Forecast. Synthesis report, 
Luxembourg, EC. 
CIETT (2009), The agency work industry around the world, Brussels. 
Cournède, B. (2006). Removing obstacles to employment for women in Ireland. OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, no. 511. 
Elhorst & Zeilstra (2007), Labour Force Participation rates at the regional and national levels of 
the European Union: An Integrated Analysis, Papers in Regional Science, Volume 86 
Number 4 November 2007. 
Elmeskov, J. (2008). Economic Projections for the US, Japan & Euro area. Press Conference, 
Paris, 13th November 2008. OECD. 
European Commission (2007). Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs 
through flexibility and security.  
European Commission (2008). Employment in Europe 2008.  
European Commission (2008). New Skills for New Jobs. Anticipating and matching labour 
markets and skills needs. Commission staff working document.  
European Commission (2009). Interim Forecast, Press conference of 19 January 2009. 
168 APPENDIX B 
SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
European Commission (2009). EU Autumn Forecasts 2009-2001, see 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/thematic_articles/article16051_en.htm. 
European Commission (2009). The 2009 Ageing report: economic and budgetary projections for 
the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060). See 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/thematic_articles/article14761_en.htm.  
Goldin & Katz (2007), The Race Between Education and Technology: The Evolution of US 
Educational Wage Differentials, 1890 to 2005, NBER Working Paper 12894, 
Cambridge. 
Graaf-Zijl, M. de (2006). Economic and social consequences of temporary employment. 
Tinbergen Institute Research Series No. 380. Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute. 
Graaf-Zijl, M. de, A.O.J. Heyma & G.J. van den Berg (2004). Stepping stones for the 
unemployed: the effect of temporary jobs on the duration until regular work. SEO 
Economic Research Discussion Paper 30. Amsterdam: SEO Economic Research.    
Heyma, A., E. Berkhout, S. van der Werff & B. Hof (2008). De economische impact van 
arbeidsmigratie uit de MOE-landen, Bulgarije en Roemenië. SEO Economisch 
Onderzoek, SEO-rapport nr. 2008-70, Amsterdam. 
Heywood & Siebert (2009), Understanding the Labour Market for Older Workers: A Survey, IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 4033, Bonn. 
Storrie, D. (2002). Temporary agency work in the European Union. Dublin: European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
 
Databases  
CIETT, several year statistics on agency work, http://www.ciett.org. 




References drivers of participation 
Cost and provision of childcare 
Addabbo, T. (2001). Labour Supply and child care in Emilia Romagna. AIEL 2001 mimeo 
Florence. 
Averett, S.L., H.E. Peters & D. Waldman (1997). Tax credits labour supply and child care. The 
review of Econometrics and Statistics, 79 (1)1, 125-135.  
Chevalier, A. & T.K. Viitanen (2002). The causality between female labour force participation 
and the availability of childcare, Applied Economic Letters, vol. 9, 915-918. 
Chiuri, M.C. (2000). Quality and Demand of Child Care and Female Labour Supply in Italy. 
Labour, 14, 97-118. 
 169 
SEO ECONOMISCH ONDERZOEK 
Choné, P., D. Le Blanc & I. Robert-Bobée (2003). Female Labour Supply and Child Care in 
France. CESifo Working Paper No. 1059. CESifo. 
Del Boca, D. (1993). Offerte di Lavoro e Politiche Pubbliche. Roma: Nuova Italia Scientifica.  
Del Boca, D. (2002a). Do Child Care Costs affect Labour Supply? Working Paper. Centre for 
Household Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD). 
Del Boca, D. (2002b). The effect of Child care and Part time Opportunities on the Participation 
and Fertility of Italian Women. Journal of population Economics 15,(3), 549-573. 
Ferrera, M. (1996). The Southern Model in Social Europe. Journal of European Social Policy, 6 (1), 
17-37. 
Fouarge, D., B. Huynen & W. Uunk (2005). Herintreding van vrouwen; regionale effecten van 
kinderopvang en economie. Tilburg: OSA publicatie A214. 
Groot, W. & H. Maassen van den Brink (1992). Arbeidsparticipatie en kinderopvang. ESB, (29) 7, 
731-734. 
Hofferth, S.L. & D.A. Wissoker (1992). Price, Quality, and Income in Child Care Choice. The 
Journal of Human Resources, 27 (1) Special Issue on Child Care (Winter, 1992), 70-111.  
Michalopoulos, C., P.K. Robins, & I. Garfinkel (1992). A Structural Model of Labour Supply and 
Child Care Demand. The Journal of Human Resources, 27 (1) Special Issue on Child Care 
(Winter, 1992), 166-203. 
Powell, L.M. (1997). The Impact of Child Care Costs on the Labour Supply of Married Mothers: 
Evidence from Canada. Canadian Journal of Economics, 30(3), 577-594.  
Powell, L.M. (1998). Part-time versus full-time work and child care costs: evidence for married 
mothers. Applied Economics, 30, 503-511. 
Ribar, D.C. (1995). A Structural Model of Child Care and the Labour Supply of Married Women. 
Journal of Labour Economics, 13 (3), 558-597.  
Wetzels, C. (2005). Supply and price of childcare and female labour force participation in the 
Netherlands. Labour, 19 (Special Issue), 171-209.  
Wrohlich, K. (2004). Child Care Costst and Mothers’ Labour Supply: An Empirical Analysis for 
Germany. Discussion Paper 412, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin).  
(Paid) parental leave 
Edin, P. & M. Gustavsson (2001). Time out of work and skill depreciation. Mimeo, Uppsala 
University. 
Gustafsson, S.S., C.M.M.P. Wetzels, J.D. Vlasbom & S. Dex (1996). Women’s labour force 
transitions in connection with childbirth: a panel data comparison between Germany, 
Sweden and Great Britain. Journal of population economics, 9, 223-246. 
Jaumotte, F. (2003). Female Labour Force Participation: Past Trends and Main Determinants in 
OECD Countries. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 376. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
Kok, L., P. Hop & H. Pott-Buter (2007). Kosten en baten van participatiebeleid. Amsterdam: 
SEO Economisch Onderzoek. 
170 APPENDIX B 
SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
Mandel, H. & M. Shalev (2006). A welfare state paradox: state interventions and women’s 
employment opportunities in 22 countries. American journal of sociology, 111, 1919-1949. 
OECD (2002a). Babies and bosses-reconcile work and family life, Volume 1: Australia, Denmark 
and the Netherlands. Paris: OECD Publications service. 
Ondrich, J., C.K. Spies, Q. Yang and G.G. Wagner (1998). The liberalization of maternity leave 
policy and the return to work after childbirth in Germany. Institute for the Study of Labour 
Discussion Paper No. 21. Bonn Germany: IZA. 
Román, A. & J. Schippers (2006). Career breaks in Belgium: how they affect labour participation 
and individual careers. Tilburg: OSA. 
Ruhm, C.J. (1998). The economic consequences of parental leave mandates: lessons from 
Europe. The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 113, Issue 1 (February), 285-317. 
Stier, H., N. Lewin-Epstein & M. Braun (2001). Welfare regimes, family-supportive policies, and 
women’s employment along the life-course. American journal of sociology, 106, 1731-1760. 
Equal tax treatment for married women 
Gustafsson, S. (1992). Separate taxation and married women’s labour supply: a comparison of 
West Germany and Sweden. Journal of Population Economics, 5, 61-85. 
Holst, K., S. Ström, G. Wagenhals & J. Östervold (1988). Female labour supply and taxes in the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1984. Department of Economics. University of Oslo. 
Memorandum no. 5. 
Jaumotte, F. (2003). Female Labour Force Participation: Past Trends and Main Determinants in 
OECD Countries. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 376. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
O’Donogue, C. & H. Sutherland (1998). Accounting for the Family: The Treatment of Marriage 
and Children in European Income Tax Systems. Innocenti Occasional Papers. 
Economic and social policy series, no. 65. 
Part-time work opportunities  
Euwals, R. (2001). Female labour supply, flexibility of working hours, and job mobility. Economic 
journal, vol. 111, Issue 471 (May), 120-143. 
Jaumotte, F. (2003). Female Labour Force Participation: Past Trends and Main Determinants in 
OECD Countries. OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 376. OECD. 
Temporary contract & agency work 
Ahituv, A & R. Lerman (2005) Job turnover, wage rates and marital stability: how are they 
related. IZA Discussion Paper 1470. Bonn: Institue for the Study of Labour. 
Albert, S. & K. Bradley (1998) Professional temporary agencies, women and professional 
discretion: Implications for organizations and management. British Journal of Management, 
vol. 9, 261-272. 
De La Rica, S. & A. Iza (2005). Career planning in Spain: Do temporary contracts delay marriage 
and motherhood? Review of Economics of the Household, forthcoming. 
Cultural attitudes 
SCP (2006). Hoe het werkt met kinderen. Moeders over kinderopvang en werk. Den Haag: SCP. 
 171 
SEO ECONOMISCH ONDERZOEK 
SCP (2008). Nederland deeltijdland. Den Haag: SCP. 
Gender discrimination 
Jaumotte, F. (2003). Female Labour Force Participation: Past Trends and Main Determinants in 
OECD Countries. OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 376. OECD. 
Berkhout, E., C. van Klaveren, K. Tijdens, W. Salverda (2008), Verdiepende analyse van 
loonverschillen; de achterstand van vrouwen verder uitgediept. SEO Report 2008-7, SEO 
Economic Research, Amsterdam. 
Raising the statutory retirement age 
Blöndal, S. & S. Scarpetta. (1997). Early retirement in OECD countries: The role of social 
security systems. OECD Economic Studies No. 29. Paris: OECD 
Create an actuarially neutral social security system 
Blöndal, S. & S. Scarpetta. (1997). Early retirement in OECD countries: The role of social 
security systems. OECD Economic Studies No. 29. Paris: OECD 
Blöndal, S. & S. Scarpetta. (1998). The retirement decision in OECD countries. Economic 
Department Working Papers No. 202. Paris: OECD. 
Duval, R. (2003). The Retirement effects of Old-Age Pension and Early Retirement Schemes in 
OECD Countries. OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 370. OECD. 
Link contributions to pension levels: moving from defined benefit towards defined 
contribution 
Friedberg, L. & A. Webb (2003). Retirement and the evolution of pension structure. NBER 
Working Paper 9999. NBER. 
Groot, I. & A. Heyma (2004). Financiële prikkels voor werknemers bij uittreding. SEO 
Economisch Onderzoek. 
Reforming early retirement schemes  
Euwals, R. D. van Vuuren & R. Wolthoff (2005). Early Retirement Behaviour in the Netherlands. 
Evidence from a Policy Reform. CPB Discussion Paper No. 52. CPB. 
Gruber, J. & D.A. Wise (2002). Social security programs and retirement around the world: micro 
estimation. NBER Working Paper No. 9407.  NBER.  
Schils, T. (2008). Early Retirement in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom: A 
Longitudinal Analysis of Individual Factors and Institutional Regimes. European 
Sociological Review Volume 24, No. 3, 315-329. 
Theeuwes, J.J.M. & M. Zijl. (2001). Arbeidsparticipatie van ouderen. Tilburg: OSA-publicatie 
A181. 
Introduce lump-sum bonuses to delay retirement   
Dalen, H.P. van & K. Henkens (2002). Early-retirement reform: can it and will it work? Ageing & 
Society 22, 209-231.  
Health 
Barnay, T. & T. Debrand (2006). Effects of Health on the Labour Force Participation of Older 
Persons in Europe. Health Economics Letter ,109. 
172 APPENDIX B 
SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
Kalwij, A. & F. Vermeulen (2005) Labour Force Participation of the Elderly in Europe: The 
Importance of Being Healthy. IZA Disussion Paper No. 1887. IZA. 
Ease of access to out-of-work benefits  
OECD. (2002). Economic Outlook, No. 72. Chapter 5, Increasing employment: The role of later 
retirement. Paris: OECD. 
Training-on-the-job 
Fouarge, D. & T. Schils (2008) Training older workers - Does it help make them work longer? 
Tilburg: OSA Publicatie A230. 
Alternative employment modes 
OECD. (2002). Economic Outlook, No. 72. Chapter 5, Increasing employment: The role of later 
retirement. Paris: OECD. 
Reintegration 
Dagevos, J., M. Gijsberts & C. van Praag (2003). Rapportage minderheden 2003. Onderwijs, arbeid en 
sociaal-culturele integratie. Den Haag: SCP. 
Kluve, J. (2006). The Effectiveness of European Active Labour Market Policy. IZA Discussion Paper No. 
2018. IZA. 
Koning, J. de, A. Gelderblom, K. Zandvliet & L. van den Boom (2005). Effectiviteit van reïntegratie. 
De stand van zaken. Literatuuronderzoek. Rotterdam: SEOR. 
Martin, J. P. (2000). What Works Among Active Labour Market Policies: Evidence From OECD Countries 
Experiences. OECD Economic Studies, No. 30, OECD Publishing. 
Van der Klauw, B., A. te Voortwis, R. de Vos & I. Willems (2008). Waarschuwingen voor 
werklozen even effectief als sancties. ESB 93(4548), 28 november 2008. 
Ochel, W. (2001). Financial incentives to work – conceptions and results in Great Britain, Ireland and 
Canada. CESifo Working Paper No. 627. 
Temporay employment 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C. (2002). Work safety in the context of temporary employment: The 
Spanisch experience. Industrial and labour Relations Review, vol. 55, no. 2, 262-285. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C. & C. Bansak (2003). The role of contingent work in the war against 
poverty. Chicago Policy Review, vol. 7, no. 1, 77-98. 
Autor, D.H. & S.N. Houseman (2002). Do temporary help jobs improve labour market outcomes? A pilot 
analysis with welfare clients. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute for Technology, Mimeo. 
Booth, A.L., M. Francesconi & J. Frank (2002). Temporary Jobs: stepping-stones or dead ends? 
The Economic Journal, vol. 112 (June), F189-F215. 
Casquel, E & A. Cunyat (2004). The dynamics of temporary jobs: Theory and some evidence for 
Spain. Mimeo.  
Chalmers, J. & G. Kalb (2001). Moving from unemployment to permanent employment: Could a 
casual job accelerate the transition? The Australian Economic Review, vol. 34, no. 4, 415-436.   
 173 
SEO ECONOMISCH ONDERZOEK 
Forrier, A., V. Heylen, T. Vandenbrande, J. Bollens & L. Sels (2004). Arbeidsloopbanen in kaart. 
Ondrzoek op de PSBH-databank. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven/Hoger Instituut voor 
de arbeid. 
Gagliarducci, S. (2005). The dynamics of repeated temporary jobs. Labour Economics, vol. 12, no. 4, 
429-448. 
Göbel, C. & E. Verhofstadt (2008). Is Temporary Employment a Stepping Stone for 
Unemployed School Leavers? ZEW Discussion Papers 08-093, ZEW - Zentrum für 
Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. 
Graaf-Zijl, M. de (2006). Economic and social consequences of temporary employment. 
Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam. 
Guell, M. & B. Petrongolo (2003). How binding are legal limits? Transitions from temporary to 
permanent work in Spain. CEPR Discussion Paper no. 3931. London: Centre for Economic 
Policy Research. 
Hagen, T. (2003). Do fixed-term contracts increase the long-term employment opportunities of 
the unemployed? ZEW Discussion Paper 03-49. Zentrum für Europäische 
Wirtschaftsforschung. 
Heyma, A. & C. van Klaveren (2008). Uitzendbaan versus direct dienstverband: vergelijking 
loopbanen CWI-cliënten. Amsterdam: SEO Economische Onderzoek. 
Ichino, A., F. Mealli & T. Nannichini (2005). Sensitivity of matching estimator to 
unconfoundedness; An applicaton to the effect of temporary work on future 
employment. Florence: European University Institute. 
Ichino, A., F. Mealli & T. Nannichini (2005). Temporary work agencies in Italy: A springboard 
toward permanenet employment? Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economica, vol. 64, no. 
1, 1-27. 
McGinnity, F. & A. Mertens (2004). Wages and wage growth of fixed-term workers in East and 
West Germany. Applied Economics Quarterly, vol. 50, no. 2, 139-163. 
Zijl, M. &  M.J. van Leeuwen (2004). Tijdelijk werk: tussenstap of springplank. Onderzoek naar 




SEO ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
Appendix C  Acronyms 
actuarially neutral social security Social security in which social security benefit is relative to the actual 
retirement age. Deciding to retire later than the statutory retirement age 
will lead to increasing  social security wealth accordingly.  
ALMP  Active Labour Market Policies; policies aiming to activate the inactive. 
benefit sanction Financial sanctions on individuals when monitoring job search behavior is 
insufficient. 
CIETT International Confederation of Temporary Work Businesses. 
CoE Council of Europe: has 47 member countries and develops European 
common and democratic principles. 
dead-end job Job position that offers no opportunity for further career improvement . 
deadweight loss  
(in relation to wage subsidies) 
Loss to society resulting from the fact that wage subsidies are not 
assigned to the target group . 
decent work Labour in conditions of freedom, equity, safety and human dignity 
(definition ILO). 
defined benefit pension Pension system in which the benefits are fixed, but contributions are 
flexible. Mostly unfunded, which means that pension risks are owned by 
the pension funds and/or their current contributors. See also ‘pay-as-you-
go system’. 
defined contribution pension Funded pension system in which the contributions are fixed and the 
benefits are flexible. The employee bears his own pension risk, as the 
benefit depends on the return on investment. 
EES European Employment Strategy: employment guidelines for EU member 
countries. 
effective retirement age Age at which an individual retires, regardless of the statutory retirement 
age. 
ELFS European Labour Force Survey. 
eligibility age Age at which an individual meets the conditions of entrance to certain 
schemes. 
employment rate Number of employed as a percentage of the ’potential labour force’. 
EPL Employment Protection Legislation. 
equal tax treatment Married women, single women and men are all taxed individually, 
meaning that all are taxed the same. Similar to separate taxation. 
EU European Union. 
family pay gap/ 
price of motherhood 
The phenomenon that woman with children earn less compared to equally 
educated and experienced woman without children. 
fixed term contract Temporary contract directly between employer & employee, with a defined 
end date.  
flexicurity An integrated labour market strategy to enhance, at the same time, job 
flexibility and income security . 
FTE Fulltime equivalent (1 FTE is usually 36-40 hours per week, depending on 
country and sector). 
GDP Gross Domestic Product. 
gender pay gap Difference in wages between men and women. 
GFSR Global Financial Stability Report: semi-annual publication from the IMF. 
grey rate Population aged 65+ as percentage of population aged 15-64. 
IDEAL International Database of Employment and Adaptable Labour. 
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ILO International Labour Organization: tripartite United Nations agency with a 
membership of 183 countries that draws up international labour standards. 
IMF International Monetary Fund: monitors the international monetary system 
and the economic and financial position of its 186 member countries. 
joint taxation Total household income is being taxed jointly, not individually. 
labour supply elasticity The degree to which labour supply is affected by a change in wages. 
LFS Labour Force Survey. 
marketisation Transformation of unpaid services into market transactions. 
modern labour relations All non-standard forms of employment. 
monitoring To closely observe and keep track of participants efforts  
(for example in ALMP). 
net migration Sum of immigration and emigration. 
net net migration Net sum of total migration from non-EU countries into the EU. 
non-standard employment employment other than full time employment  with an open-ended 
contract: part-time work, fixed-term contracts, temporary agency work and 
self-employment. 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development  
(in Dutch: OESO). 
open-ended contract Contract of unspecified duration; opposite of fixed-term contract. Equal to 
permanent contract. 
part-time trap When people (mainly women) get stuck in part-time jobs because of 
financial disincentives when wanting to work more hours . 
pay-as-you-go system Unfunded ‘defined benefit pension’ system; also called we-pay-as-you-go. 
The benefits are to be paid by the current contributors to the system 
(employers, employee and/or public finance). (In Dutch: omslagstelsel). 
penetration rate Average daily number of temporary agency workers FTE, as a percentage 
of total employment in persons.  
permanent contract Contract of unspecified duration; opposite of fixed-term contract. Equal to 
open-ended contract. 
potential employment gap Hypothetic employment gap due to a disequilibrium between future supply 
and demand of labour. 
potential labour force Working age population,  every person between 15-64 years. 
replacement rate Defines the size of social security entitlements, mostly as a percentage of 
of last earned income or average lifetime earnings. 
SCP Netherlands Institute for Social Research  
(in Dutch: Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau) 
sectoral gap The phenomenon that rising unemployment in some sectors goes together 
with vacancies in other sectors. 
separate taxation Each adult household member’s income is being taxed independently of 
one another. Similar to equal tax treatment. 
skills premium Higher wages as a reward for higher education and therefore higher 
productivity. 
social cohesion The capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, 
minimizing disparities and avoiding polarization (definition CoE). 
statutory retirement age Constitutional age of retirement. 
stepping stone effect The effect that people from the labour market margins are brought into 
permanent employment, through a gradual entry via temporary jobs. 
subsidized job Artificially created job for disadvantageous job searchers. 
substitution effect  
(in relation to wage subsidies) 
The phenomenon that people  who are helped by the wage subsidy are 
only helped at the expense of someone else. 
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temporary agency work When the employee is working for a temporary working agency, but 
assigned to a user company. Mostly on a fixed-term base. Not similar to 
temporary work. 
temporary work Used by Eurostat and many other official statistics: includes temporary 
agency work but mainly  fixed-term contracts.  
tempworkers Those categorized by the definition of temporary work  
training programs Programs aiming to enhance the productivity  and employability of 
participants, by learning new skills. 
wage subsidies Subsidies to encourage employers to hire new workers or to keep workers 
instead of laying them off. 
WEO World Economic Outlook: semi-annual publication of the IMF.  
 
 
